WSR 16-05-032
PERMANENT RULES
UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION
COMMISSION
[Docket TR-151079, General Order R-584—Filed February 9, 2016, 11:03 a.m., effective March 11, 2016]
In the matter of amending and adopting rules in chapter 480-62 WAC, relating to rail safety.
1 STATUTORY OR OTHER AUTHORITY: The Washington utilities and transportation commission (commission) takes this action under Notice No. WSR 15-22-105, filed with the code reviser on November 4, 2015. The commission has authority to take this action pursuant to RCW 80.01.040, 80.04.160, 81.24.010, 81.53.010, 81.53.240, and chapter 81.44 RCW.
2 STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE: This proceeding complies with the Administrative Procedure Act (chapter 34.05 RCW), the State Register Act (chapter 34.08 RCW), the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 (chapter 43.21C RCW), and the Regulatory Fairness Act (chapter 19.85 RCW).
3 DATE OF ADOPTION: The commission adopts this rule on the date this order is entered.
4 CONCISE STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND EFFECT OF THE RULE: RCW 34.05.325(6) requires the commission to prepare and publish a concise explanatory statement about an adopted rule. The statement must identify the commission's reasons for adopting the rule, describe the differences between the version of the proposed rules published in the register and the rules adopted (other than editing changes), summarize the comments received regarding the proposed rule changes, and state the commission's responses to the comments reflecting the commission's consideration of them.
5 To avoid unnecessary duplication in the record of this docket, the commission designates the discussion in this order, including appendices, as its concise explanatory statement. This order provides a complete but concise explanation of the agency's actions and its reasons for taking those actions.
6 REFERENCE TO AFFECTED RULES: This order amends and adopts the following sections of the Washington Administrative Code: Amending WAC 480-62-130 Application of this chapter and 480-62-300 Annual reports—Regulatory fees; and adopting WAC 480-62-260 First-class cities opt-in and 480-62-270 Safety standards at private crossings.
7 PREPROPOSAL STATEMENT OF INQUIRY AND ACTIONS THEREUNDER: The commission filed a preproposal statement of inquiry (CR-101) on May 20, 2015, at WSR 15-11-092. The statement advised interested persons that the commission was considering a rule making to implement provisions of ESHB 1449, passed and signed into law in the 2015 legislative session, including a provision that adopts a requirement that railroads hauling crude oil must report information about their financial responsibility in the annual reports they submit to the commission. The commission also informed persons of this inquiry by providing notice of the subject and the CR-101 to everyone on the commission's list of persons requesting such information pursuant to RCW 34.05.320(3), and by sending notice to all railroad companies operating in the state and the commission's list of transportation attorneys. The commission posted the relevant rule-making information on its web site at www.utc.wa.gov/151079. Pursuant to the notice, the commission received written comments on June 22, 2015, and convened a workshop for interested stakeholders on July 8, 2015.
8 On August 21, 2015, the commission issued a notice soliciting written comments from stakeholders on draft rules by September 21, 2015, and notice of second workshop on October 1, 2015.
9 On September 28, 2015, the commission issued a notice cancelling the October 1, 2015, workshop.
10 NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULE MAKING: The commission filed a notice of proposed rule making (CR-102) on November 4, 2016, at WSR 15-22-105. The commission scheduled this matter for oral comment and adoption under that notice at 1:30 p.m., Wednesday, January 6, 2016, in the Commission's Hearing Room, Second Floor, Richard Hemstad Building, 1300 South Evergreen Park Drive S.W., Olympia, WA. The notice provided interested persons the opportunity to submit written comments to the commission by December 7, 2015.
11 CONTINUED NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULE MAKING: The commission filed a continuance of the notice of proposed rule making (CR-102) on December 29, 2015, at WSR 16-02-020. The commission rescheduled this matter for oral comment and adoption under Notice No. WSR 15-22-105 at 2:00 p.m., Thursday, January 7, 2016, in the Commission's Hearing Room, Second Floor, Richard Hemstad Building, 1300 South Evergreen Park Drive S.W., Olympia, WA.
12 WRITTEN COMMENTS: The commission received written comments in response to the WSR 15-22-105 notice from Jean M. Avery, Washington Department of Ecology (ecology), Columbia Riverkeeper, Friends of the Columbia Gorge, ForestEthics, Sierra Club Washington Chapter, The Lands Council, Washington Environmental Council, and Washington Physicians for Social Responsibility, BNSF Railway Company (BNSF), Union Pacific Railroad Company (UPRR), Fred Millar, and Senator Christine Rolfes. Summaries of all written comments and commission's responses are contained in Appendix A, shown below, and made part of this order.
13 RULE-MAKING HEARING: The commission considered the proposed rules for adoption at a rule-making hearing on January 7, 2016, before Chairman David W. Danner, Commissioner Philip B. Jones, and Commissioner Ann E. Rendahl. The commission heard comments at the hearing from Pat Dickason, Daniel McCabe, Robert Mack, Janet Lind, Sally Jacky, Matt Petryni, Alex Ramel, Matt Krogh, Don Steinke, Laura Ackerman and Hector Gruncaum.
14 SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE THAT ARE REJECTED/ACCEPTED: The commission proposed rules to cover three areas: (1) Establish minimum safety signage requirements at private crossings along oil train routes and commission inspection of those crossings; (2) permit first-class cities to opt into the commission's grade crossing inspection program should they choose to do so; and (3) require railroad companies to submit information to the commission concerning a company's ability to pay to cleanup a reasonable worst case spill resulting from the railroad's transportation of crude oil in Washington.
15 Written and oral comments suggested changes to the proposed rules. The commission received comments from Ms. Avery, UPRR, and the City of Tacoma concerning WAC 480-62-270, the proposed rule establishing safety standards at public crossings. The remaining comments concerned the language in the proposed rule establishing the reporting requirements for railroad company financial responsibility. The suggested changes and the commission's reason for rejecting the suggested changes are included in Appendix A. The commission also provides the following additional explanation for adopting the proposed rule that implements the statutory requirement that railroad companies report on their ability to pay the clean-up costs of a reasonable worst case spill.
16 The commission "possesses only those powers granted by statute."1 The legislature has directed the commission to require railroad companies to include in the annual reports they file with the commission "a statement of whether the railroad has the ability to pay for damages resulting from a reasonable worst case spill of oil, as calculated by multiplying the reasonable per barrel cleanup and damage cost of spilled oil times the reasonable worst case spill volume as measured in barrels."2 This is strictly a reporting requirement. The statute expressly prohibits the commission from using the information in this statement as a basis for penalizing the company,3 assigning liability to the company, or establishing liquidated damages for a spill or accident.4
1 E.g., In re Electric Lightwave, Inc., 123 Wn.2d 530, 536, 869 P.2d 1045 (1994).
2 RCW 81.04.560(1).
3 RCW 81.04.560(3).
4 RCW 81.04.560(4).
17 Our charge, then, is to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent.5 The rules of statutory construction require that we discern the plain meaning of the statute by looking to "the ordinary meaning of the language at issue, the context of the statute in which the provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole."6 The statute obligates railroad companies to report their ability to pay the "cleanup and damage cost of spilled oil" resulting from a "reasonable worst case spill." The legislature, however, did not define those terms.
5 E.g., Department of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002).
6 Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Ass'n, 169 Wn.2d 516, 526, 243 P.2d 1283 (2010) (quoting State v. Engel, 166 Wn.2d 572, 578, 210 P.3d 1007 (2009)).
18 The commission received many comments on the meaning of "reasonable worst case spill" and "cleanup and damage cost of spilled oil." Railroad companies contend that the rule the commission has proposed is flawed and that the legislature's reporting requirement is preempted by federal law.7 Other commenters maintain that the proposed rule underestimates both the potential for the amount of oil that will be spilled as a result of rail accidents and the damages associated with such spills.8 Given the lack of consensus on the plain meaning of "reasonable worst case spill" and "clean up and damage cost of spilled oil," we apply the rules of statutory construction to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent when it used those terms.
7 See Comments of Melissa B. Hagen, UPRR ("These requirements are preempted by federal law, compromise the integrity of Union Pacific's confidential business records and are blatantly discriminatory on their face.")
8 Comments of Columbia Riverkeeper, et al. ("Assuming that a worst case scenario event were to be a result of a 100% spill of a typical 3,000,000 gallon oil train, that $6.3 billion comes to $2100 per gallon.")
Reasonable Worst Case Spill
19 We find it helpful to begin our analysis with some context. The genesis of the financial responsibility obligation in the statute and the legislature's use of the term "reasonable worst case spill" is the oil transportation study (study) led by ecology at the direction of the 2014 legislature.9 The governor tasked ecology with analyzing oil transportation by ship and rail and developing recommendations to enhance safety and environmental stewardship.10 The study recommendations include extending ecology's certification of financial responsibility program11 to railroads, requiring railroads to demonstrate a financial ability to pay for costs and damages of an oil spill into Washington waters. The governor incorporated this recommendation into the original draft of HB 1449, the legislation he requested based on the findings and recommendations in the study. The legislature amended this provision to require only that railroads submit this information as part of their annual reports to the commission. The legislature also required that railroad companies report only on their ability to pay for a "reasonable worst case spill."
9 https://fortress.wa.gov/ecy/publications/SummaryPages/1508010.html.
10 http://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/directive/dir_14-06.pdf.
11 RCW 88.40.020.
20 In this context we examine the language of the phrase "reasonable worst case spill." Merriam-Webster defines a "worst case" as one "involving, projecting, or providing for the worst possible circumstances or outcome of a given situation."12 The legislature has defined "worst case spill" in the context of vessel oil spill prevention and response as "the largest foreseeable spill in adverse weather conditions."13 The statute at issue here, however, adds the word "reasonable" to modify "worst case spill." "Reasonable" is a common term in the law and is generally defined as "fair, proper, just, moderate, suitable under the circumstances" and "[n]ot immoderate or excessive."14 Similarly, Merriam-Webster defines "reasonable" as "not extreme or excessive."15 The term "reasonable worst case spill" thus is ambiguous because of the inherent conflict that arises from modifying an extreme - worst case - with an adjective that means "not extreme."
12 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/worst%E2%80%93case.
13 RCW 88.46.010(30). In implementing this definition, ecology requires an Aframax tanker holding thirty-three million gallons of oil to have a certificate of financial responsibility of $1 billion. An articulated tug barge holding nine million gallons of oil has the same requirement. http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/docs/project_reports/CofrMatrix2.pdf. Under the rule we adopt today, a unit train holding approximately three million gallons of oil at a speed greater than forty mph would need to report a financial responsibility of approximately $650 million.
14 Black's Law Dictionary 1138 (5th Ed. 1979).
15 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reasonable.
21 We nevertheless must give effect to all of the language in the statute.16 We resolve the inherent conflict between "reasonable" and "worst" by interpreting "reasonable worst case spill" to mean a foreseeable oil spill that, while not as devastating as the worst possible incident, is nevertheless of high consequence and would have a significant impact on the citizens of this state.
16 Lake, 169 Wn.2d at 526.
22 To give practical meaning to that definition, we look to the federal agencies charged with regulating railroads, the Pipeline Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). Those agencies engaged in a rule making to establish enhanced tank car safety standards. That proceeding resulted in the most complete and exhaustive regulatory analysis available to examine all factors associated with the enhanced tank car rule.17 PHMSA and the FRA developed the rule by calculating the results of "high consequence events," which "would cause greater environmental damages than a typical derailment."18 PHMSA then applied data from the incident in Lac Mégantic, Quebec, the most catastrophic crude oil car derailment in North America,19 which PHMSA scaled down to approximate the results of a high consequence event.
17 Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082 (HM-251), Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for High-Hazard Flammable Trains.
18 Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082, at 52.
19 See Railway Investigation Report R13D0054 ("As a result of the derailment and the ensuing fires and explosions, forty-seven people died, and about two thousand people were evacuated. Forty buildings and fifty-three vehicles were destroyed. The derailed tank cars contained about 6.7 million litres of petroleum crude oil, about six million litres of which were released, contaminating approximately thirty-one hectares of land. An estimated one hundred thousand litres of crude oil ended up in Mégantic Lake and the Chaudière River.")
23 We find that PHMSA's approach to determining "high consequence events" is reasonable. The commission, therefore, has quantified a "reasonable worst case spill" based on PHMSA's scaled down approach.20 As part of that approach, PHMSA calculated that the likelihood of high consequence events varies directly with the square of the train's speed - the faster a train is traveling, the higher the percentage of tank cars that are likely to derail and spill the oil they are carrying.21 That determination is based on the assumption that all loaded unit trains are of equal mass and that the kinetic energy (i.e., energy associated with motion) generated by a unit train in motion will be a key factor in predicting the number of cars in a possible derailment,22 as well as the potential release of oil23 and extent of the damage24 from oil to those cars and surrounding area. Accordingly, our rule requires each railroad company to calculate the amount of oil involved in a reasonable worst case spill through a formula that takes a percentage of the unit train, based on the highest operating speed of the train when moving oil, and multiplies that percentage by the company's largest train load of crude oil, measured in barrels, moved in the previous calendar year.25
20 Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082, at 101.
21 Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082, at 52.
22 FRA Emergency Order No. 30, Notice No. 1.
23 Xiang Liu, Mohd Rapik Saat, Christopher P. L. Barkan, Probability analysis of multiple-tank-car release incidents in railway hazardous materials transportation, Journal of Hazardous Materials 276 (2014) ("Train speed has a two-fold effect on the number of tank cars releasing. First, on average, lower speed derailments result in fewer cars derailed. Second, as already discussed, lower derailment speed results in a lower release probability of a derailed tank car compares the distribution of tank car releases by derailment speed.")
24 DOE/DOT Tight Crude Oil Flammability and Transportation Spill Safety Project, at 14 (March 2015).
25 For example, a railroad company that transports oil would have to report both the company's largest load of crude oil by tank car and its maximum operating speed. The calculation of potential oil spilled would result from (a) dividing the maximum operating speed by sixty-five mph (the speed of the train in the Lac Mégantic accident); (b) squaring the results of the maximum operating speed divided by sixty-five; and (c) multiplying the squared amount by the number of tank cars in the largest unit train moved by the railroad in the previous year. The result of this calculation will determine the likely amount of oil spilled in a "reasonable worst case" spill involving rail transporters.
24 Railroad industry commenters in this rule making contend that PHMSA's approach is overstated and inapplicable. They propose that the commission determine a reasonable worst case spill based on the most probable number of tank cars derailed or on an historical analysis of the average number of tank cars that have derailed. We reject that proposal. Had the legislature intended that the commission determine "the most probable" or "historic average" oil spill, the statute would have used those terms. Instead, the legislature used the term "reasonable worst case spill" - a term not limited to historical averages or upon probability derivatives based upon this history. The commission must give meaning to the statutory language, and we reject the railroads' proposal as being inconsistent with that language. PHMSA's approach, although developed in a different context, provides an appropriate methodology for defining a "reasonable worst case spill."
25 Other commenters urge the commission to recognize that far worse oil spills are more likely than the "high consequence events" that PHMSA has calculated. They recommend that we use the events in Lac Mégantic as the basis for calculating a reasonable worst case spill. Again, we decline that recommendation. We certainly are aware that Lac Mégantic was the worst oil by rail spill in North America, and that even more disastrous spills are conceivable. The legislature, however, did not authorize the commission to gather information on railroad companies' ability to pay the costs of a worst case spill. Rather, we may only determine what constitutes a reasonable worst case spill, and the PHMSA approach comports with that legislative direction.
Cleanup and Damage Cost of Spilled Oil
26 Just as the legislature limited the commission to assessing what constitutes a "reasonable worst case spill," we must determine the "cleanup and damage cost of spilled oil." The plain meaning of this phrase is that the commission must consider costs associated with cleaning up the spilled oil and compensating for the damage caused by that oil. The damage, however, must result from "spilled oil." As we explain below, we do not interpret that term to include personal injury, property damage, and other liabilities resulting from a fire or explosion, rather than from the spill itself.
27 As part of the commission's analysis, we looked at numerous sources to determine the reasonable cost of cleaning up spilled oil and the range of compensation for damages caused by such a spill. These sources included, but were not limited to, ecology's contingency plan rule making,26 California Contingency Plan Rulemaking,27 and railroad derailment data and clean-up costs.28 The commission also reviewed and considered stakeholder comments, and we ultimately concluded that the data compiled by the federal government as part of its enhanced tank car rule making was the most reliable and therefore reasonable.
26 Final Cost-Benefit Analysis for Oil Spill Contingency Planning, Oil Spill Contingency Plan Rules, Pub. No. 06-08-020.
27 14 CCR § 817.04 § 817.04. Inland Facilities.
28 Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082, at 87.
28 The literature on the subjects of clean-up costs and damage assessments identified in the PHMSA and FRA proceeding was both comprehensive and well-analyzed. It found that the weighted average of the cost estimates per gallon of spilled crude oil, including marine, pipeline, and rail spills, is $407 to $415.29 PHMSA's final regulatory impact analysis for the federal enhanced tank car rule estimated that costs for crude oil cleanup for rail carriers was $200 per gallon, but "the review found that damages could be as high as twice that amount for crude oil spills."30 In addition, a 1999 study estimated a cost of $326 per gallon for cleanup alone,31 and a 2012 study showed a clean-up cost of $378.34 for crude oil by rail.32 PHMSA recognized that it is unlikely that any of these estimates capture the comprehensive societal damages that result from these incidents.33
29 Id. at 115.
30 Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082, at 86.
31 Etkin, D.S. "Estimating Clean-up Costs for Oil Spills," Proceedings, International Oil Spill Conference, 1999.
32 Marruffo, Amanda, Hongkyu Yoon, David J. Schaeffer, Christopher P. L. Barkan, Mohd Rapik Saat, and Charles J. Werth. "NAPL Source Zone Depletion Model and Its Application to Railroad-Tank-Car Spills." Groundwater 50, no. 4 (2012): 627-32. This model is used to predict the relative impact of crude oil or ethanol released from railroad-tank car accidents on soil and groundwater contamination and cleanup times.
33 Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082, at 115.
29 The commission finds that the weight of the available evidence supports a minimum estimate of "cleanup and damage cost of spilled oil" of $400 per gallon or $16,800 per barrel. Accordingly, the rule we adopt requires railroad companies to demonstrate their ability to pay the costs to cleanup a reasonable worst case spill of oil, calculated as $16,800 per barrel multiplied by the percentage of barrels in the largest train load of crude oil likely to be spilled.34 While this assessment has been criticized by several stakeholders, none of them offered specific reasonable alternatives to the PHMSA analysis.35
34 For more detailed discussion of this issue, see staff's January 7, 2016, memorandum concerning rail safety rule making related to ESHB 1449, Docket TR-151079 Oil train safety rule making, available on the commission's web site in this docket.
35 See, e.g., comments of BNSF ("The definition of reasonable worst case in the CR-101 and CR-102 are flawed. The formula focuses on one aspect of rail safety - speed. There are numerous other factors that may influence the potential of a rail car carrying crude oil to derail and spill."); comments of Columbia Riverkeeper, et al. ("Worst case planning should include all risk categories."); comments of Fred Millar ("The Commission's cleanup cost calculations are dubious. The commission process for calculating fees does not properly weight safety.").
30 Several commenters contend that these costs are far too low. They point to the billions of dollars in loss resulting from the Lac Mégantic incident and to the enormous devastation and resulting costs that would result from a spill in any of the state's waterways that trains carrying oil parallel or cross. As PHSMA observed, however, an event like Lac Mégantic "would not be representative of damages from a typical accident or even a high consequence accident."36 We agree with PHMSA on this point. As discussed above, promulgating a rule based on the incident in Lac Mégantic would exceed the commission's authority under RCW 81.04.560. The legislature did not establish a specific benchmark for the commission to determine the magnitude of oil spills and scope of damages. Accordingly, we must employ our expertise and discretion to make those determinations, and we conclude that our rule reasonably does so based on the information available.
36 Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082, at 87.
31 We recognize that even cleanup and damage costs of spilled oil likely would be much higher if a spill occurs in areas close to the Columbia River, Puget Sound, the Spokane River and tributaries, or any of the other environmentally sensitive areas in Washington. At the same time, however, we must have a sound and credible factual basis for any cost estimates we establish. If more evidence becomes available, especially from the relevant federal authorities such as PHMSA or FRA, we may revisit this issue in the future. For now, we believe the studies and data we cite above persuasively provide a solid foundation for the analysis and cost estimates underlying the rule we adopt today.
32 Finally, we emphasize that RCW 81.04.560 authorizes the commission only to obtain information, none of which may be used as the basis of enforcement action against the railroad companies providing it. We construe this authorization and limitation as reflecting the legislative purpose to obtain data on the hazards and financial consequences of oil train operations in Washington. We therefore seek to maximize the information the railroads make publicly available about those operations. The rule we adopt obligates the railroads to inform the commission of the largest amount of oil they transport on a train, the maximum speed of that train, and whether the company has the financial ability to pay to cleanup a reasonable worst case spill resulting from a derailment or other accident involving that train. Such information provides the commission and the public with a clearer picture of the possible perils presented by the transportation of oil by rail in Washington.
33 The recommendations the railroads and other commenters have made, on the other hand, would result in the railroads reporting less or no information about oil trains in Washington. Both sets of proposals rely on data from occurrences outside this state - an historic national average of oil train cars derailed (as proposed by the railroads) or the incident in Lac Mégantic (as others would have us use) - which would provide no real insights into what a reasonable worst case spill would look like in Washington.
34 Indeed, imposing a reporting requirement based on an incident of the magnitude of that in Lac Mégantic - or an even worse spill - would be particularly problematic in this respect. The railroad involved in the Quebec incident was unable to pay for the damage and declared bankruptcy, forcing the provincial and Canadian federal governments to fund the cleanup and damage reparations.37 Assuming a railroad company in Washington similarly did not have the financial resources to cover the billions of dollars in damages from such an incident, we expect that the company would report nothing more than a single statement to that effect. The commission would then be left with virtually no information about oil by rail operations in this state or the extent of the companies' ability to pay oil spill clean-up costs. We decline to take that path. Rather, we adopt a rule that gives full effect to the intent and purpose of RCW 81.04.560, and which will provide the commission and the public with more useful information.
37 Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082, at 23.
35 COMMISSION ACTION: After considering all of the information regarding this proposal, the commission finds and concludes that it should amend and adopt the rules as proposed in the CR-102 at WSR 15-22-105.
36 STATEMENT OF ACTION; STATEMENT OF EFFECTIVE DATE: After reviewing the entire record, the commission determines that chapter 480-62 WAC should be amended and adopted to read as set forth in Appendix B, as rules of the Washington utilities and transportation commission, to take effect pursuant to RCW 34.05.380(2) on the thirty-first day after filing with the code reviser.
Number of Sections Adopted in Order to Comply with Federal Statute: New 0, Amended 0, Repealed 0; Federal Rules or Standards: New 0, Amended 0, Repealed 0; or Recently Enacted State Statutes: New 2, Amended 2, Repealed 0.
Number of Sections Adopted at Request of a Nongovernmental Entity: New 0, Amended 0, Repealed 0.
Number of Sections Adopted on the Agency's Own Initiative: New 0, Amended 0, Repealed 0.
Number of Sections Adopted in Order to Clarify, Streamline, or Reform Agency Procedures: New 0, Amended 0, Repealed 0.
Number of Sections Adopted Using Negotiated Rule Making: New 0, Amended 0, Repealed 0; Pilot Rule Making: New 0, Amended 0, Repealed 0; or Other Alternative Rule Making: New 0, Amended 0, Repealed 0.
ORDER
37 THE COMMISSION ORDERS:
38 The commission amends WAC 480-62-130 and 480-62-300, and adopts WAC 480-62-260 and 480-62-270 to read as set forth in Appendix B, as rules of the Washington utilities and transportation commission, to take effect on the thirty-first day after the date of filing with the code reviser pursuant to RCW 34.05.380(2).
39 This order and the rule set out below, after being recorded in the order register of the Washington utilities and transportation commission, shall be forwarded to the code reviser for filing pursuant to chapters 80.01 and 34.05 RCW and 1-21 WAC.
DATED at Olympia, Washington, February 9, 2016.
Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission
David W. Danner, Chairman
Philip B. Jones, Commissioner
Ann E. Rendahl, Commissioner
Appendix A
(Comment Summary Matrix)
Synopsis: The oil train safety rule making before the commission is one part of a larger effort to enhance safety around crude oil trains and mitigate, to the extent possible, risks posed by the transportation of oil by rail in the state of Washington. The commission participated in the oil transportation study (study)1, led by ecology at the direction of the 2014 legislature. The study was further tasked by the governor2 with analyzing oil transportation in regards to marine and rail along with developing recommendations to enhance safety and environmental stewardship. As a result of the study, the governor requested legislation on oil movements by marine and rail. The recommendations that the commission and ecology submitted during the study were drafted into the governor's legislation (HB [ESHB] 1449). The passage of HB [ESHB] 1449 gave the commission regulatory authority over a few key areas (private shipper property, private crossings, first class city opt-in and financial responsibility reporting) along with increasing the regulatory fee paid by the railroad industry to provide more commission railroad inspectors.
1 https://fortress.wa.gov/ecy/publications/SummaryPages/1508010.html.
2 http://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/directive/dir_14-06.pdf.
This rule making is necessary to implement ESHB 1449, as signed into law on May 14, 2015.
Commission Provisions in ESHB 1449:
Private Shipper Property (not part of the rule making): Before the passage of ESHB 1449, commission employees needed an escort from FRA to enter private shipper property to conduct hazardous materials inspections. This requirement created delays in inspections and inefficient scheduling. After the passage of ESHB 1449, commission employees that are FRA-certified inspectors are able to go onto shippers property, with prior notice, to inspect any rail cars, review documents (generally located near the rail cars) and observe any loading or unloading of hazardous materials. The inspector then forwards notice of any defects to FRA for enforcement. Since 2010 there have been approximately one hundred thirty-four safety defects discovered during these inspections.
Private Crossings Along Oil Routes: Before the passage of EHB [ESHB] 1449, neither the state nor federal government had authority over private crossings. This provision allows the commission to adopt minimum safety language at private crossings along oil routes and gives the commission authority to inspect the crossings. There are approximately three thousand private crossings in the state of Washington, with three hundred fifty along the oil routes.
Increase in Regulatory Fee: The commission rail program is funded by fees paid for by the railroad industry. The current fee on railroads is 1.5 percent of the gross annual intrastate operating revenues. Existing fees do not apply to oil, since oil is considered an interstate activity. ESHB 1449 allows for an increase in the regulatory fee, up to 2.5 percent, for railroads that haul crude oil. The increase in regulatory fees allows the commission to hire additional inspectors in the areas of track, hazardous materials, motive power and equipment, signal and train control and operating practices.
First Class City Opt-In: First-class cities are exempt from the commission's railroad safety jurisdiction. However, the influx of hazardous materials and train traffic has overwhelmed the resources of some first-class cities. This provision allows first-class cities to opt-in to the commission's grade crossing inspection program. There is also a requirement that first-class cities inform the commission when crossings are opened or closed.
Financial Responsibility Reporting: ESHB 1449 requires each railroad company to provide information on the company's ability to pay for a reasonable worst case spill in its annual report to the commission. The commission is prohibited from using the information in the reports as a basis for developing economic regulations or issuing penalties against railroad companies.3
3 Financial responsibility is explained in greater detail in the justification section of the memo.
Background: There have been significant changes in the transportation of crude oil in the state. Historically, ninety percent of crude oil used by Washington refineries was delivered by tank ship. However, in 2014, pipeline and rail delivery accounted for approximately thirty percent of the oil imported. In addition to the increase in oil being imported via rail, there is a concern surrounding the volatility of some of the types of oil, like Bakken crude.4
4 https://fortress.wa.gov/ecy/publications/SummaryPages/1508010.html.
Concerns regarding oil transportation led the legislature to authorize the oil transportation study in April 2014. The objective of the study was to analyze the risks to public health and safety associated with the transport of oil in Washington. Final recommendations were delivered to the legislature and governor in March 2015. Prior to completion of the study, in October 2014, Governor Inslee requested a preliminary set of recommendations regarding oil transportation. The commission provided a list of recommendations that were incorporated into governor-request legislation (ESHB 1449) and ultimately signed into law.
Notice of Opportunity to File Written Comments: On May 22, 2015, the commission published a "Notice of Opportunity to File Written Comments" and distributed it to the list of rail stakeholders on file at the commission, those individuals that signed up and/or testified at one of the legislative hearings on oil by rail, the railroads in the state and legislative staff. The commission also posted it on its web site. The notice served the purpose of informing interested persons of a scheduled workshop to discuss the rule making and to ask three questions related to the rule making. The commission asked the following questions:
1. What is your definition of a reasonably likely worst case spill of oil?
2. What is a reasonable per-barrel cleanup and damage cost of spilled oil?
3. What risk factors should the commission consider in establishing safety standards on private crossings?
The commission accepted comments until June 22, 2015, and received more than two hundred forty responses. A summary of the comments are below.
Many of the comments focused on the need for the commission to stop oil trains and oil facilities, as well as the need to guarantee safety before allowing trains to transit Washington state. Federal preemption precludes the commission from stopping trains, setting train speeds or interfering with interstate commerce.
In general, comments can be summarized as follows:
1. In looking at a "reasonable worst case spill" consider:
A spill could include 1 to 3.5 million gallons of fuel.
An explosion could result, causing further damage and clean-up costs.
Environmental impacts can drive up costs.
A worst case spill should be calculated at the largest foreseeable discharge of oil.
A worst case spill should be considered one tank car.
2. Reasonable clean-up costs should be calculated at:
$78,750 per barrel.
The clean-up amounts estimated in ecology studies.
The cost of all impacts, including environmental, human, economic, etc.
$175 per barrel.
3. Rules for private crossing safety should include risk factors such as traffic, type of cargo and location of the crossing. Railroads suggest maintaining existing contractual relationships between the railroads and private crossing owners.
4. The commission should stop oil projects and trains completely.
5. The commission needs to keep federal preemption in mind in thinking about any new rules.
Workshop: A workshop was held at the commission on July 8, 2015. The comments received at the workshop were from the railroad industry and concerns from the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon.
CR-101 Draft Language: On August 21, 2015, the commission issued draft language on opt-in for first class cities, private crossing signage standards, an increase in the regulatory fee paid by railroads hauling crude oil and financial responsibility standards for railroads that haul crude oil. The commission received comments from eight respondents.
Stakeholder Response: The comments received from respondents to the draft language can be summarized as follows:
1. First Class Cities Opt-In
a. Karen Hengerer
i. UTC should require participation.
2. Private Crossings
a. Tacoma Rail
i. Recently made significant investment to comply with federal emergency notification system (ENS) regulation 49 C.F.R. 234.
ii. Requests language that would honor investments already made on existing signage.
b. Kennewick Terminal Railroad & Western Washington Railroad.
i. Language is duplicative and conflicts with federal standards.
ii. Ninety days is not enough time to respond to a commission finding.
c. Dow Constantine
i. Supports language.
d. Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon.
i. Recommends installation of stop signs where no automatic grade crossing protective device is installed.
e. Johan Hellman (BNSF)
i. Supports language in the private crossing section.
3. Regulatory Fees
a. No comments received.
4. Financial Responsibility
a. Tacoma Rail
i. Kinetic energy scale-down is flawed.
ii. Consideration should be given to railroads that operate at speeds less than forty-five miles per hour.
iii. Tacoma Rail does not exceed ten miles per hour.
b. Kennewick Terminal Railroad & Western Washington Railroad
i. Item 2(d), relating to information sufficient to demonstrate a railroad's ability to pay the cost of a reasonable worst case spill, is burdensome and potentially in conflict with federal requirements.
c. Karen Hengerer
i. $400 gallon is not high enough.
d. Dow Constantine
i. Supports definition of reasonable worst case.
ii. Recommends a per-gallon cleanup of $1,880 (Lac-Megantic costs).
iii. $400 per gallon only captures cleanup and not loss of life, property damage, loss of tribal access, etc.
e. Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon
i. Reasonable worst case should be the largest foreseeable discharge.
ii. There should be no cap on liability.
iii. There should be a format for reimbursement to federal, state, tribal and local governments.
iv. Natural resource damage assessment should be included.
f. Johan Hellman (BNSF)
i. Concerns with the definition of reasonable worst case and clean-up costs of $400 gallon.
ii. PHMSA never defined reasonable worst case in scale-down approach.
iii. Lac-Megantic is not representative of a worst case.
iv. Numerous safety enhancements have been adopted and reduce PHMSA scale-down calculation.
v. PHMSA's scale-down costs were in the event that federal rules were not adopted.
vi. Supports using historical data to determine reasonable worst case instead of Lac-Megantic.
5. Other
a. Jeanne Poirier
i. Concerns regarding oil and coal transportation.
ii. Draft language does not go far enough.
b. Karen Hengerer
i. Rules should not be on an opt-in basis.
c. Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon
i. Opposed to the transportation of oil in general due to the impact to the tribe.
CR-102 Draft Language: Technical changes were made in the CR-101 draft language stage to address stakeholder comments. Some of the changes that were addressed dealt with:
Private crossings - allowing one hundred twenty days to correct deficiency from the time of notification.
Financial responsibility reporting - converting the clean-up costs to a per barrel basis instead of per gallon and allowing the reporting requirement to be based on operating speed.
Federal Action: The federal government has taken several actions that may impact the movement of oil by railroad within our state. These include:
A study that may remove electronically controlled pneumatic brakes from the federal enhanced tank car rule (Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082 (HM-251)). This would eliminate the only derailment mitigation measure addressed in the rule making. A separate action, in HR-22, Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act, Section 7311, directs the comptroller general to conduct an independent evaluation of electronically controlled pneumatic brakes and determine whether or not the benefits outweigh the costs.
HR-22, Section 7310, requires the USDOT secretary to initiate a study on the levels and structure of insurance for railroads transporting hazardous materials.
On December 18, 2015, President Obama signed the law removing the ban on crude oil exports. Crude oil export restrictions were introduced in the United States in 1975 in the middle of the energy crisis. It is unknown how many more unit trains will traverse Washington due to lifting the export ban.
Financial Responsibility Methodology: In its determination of financial responsibility reporting, the definition of a "reasonable worst case" spill and the scope and costs associated with cleanup, the commission staff relied heavily on the federal agencies charged with regulating the railroads and the tank cars that are used by railroads, PHMSA and FRA. PHMSA is an agency within the USDOT and is responsible for establishing and enforcing requirements for the safe transport of hazardous materials by all modes of transportation. This includes the design of railroad tank cars carrying crude oil. PHMSA was created in 2004 to provide USDOT with a more focused research organization and establish an operating administration for the inspection and enforcement of requirements for pipeline safety and hazardous materials transportation. The FRA is also an agency within the USDOT and has jurisdiction over railroad safety at the federal level. FRA was created by Department of Transportation Act of 1966 and was charged with the uniform administration of the Federal Railroad Safety Act. Under the FRA region designation, Washington is located in FRA Region 8, along with Alaska, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, and Wyoming.5
5 Oil transportation study, page 86.
The commission was charged with defining a "reasonable worst case" spill and calculating costs for the purposes of reporting by the railroads that haul crude oil. Staff looked at the implementing legislation in determining the scope of the definition and intent. As originally drafted, the financial responsibility reporting was intended to be a certificate of financial responsibility that would be reported to ecology. The legislature amended the language to create a simple reporting function on the railroads annual report submitted to the commission. The legislature specifically prohibited any punitive actions based on the information provided and expressly stated that the report was not a means of economic regulation. Instead of defining the reporting for a "worst case" spill, the legislature used the term "reasonable worst case" for the purposes of reporting. Commission staff looked to the federal agencies charged with regulating railroads and at the conditions and requirements for a certificate of financial responsibility in determining the necessary scope for the reporting requirement. According to the Pacific States/B.C. Oil Spill Task Force, the certificate of financial responsibility requirements for the west coast states are as follows:6
6 http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/docs/project_reports/CofrMatrix2.pdf.
RESPONSIBLE PARTY OR DAMAGE TYPE
ALASKA (SEE CITATIONS BELOW)
BRITISH COLUMBIA (CANADA)2
WASHINGTON (SEE RCS 88.40)
OREGON
(SEE ORS
468B.390)
CALIFORNIA
(CCR TITLE 14, SECTIONS 791-797
S.8670.32 AND S.8670.56.5)
Small Tank Barges
Same as for large tank barges (see below)
See below
Tank barges
< 300 GT:
Greater of $2 million or $3,000/bbl for persistent oil or $1500/bbl for non-persistent oils
None
Tank barges <150,000 bbls:
$12,500 x 30% maximum cargo capacity
Tank Vessels and Large Barges
Greater of $469.80/bbl of crude capacity or $156.6 million, per incident; or
Greater of $156.60/bbl of noncrude capacity or $1.566 million per incident, up to a maximum of $54,810,000
See AS 46.04.040 and 18 AAC 75.235
The Canada Shipping Act differentiates between convention ships and nonconvention ships since Canada is party to the CLC/Fund scheme of 69/71 as recently amended in 1992. A safety convention means seagoing ship wherever registered carrying in bulk as cargo, crude oil, fuel oil, heavy oil, lubricating oil or any other persistent hydrocarbon mineral oil or on a voyage following any such carriage of oil, unless it is proved that there is no residue of the oil on board.
For all tank ships and tank barges =>300 GT $500 million ($1 billion after 1/1/04)
>300 GT &
< 3000 GT:
Greater of $2 million or $1200/gross ton >3000 GT: Greater of $10 million or $1200/gross ton3
 
 
 
The maximum liability under section of a convention ship in respect of an occurrence is if the ship has a tonnage of not more than 5,000 tons, 4,510,000 units of account (SDRs) and if the ship has a tonnage of more than 5,000 tons, 4,510,000 units of account for the first 5,000 tons and 631 units of account for each additional ton, not exceeding 89,770,000 units of account in the aggregate.
 
 
 
In addition to reviewing the certificate of financial responsibility requirements, commission staff looked to the state of California in its recently adopted regulation on certificate of financial responsibility and contingency plan standards on railroads that haul crude oil.7 The state of California defined a "reasonable" worst case spill as "(C) Railroads: Twenty percent (20%) of the maximum volume of oil cargo that a railroad may transport by a single train within the state (e.g. a manifest train or a "unit train"), based on 714 barrels per tank car."8 Because the commission started its rule making before California's certificate of financial responsibility rule was finalized and because commission staff could not determine the methodology that California used in its regulation, staff relied on the federal enhanced tank car rule, Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082 to determine "reasonable worst case" spill of oil and the associated clean-up costs. The data that PHMSA and FRA presented in its rule making was the most complete and exhaustive analysis available on the subject.
7 https://nrm.dfg.ca.gov/FileHandler.ashx?DocumentID=107198.
8 14 CCR § 817.04 § 817.04. Inland Facilities.
In determining a "reasonable" worst case for the purposes of the regulation, staff needed to look at a scenario that would be less than the worst case scenario described in the certificate of financial responsibility and less than the worst recorded tragedy in North America. However, staff did not believe that a "reasonable" worst case spill was synonymous with a most probable or an average derailment. In the United States, historical evidence of derailments show an average derailment of nine cars.9 The largest derailment of crude and ethanol in the United States is thirty-one cars.10 In looking for a comparison of "reasonable worst case," the commission noted that it is similar but not necessarily interchangeable with the PHMSA analysis of high consequence event used in the previously referenced enhanced tank car rule.
9 Journal of Hazardous Materials 276 (2014) 442-451, http://railtec.illinois.edu/articles/Files/Journal%20Articles/2014/Liu%20et%20al%202014%20JHM%20Multiple%20Car%20Release.pdf.
10 Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082, at 98.
PHMSA determined that high consequence events are "events that exceed the "typical" derailment event because they would result either in multiple fatalities or injuries, or would cause greater environmental damages than a typical derailment."11 In its evaluation of criteria for calculating costs of a reasonable worst case spill, commission staff elected to use the PHMSA scale down methodology that was used in the federal Enhanced Tank Car Rule. The PHMSA approach was applied, in determining reasonable worst case, primarily for two reasons. First, the tragedy in Lac Mégantic, Quebec is to date the worst case example of a catastrophic derailment in North America involving crude oil. Using the tragedy in Lac Mégantic, Quebec as a worst case scenario seems appropriate. While it is true that a catastrophic event like what was seen in Lac Mégantic, Quebec could be exponentially worse, staff considered that the catastrophe in Quebec was the result of a number of failures, and that the USDOT has adopted regulations to ensure such an event would not happen again. Staff considered new federal regulations adopting enhanced tank car requirements to mitigate the risks associated with moving crude oil by rail. Ultimately, staff chose to move forward with the scale down approach used by PHMSA because, while there were safety measures adopted through the enhanced tank car rule, those safety measures would not be fully implemented for ten years. However, since it appears the electronically controlled pneumatic brakes may be removed from the enhanced tank car regulations, staff believes it is prudent to define a "reasonable worst case" as though there were no additional safety measures adopted at the federal level.
11 Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082, at 52.
In applying the scale down calculation, staff accepts the PHMSA assertion that kinetic energy varies directly with the square of speed. In Lac Mégantic, the train in question was traveling at a rate of 65 mph12 and resulted in the loss of approximately seventy-eight percent of its crude oil cargo or 1.59 million gallons. PHMSA calculations on average train derailments in the United States use an average speed of forty-one mph in determining a "scale down" calculation of Lac Mégantic. While this is used to illustrate monetary assumptions, an assumption on damage should be calculated using the operating speeds in the state. Kinetic energy = 1/2 Mass x (Velocity)2. Staff agreed with the PHMSA assumption that loaded high hazard flammable trains are of equal mass. While the purpose of the kinetic force scale down calculation in the federal Enhanced Tank Car Rule was to show the projected number of high consequence events over the next twenty years in the absence of the federal Enhanced Tank Car Rule, staff believes that because it will take ten years to phase out older tank cars, and because the only mitigating factor in derailments will likely be removed, the calculation can be used to determine a "reasonable worst case."
12 Railway Investigation Report R13D0054, http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2013/R13D0054/R13D0054.pdf.
As an example, a railroad that operates crude oil trains at a maximum speed of forty-five mph would have a reasonable worst case spill of approximately forty-eight percent.
There were a number of factors the commission staff weighed in the evaluation of the definition of "reasonable." These include comments received (Dow Constantine, Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation, Tacoma Rail and BNSF), history of derailments, safety measures in place to prevent or reduce derailment impacts, damages of largest crude oil train, tribal impacts, implementation of the federal Enhanced Tank Car Rule, environmental impacts of a spill, consistency with federal and state standards, and regulatory authority of the commission. Staff also considered the federal agencies that regulate railroads, the data used in determining safety considerations for enhanced tank cars, existing regulations pertaining to certificates of financial responsibility and states that have adopted regulations on "reasonable" worst case spills and the cost calculation used to determine the necessary financial resources needed by a railroad.
The cost for a cleanup of a "reasonable worst case" spill was weighed using the same data. It would not seem reasonable to have a clean-up cost disproportionately greater than existing financial responsibility reporting requirements. Staff needed to determine the scope of the clean-up costs and damages as used in the legislation. Given that the financial reporting requirement started as a certificate of financial responsibility and that the term damages were not defined, staff used the certificate of financial responsibility and the final bill report as a guide. As stated in the ESHB 1449 bill report, "Railroads that transport oil as bulk cargo must provide information to the UTC regarding their ability to pay for a reasonable worst-case spill of oil, an amount which is to be calculated by multiplying the reasonable anticipated per-barrel cleanup costs by the reasonable worst case spill volume. This information is to be provided to the UTC as part of railroad's annual report, and the UTC may not use this information to economically regulate or penalize a railroad."13
13 http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2015-16/Pdf/Bill%20Reports/House/1449-S.E%20HBR%20FBR%2015.pdf.
In evaluating how the per barrel costs should be calculated, commission staff received comments requesting that it look towards ecology['s] past rule makings in its calculations. Ecology is in the process of adopting contingency plan standards for railroads, which commission staff supports, but available data on cleanup and damage costs by ecology do not seem to be appropriate for this reporting function. Ecology costs are more applicable to maritime. The commission will be interested in the calculations that ecology uses in its ongoing rule making.
 
Costs by Quantity 
and Oil Type 14 
Environmental Damage 
Socioeconomic
Cost
Oil Type
Volume (Gallons)
2005$/
Gallon
2005$/
Gallon
Volatile Distillates
<500
500-1,000
1,000-10,000
10,000-100,000
$51
$48
$37
$32
$69
$281
$425
$191
Light Fuels
<500
500-1,000
1,000-10,000
10,000-100,000
$90
$85
$74
$69
$85
$350
$531
$212
Heavy Oils
<500
500-1,000
1,000-10,000
10,000-100,000
$101
$96
$90
$80
$159
$637
$955
$531
Crude Oil
<500
500-1,000
1,000-10,000
10,000-100,000
$96
$92
$85
$77
$53
$212
$318
$149
14 Final cost-benefit analysis for oil spill contingency planning.
Table 7.1:
Environmental and Socioeconomic Damage Estimates: The weighted average of these costs provides an estimate of the value that may accrue for removal on an overall per gallon basis for a large number of spills. The costs were weighted based on the share of spills in each of the sized classes. Further weighting by the shares of light and heavy oils give an average value of $124 per gallon for socioeconomic damages and $86 for environmental losses.
The commission determined that a clean-up cost of $400 per gallon should be used in determining the financial reporting, based primarily on the federal Enhanced Tank Car Rule. In determining the clean-up costs associated with a "reasonable worse case" spill, the commission looked at costs associated with the spill and did not take into account those costs outside of the spill or spill cleanup. In addition, the commission looked at the PHMSA enhanced tank car regulation, where the federal government determined that an event like Lac Mégantic "would not be representative of damages from a typical accident or even a high consequence accident."15 One recent higher consequence event was the Lynchburg, Virginia, incident which resulted in thirty thousand gallons spilled. The emergency response and clean-up costs for that incident were reported to FRA by CSX as $8.99 million. Of this $8.99 million cost, an estimated $5 million was due to environmental damage. The CSX estimate of the costs of Lynchburg results in a cost per gallon of crude of about $300.16
15 Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082, at 87.
16 Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082, at 87.
The weighted average of the per gallon estimates from all the federal Enhanced Tank Car Rule listed literature, including marine, pipeline and rail, is between $407 to $415 per gallon spilled of crude oil or ethanol. It is unlikely that any of these estimates capture the full comprehensive societal damages that result from these incidents.17 The PHMSA Final Regulatory Impact Analysis for the federal Enhanced Tank Car Rule stated that costs for crude oil for rail carriers was estimated at $200 per gallon but "the review found that damages could be as high as twice that amount for crude oil spills."18 Further, the 1999 Etkin19 crude oil study had a cost of $326 per gallon for cleanup and the 2012 Marruffo20 study showed a clean-up cost of $378.34 for crude oil by rail.21
17 Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082, at 115.
18 Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082, at 86.
19 Etkin, D.S. "Estimating Clean-up Costs for Oil Spills." Proceedings, International Oil Spill Conference, 1999.
20 Marruffo, Amanda, Hongkyu Yoon, David J. Schaeffer, Christopher P. L. Barkan, Mohd Rapik Saat, and Charles J. Werth. "NAPL Source Zone Depletion Model and Its Application to Railroad-Tank-Car Spills." Groundwater 50, no. 4 (2012): 627–632.
21 The model described in Marruffo (2012) model is used to predict the relative impact of crude oil or ethanol released from railroad-tank car accidents on soil and groundwater contamination and cleanup times, but no monetized costs are presented. (page 115).
Based on the available information, the commission has elected to propose a reasonable worst case definition that would use the kinetic force scale down formula, using the railroad's maximum operating speed for a train moving oil. The clean-up cost to be used in the reporting regulation is $16,800 per barrel, or $400 per gallon.
TR-151079 Oil Train Safety Rule-Making
Comment Summary Matrix CR-102
December 24, 2015
Section
Commenter
Comments
Staff Response
WAC 480-62-270
Safety standards at private crossings.
Citizen, Jean Avery
The commenter believes:
1. Crossing areas should include distances on both sides of the tracks and in all directions.
2. Crossings should include a posting of the largest area of possible impact of a crude oil spill (similar to the "tsunami zone" signs).
1. The recommendations and safety measures contained in WAC 480-62-270 are consistent with the federal government and provide additional safety precautions to ensure that the crossing is well marked and there is a process if the crossing has hazards that require more than signage.
2. HB [ESHB] 1449 did not direct the commission to create impact zones associated with crude oil movement by rail.
WAC 480-62-270
Safety standards at private crossings.
Union Pacific (UP),
Melissa Hagan
1. In WAC 480-62-270(2), UP is concerned that the railroads only have ninety days following the adoption of the rule to install signage at private crossings. The timeline would impose a significant burden on UP. UP requests the commission allow one hundred eighty days to comply.
1. The ninety day timeline UP cited is from a previous draft of the proposed rules. The CR-102 language that was drafted and posted to the commission web site allows for one hundred twenty days following the adoption of the rule to install signage at private crossings.
 
 
2. UP suggests the commission consider including an exception to its signage requirement for private crossings where only a de minimis amount of crude oil is transported.
2. If a railroad uses a private crossing to haul a de minimis amount of oil and believes an exemption from the rule is in order, the railroad may apply for an exemption from the commission.
 
 
3. UP suggests a technical change to the language in WAC 480-62-270(4). UP stated that the rule would require an additional crossbuck to be installed within ninety days of the adoption of the rule. UP believes this is a clerical mistake and the language should read "within ninety days of notification of the insufficient sight restriction."
3. The ninety day timeline UP cited is from a previous draft of the proposed rules. The CR-102 language that was drafted and posted to the commission web site reads that a railroad is required to install an additional crossbuck within one hundred twenty days of receiving notification of the hazard from commission staff.
WAC 480-62-300
Annual reports
Regulatory fees.
Senator Christine Rolfes
The commenter believes:
1. The proposed definition of reasonable worst case spill is far too conservative.
1. The commission researched similar definitions in other states and at the federal level. The state of California limits the definition to twenty percent of the train. PHMSA, while not defining a reasonable worst case, calculates a high consequence event in the recently adopted Enhanced Tank Car Rule. The commission utilized the PHMSA calculation as the preferred methodology.
 
 
2. The calculation of a potential amount of oil spilled assumes the train will follow the maximum operating speed. A reasonable worst case should cover circumstances when a train is out of control and, therefore, exceeding the maximum speed.
2. The commission explored ways to calculate a reasonable worst case scenario that was not unduly punitive to railroad operators that operate on small sections of track at speeds less than ten mph.
 
 
3. Planning and estimating for reasonable worst case should be calculated and assessed for a large metropolitan area such as Spokane or Seattle.
3. The commission looked to other states for guidelines on financial responsibility and PHMSA in its regulatory impact analysis of the federal Enhanced Tank Car Rule. The commission estimate exceeds other states (i.e. California) and matches the PHMSA calculations.
 
 
4. The estimate of the per barrel clean-up cost seems excessively low.
4. The per barrel cleanup cost was calculated using the data available in the PHMSA Enhanced Tank Car Rule regulatory impact analysis.
WAC 480-62-300
Annual reports—
Regulatory fees.
Ecology,
Dale Jensen
The commenter states:
1. Ecology supports the commission's effort to promote and secure a demonstration of financial responsibility for the clean-up costs of oil spills.
1. The commission looks forward to working in partnership with ecology on its contingency plan rule making.
 
 
2. The proposed rule appears to establish a reasonable level of financial responsibility for clean-up costs associated with an oil spill.
2. Commission staff agrees.
 
 
3. Ecology notes that the estimated clean-up cost of $400 per gallon is only a portion of the overall costs of an oil spill. The potential costs for restoration of property and natural resources along with loss of life would be additional costs above and beyond the cost for cleanup of spilled oil.
3. The commission agrees that the potential costs associated with loss of life and restoration of property and natural resources would far exceed the costs of cleanup. The commission supports ecology as it evaluates the contingency plan rules for the state related to railroads and believes that the rule process may find that clean-up costs exceed the documented studies and reports available at this time.
 
 
4. In the event of a worst case spill, the true cost of damages incurred could certainly exceed the level established within the proposed rule.
4. The commission agrees that an absolute worst case spill could exceed any level of cost that staff was able to find in federal or state rules or in available studies. However, HB 1449 refers to a "reasonable" worst case spill and not an absolute worst case spill.
 
 
5. Ecology recommends the adoption of the rule as currently proposed.
5. Commission staff agrees.
WAC 480-62-300
Annual reports—
Regulatory fees.
BNSF, Johan Hellman
The commenter suggests:
1. The definition of reasonable worst case in the CR-101 and CR-102 are flawed. The formula focuses on one aspect of rail safety - speed. There are numerous other factors that may influence the potential of a rail car carrying crude oil to derail and spill.
1. The commission researched available options to calculate reasonable worst case and found that speed was the one variable that could reduce the amount of kinetic force involved in a derailment. The commission explored some of the other factors BNSF previously mentioned, but chose to follow the PHMSA calculations.
 
 
2. The authority of any state to regulate train speeds is questionable since the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over train speed.
2. The commission agrees with BNSF that the state does not have the authority to regulate train speeds. The requirement in the annual report for reporting financial responsibility is for informational purposes only. It does not authorize the commission to economically regulate railroads or railroad speed, nor do the draft rules propose to do so.
 
 
3. A definition of worst case spill based solely on speed could negatively impact other aspects of rail safety and operations across the state, including at public crossings.
3. The commission does not believe that a reporting feature on an annual report will cause a railroad to changes its speeds or operating practices. The commission is expressly prohibited from economic regulation of railroads, may not use the information submitted by a railroad as a basis for penalties and nothing in the report may be construed as assigning liability.
WAC 480-62-300
Annual reports—
Regulatory fees.
UP, Melissa Hagan
The commenter states:
1. The imposition of financial reporting would conflict with federal law.
1. Commission staff does not believe that requirements of an annual report conflicts with federal law.
 
 
2. Adoption of the Surface Transportation Board (STB) R-1 report should be a sufficient reporting mechanism for meeting the requirements of the statute.
2. The commission currently allows and asks for the STB R-1 as a portion of its annual report but the STB R-1 does not include financial responsibility for spill data as required by Washington state statute.
 
 
3. Aspects of the annual reporting provisions remain under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government for the preservation of common carrier service obligations.
3. Commission staff does not believe that requirements of an annual report violate common carrier service obligations or the jurisdiction of the federal government.
 
 
4. UP is concerned about the "financial fitness" and insurance requirements in the draft rule.
4. The annual report is not used to determine financial fitness, Section 10 of HB [ESHB] 1449 expressly prohibits the commission from economic regulation of railroads. The data in the annual report is for informational purposes only.
 
 
5. Requirements that railroads provide annual reporting statements that identify all insurance carried by the railroad, including coverage amounts, limitations, and other conditions of the insurance as well as a reasonable worst case spill of oil are preempted by federal law. Such requirements compromise the integrity of UP's confidential business records and are "blatantly discriminatory" on their face.
5. The commission is sensitive to the need for the railroad industry to maintain confidential business records. However, the requirements in the rule language, including insurance and worst case scenarios, are issues openly discussed by UP. As stated in the UP 2014 STB Annual Report on page 10, "We transport certain hazardous materials and other materials, including crude oil, ethanol, and toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) materials, such as chlorine, that pose certain risks in the event of a release or combustion … A rail accident or other incident or accident on our network, at our facilities, or at the facilities of our customers involving the release or combustion of hazardous materials could involve significant costs and claims for personal injury, property damage, and environmental penalties and remediation in excess of our insurance coverage for these risks …." Further, on page 11 of the same 2014 Annual Report, UP concedes that hauling hazardous materials like crude oil may impact the company's operations, "We could incur significant costs as a result of any of the foregoing, and we may be required to incur significant expenses to investigate and remediate known, unknown, or future environmental contamination, which could have a material adverse effect on our results of operations, financial condition, and liquidity."
 
 
6. Congress's assertion of federal authority over the railroad industry has been recognized as "among the most pervasive and comprehensive of federal regulatory schemes." The ICC Termination Act confers exclusive jurisdiction over licensing and economic regulation of interstate railroad operations on the STB.
6. The reporting requirements are for informational purposes only. The commission is expressly prohibited from economically regulating railroads or using the information for punitive measures.
 
 
7. STB has stated that the ICC Termination Act Section 10501(b) is intended to prevent a patchwork of local regulation from unreasonably interfering with interstate commerce.
7. Please see answer #6.
 
 
8. Federal courts and the STB have found two types of state regulations of railroads to be so pernicious as to be "categorically" preempted without any inquiry into the state's reason. First, states are categorically prevented from intruding into matters that are directly regulated by the STB – any form of state economic regulation which may include a financial fitness inquiry. Second, states cannot impose permitting or preclearance requirements.
8. Please see answer #6.
 
 
9. UP is required to transport all commodities, including crude oil. Railroads cannot stop transporting crude oil through the state.
9. The rules in no way limit transportation of crude oil in the state.
 
 
10. The commission cannot regulate the amount of insurance to be held by a federally licensed rail carrier. Regulating financial fitness of rail carriers is quintessential economic regulation that is preempted.
10. Please see answer #6.
 
 
11. The commission cannot superimpose another layer of economic regulation by forcing carriers to demonstrate they have obtained a minimum level of insurance.
11. Please see answer #6.
 
 
12. UP's R-1 for 2014 reports net revenue from railway operations of $8.5 billion. Legislation requires no disclosure beyond that already made publicly available in the R-1.
12. HB [ESHB] 1449 requires railroads to report to the commission related to the railroad's ability to pay damages in the event of a spill or accident involving the transport of crude oil, including a statement of whether the railroad has the ability to pay for damages resulting from a reasonable worst case spill. Please also refer to answer #5.
 
 
13. Coverage amounts, limitations, and other conditions of the insurance would require UP to divulge the terms of insurance coverage that UP has negotiated with its insurance providers.
13. Filings by railroads to the STB disclose insurance levels and rates when the railroad company is interested in increased fees or protection from liability under common carrier provisions.
WAC 480-62-300
Annual reports—
Regulatory fees.
Columbia Riverkeeper, Friends of the Columbia Gorge, Forest Ethics, RE Sources for Sustainable Communities, Sierra Club Washington Chapter, The Lands Council, Washington Environmental Council, Washington Physicians for Social Responsibility
The commenter includes, in its comments:
1. Concerns regarding the worst case spill cost in WAC 480-62-300 (2)(d).
1. The commission used available study and report data, as well as the PHMSA regulatory impact analysis to set spill cost.
 
 
2. Objections to the adoption of the worst case scenario cost of oil spill cleanup.
2. The commission used available data, through the PHMSA federal Enhanced Tank Car Rule to determine reasonable worst case scenario.
 
 
3. The monetary amount of $16,800 per barrel multiplied by the percentage of the largest train of crude oil gravely underestimates the potential cost of an oil train disaster.
3. The commission used the available data to determine per barrel clean-up costs. The percentage was extracted from the PHMSA Enhanced Tank Car Rule.
 
 
4. The commission deviated significantly from the charge in the legislation which does not call for financial assurance for a "typical accident" or "high consequence accident" but for a "worst case spill."
4. The commission was charged with defining a "reasonable" worst case spill. The definition of "reasonable" is subjective but the commission believes that if the legislature had intended an absolute worst case spill, then the quantifier "reasonable" would not have been included. A high consequence event from the PHMSA Enhanced Tank Car Rule was used because it calculated costs, showed potential impacts and predicted possible derailments.
 
 
5. Lac Megantic may not be the worst case spill scenario. An oil spill in an area with a denser population, such as Seattle, or an area that is environmentally sensitive, such as the Columbia River, could have clean-up costs much higher than Lac Megantic on a per barrel basis.
5. The commission agrees that there are numerous scenarios where an absolute worst case spill would be significantly more than what was drafted in the CR-102 and in Lac Megantic. The annual report is for informational purposes only and is not intended to be an absolute worst case scenario but rather a "reasonable" worst case.
 
 
6. Recommends looking at real world examples like Lac Megantic and "near miss" incidents to model what could happen.
6. The commission reviewed available data related to crude oil transportation by rail and used a methodology that was based in fact and accepted by the federal agencies that regulate railroads and tank cars - PHMSA and FRA.
 
 
7. Suggests the commission use the worst high consequence event considered in the Final PHMSA Regulatory Impact Analysis on page 110.
7. The commission reviewed the PHMSA regulatory impact analysis on the worst high consequence event for fatality and nonfatality damages. The commission focused the methodology on clean-up costs and damages associated with the spilled oil and not fatality, nonfatality and societal costs.
 
 
8. PHMSA projected a 95th percentile high consequence derailment that simulates the cost of a derailment in a high population density area. The cost of these events would be far more serious at an estimate of $6.3 billion.
8. The commission agrees that an absolute worst case spill, and in particular an accident that takes into account fatalities and societal costs could exceed the clean-up costs envisioned in the proposed rule. However, the legislation required the commission to define a "reasonable" worst case spill and not an absolute worst case.
 
 
9. USDOT believes that in any given year, there is a five percent chance that a major derailment will happen in an urban setting in the United States with a cost of $6.3 billion.
9. See answer #6, 7 and 8.
 
 
10. The cost of a $6.3 billion spill results in a per gallon cost of $2,100.
10. The cost per gallon proposed by the commenter includes the costs of fatalities and damages outside the scope of the commission's rule making. See answer #6, 7 and 8.
 
 
11. HB [ESHB] 1449 states that the purpose of the bill is to ensure that responsible parties are liable, and have the resources and ability to respond to spills and provide compensation for all costs and damages (Section 1 (3)(c)). The commission only considered clean-up costs and ignored the separate cost of damages.
11. See answer #6, 7 and 8.
 
 
12. The proposal unlawfully limits the potential costs in ways that are inconsistent with the governing legislation. Legislature used the word "damages" rather than "cleanup costs."
12. See answer #6, 7 and 8.
 
 
13. Damages should account for both economic damages and noneconomic damages.
13. See answer #6, 7 and 8.
 
 
14. The commission focused on clean-up costs and the analysis should fully account for both spills and accidents.
14. See answer #6, 7 and 8.
 
 
15. Worst case planning should include all risk categories.
15. See answer #6, 7 and 8.
 
 
16. Maximum possible speed should be factored into worst case and not the fastest operating speed.
16. The commission used the maximum operating speed to determine the reasonable worst case spill methodology to ensure that railroad operators that travel at lower speeds for limited distances would not be subjected with the same cost calculation as unit trains traveling at higher rates of speed throughout the state.
 
 
17. Rule, as written, sets a weak standard.
17. The rule requires specific data from the railroads for informational purposes only, it does not bestow the commission with any economic regulatory authority and, therefore, sets no standards.
WAC 480-62-300
Annual reports—
Regulatory fees.
Citizen, Jean Avery
The commenter believes that clean-up requirements should include short and long-term mitigation for neighborhoods, waterways, wetlands, aquatic life and environmental regions and habitats near the tracks.
The rule requires specific data from the railroads for informational purposes only. The commission supports ecology in its contingency plan rule making which will have measures in place to mitigate oil spills.
WAC 480-62-300
Annual reports—
Regulatory fees.
Rail Safety Policy Expert, Fred Millar
The commenter states:
1. The commission should apply federal regulatory precedents in chemical accident prevention to objectively define reasonable worst case oil spill.
1. The commission looked at the federal agencies that regulate railroads and utilized the data available to define reasonable worst case spill.
 
 
2. Worst case should be based on the capacity of the longest crude by rail train and not half a train.
2. The commission used the PHMSA Enhanced Tank Car Rule to establish a methodology for determining a reasonable worst case spill. The quantifier "reasonable" is interpreted to mean less than the largest amount of oil being carried.
 
 
3. The rule should cover oil spills and other kinds of harmful discharges (fire, explosion, toxic gas cloud).
3. Discharges are defined in the oil spill statutes at the state level and do not include fires, explosions or toxic gas clouds.
 
 
4. The commission should make a direct request to each crude by rail carrier to provide information relevant to any state assessment of crude by rail risks, railroads worst case scenarios, catastrophic insurance coverage limits, comprehensive emergency response plans, routing analysis and route selection documents.
4. Commissioners requested information pertaining to company calculations on worst case spills and insurance levels at the rule-making workshop, but has not received any information from the railroads.
 
 
5. Scaling down the worst case understates the common public understanding and longstanding federal regulatory definitions.
5. The scale down approach was used in the PHMSA Enhanced Tank Car Rule and was the best available data for the commission to review in determining a reasonable worst case spill.
 
 
6. Worst case needs to include dense cities or sensitive environmental areas.
6. The commission supports ecology in its rule making on contingency plan standards including spill risks in environmentally sensitive areas. Reporting financial responsibility data as required in HB [ESHB] 1449 is for informational purposes only and relates directly to clean-up costs.
 
 
7. Discharges go beyond the bare "oil cleanup" costs.
7. The commission believes the intent of the legislature, as stated in the bill analysis before final amendment, relates directly to oil spill cleanup and damages directly related to the spilled oil.
 
 
8. HB [ESHB] 1449, Section 5(3), mandates that the department "determine the contingency plan requirements for railroads transporting oil in bulk." HB [ESHB] 1449 does not include, in subsections (4) through (11), the requirement that a railroad provide calculations of its worst case scenario, as in other federal accident prevention and emergency response legislation.
8. The requirement in HB [ESHB] 1449, Section 5(3), requires ecology, not the commission, to determine contingency plan requirements. The commission supports ecology in its rule making on contingency plans.
 
 
9. Legislation fails to require the railroad to provide documentation on its worst case scenarios for hazardous cargoes.
9. The commission is limited to the scope of the legislation.
 
 
10. The commission should define "reasonable" as what could happen versus what has already happened.
10. The commission used the PHMSA Enhanced Tank Car Rule to determine reasonable worst case spill.
 
 
11. The commission's clean-up cost calculations are dubious.
11. The per barrel clean-up cost was calculated using the data available in the PHMSA Enhanced Tank Car Rule regulatory impact analysis and in reviewing the standards in California on railroads. Washington's per barrel costs are higher than California and is consistent with the studies and reports used for the PHMSA regulatory impact analysis.
 
 
12. The commission process for calculating fees does not properly weight [weigh] safety.
12. Commission rail program staff is supported by the railroad industry through a regulatory fee. The fee is used to promote rail safety. Oil underlies only a portion of the duties performed by rail staff.
 
 
13. The commission relies on estimates on future railroad compliance with voluntary speed limits. Human error or criminal negligence is a key causal factor in runaway train disasters.
13. The commission relies on operating speed as a determination of reasonable and to allow railroads that operate at very low speeds to not have the same reporting requirement as railroads operating at fifty-five mph.
 
 
14. The commission should look at federal regulatory regimes besides the PHMSA HHFT rule for worst case scenario.
14. The commission reviewed the PHMSA Enhanced Tank Car Rule and standards related to oil pollution and contingency planning.
 
 
15. The entire train should be used to calculate release potential.
15. The commission had the obligation to define "reasonable" which is something less than the absolute worst case spill.
 
 
16. New HHFT rule does not include the societal costs of crude by rail accidents.
16. The commission agrees and does not believe that HB [ESHB] 1449 is intended to account for all societal costs in the reporting function of the annual report.
 
 
17. The EPA definition of worst case scenario is based on the largest release of what could happen.
17. For the purposes of this rule making, the commission used the PHMSA Enhanced Tank Car Rule to determine reasonable worst case spill. The commission would not oppose a worst case scenario that was defined broadly if used by ecology in its contingency plan rules.
 
 
18. The PHMSA HHFT regulatory impact analysis underlying most of the commission's analysis is a cost-benefit analysis and used to justify the cost of the new safety regulations.
18. The commission agrees that the regulatory impact analysis is primarily a cost-benefit analysis.
 
 
19. HHFT regulations are less than maximally stringent for accident protection regarding speed and tank car puncture resistance.
19. The commission submitted comments to the PHMSA Enhanced Tank Car Rule requesting more stringent standards. Further, the commission wrote congress to express opposition to the removal of the electronically controlled pneumatic brakes from the PHMSA Enhanced Tank Car Rule.
 
 
20. The commission should not be limited to scaling down a worst case scenario since any regulations in this area are heavily preempted.
20. The commission believes that the qualifier "reasonable" requires a regulation that is less than an absolute worst case spill.
 
 
21. HB [ESHB] 1449 is only an information law.
21. The commission agrees that the financial reporting requirement contained in HB [ESHB] 1449 is for informational purposes only. The commission is expressly prohibited from economically regulating railroads or using the information collected for punitive measures.
Appendix B
(WAC 480-62 - RULES)
AMENDATORY SECTION (Amending WSR 01-04-026, filed 1/30/01, effective 3/2/01)
WAC 480-62-130 Application of this chapter.
The rules in this chapter apply within certain cities and to any railroad company subject to the jurisdiction of the commission under RCW 81.04.010 and chapters 81.04, 81.24, 81.28, 81.36, 81.40, 81.44, 81.48, 81.52, 81.53, 81.54, 81.60, and 81.61 RCW, as set forth below:
(1) To all Class I, II, and III railroad companies operating within the state of Washington, with the exceptions noted in subsections (2), (3), and (4) of this section.
(2) To and within first-class cities except for WAC 480-62-145, 480-62-150, ((480-62-155,)) and 480-62-225.
(3) To and within cities with a population of more than 400,000 except for WAC 480-62-145, 480-62-150, ((480-62-155,)) 480-62-225, 480-62-230, and 480-62-235.
(4) To logging and industrial railroads except for WAC 480-62-200, 480-62-205, 480-62-215, 480-62-240, 480-62-245, 480-62-250, 480-62-300, the portions of WAC 480-62-310 that do not involve grade crossing accidents, WAC 480-62-315 (2), (4) and (5), and WAC 480-62-325.
NEW SECTION
WAC 480-62-260 First-class cities opt-in.
(1) Participation in the commission's rail safety program. RCW 81.53.240 allows a first-class city to request participation in the commission's crossing safety inspection program. For the purposes of this section, the commission's crossing safety inspection program shall mean the inspection of grade crossings to ensure proper design and maintenance, as set forth in WAC 480-62-225. For the purposes of this section participation in the crossing safety inspection program shall not include the crossing petition process outlined in RCW 81.53.030 and 81.53.060.
(2) Process for opt-in. A first-class city must notify the commission of its intent to opt-in to the commission's rail safety program at least sixty days prior to the effective date requested by the city. A first-class city's request to opt-in must be accompanied by documentation demonstrating that the city's governing body has approved the terms and conditions set forth in a memorandum of understanding between the city and the commission governing the commission's assumption of rail crossing safety inspection authority within the city limits. A first-class city's request to opt-in will become effective on the date requested by the city or the first day of the month following commission approval of the memorandum of understanding referenced in this section, whichever occurs later.
(3) Technical assistance to first-class cities. For first-class cities that opt-in to the commission's crossing safety inspection program, the commission will provide technical assistance on grade crossing safety, maintenance, and modifications as agreed between the city and the commission.
(4) Process to opt-out. First-class cities that opt-in to the commission's crossing safety inspection program may opt-out of the program by submitting to the commission documentation that the city's governing body has approved the withdrawal of the city from the commission's crossing safety inspection program. A city's notice of withdrawal must be submitted to the commission at least ninety days prior to the date upon which the city intends to assume all rail crossing safety inspections within its jurisdiction.
NEW SECTION
WAC 480-62-270 Safety standards at private crossings.
(1) For the purposes of this section, the term "private crossings" has the same meaning as in RCW 81.53.010(8).
(2) At every private crossing through which any amount of crude oil is transported, the railroad must ensure that the following are installed on each side of the crossing within one hundred twenty days after this rule becomes effective:
(a) A thirty-inch or larger R1-1 stop sign, defined as a standard R1-1 in the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices;
(b) An emergency notification system (ENS) sign that:
(i) Displays the necessary information for the dispatching railroad to receive reports of unsafe conditions at the crossing including, at a minimum:
(A) The toll-free telephone number of the railroad company established to receive reports;
(B) An explanation of the purpose of the sign (e.g., "Report emergency or problem to __"); and
(C) The United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) National Crossing Inventory number assigned to that crossing.
(ii) Measures at least twelve inches wide by nine inches high;
(iii) Is retroreflective;
(iv) Has legible text (i.e., letters and numerals) with a minimum character height of one inch; and
(v) Has white text set on a blue background with a white border, except that the USDOT National Crossing Inventory number may be black text set on a white rectangular background.
(c) A rectangular sign, at least three hundred square inches (twenty thousand square centimeters) in size, with the legend "Private Crossing" and the crossbuck symbol. 
(3) All signs must have retroreflective tape applied to the sign posts.
(4) If the commission finds, after investigation, that a restricted sight distance, unfavorable roadway or crossing configuration, or other hazard exists at a private crossing, the commission will notify the railroad and to the extent the commission has contact information, the landowner. The railroad must ensure that additional safety measures are installed at the crossing including, but not necessarily limited to, signs authorized in the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, within one hundred twenty days of receiving notification of the hazard from commission staff.
(5) At private crossings where crude oil is transported, the commission will conduct inspections giving priority to private crossings with a high frequency of oil trains, in industrial areas, and high population centers. 
(6) Nothing in this section modifies existing agreements between the railroad company and the landowner governing liability or cost allocation at the private crossing.
AMENDATORY SECTION (Amending WSR 04-05-031, filed 2/11/04, effective 3/13/04)
WAC 480-62-300 Annual reports—Regulatory fees.
(1) The surface transportation board annual report form R1 must be used by Class I railroad companies ((as)) in addition to the annual report form ((for submission to)) published by the commission. Class II and Class III railroad companies must use report forms periodically published by the commission.
(2) Any railroad company that transports crude oil in Washington must submit to the commission, in addition to its annual report, a statement that contains:
(a) All insurance carried by the railroad company that covers any losses resulting from a reasonable worst case spill.
(b) Coverage amounts, limitations, and other conditions of the insurance identified in (a) of this subsection.
(c) Average and largest crude oil train, as measured in barrels, operated in Washington by the railroad company in the previous calendar year.
(d) Information sufficient to demonstrate the railroad company's ability to pay the costs to clean up a reasonable worst case spill of oil as defined in (e) of this subsection including, but not necessarily limited to, insurance, reserve accounts, letters of credit, or other financial instruments or resources on which the company can rely to pay all such costs. For the purposes of this section, the railroad company must calculate the total cleanup costs for a reasonable worst case spill based on a minimum cost of sixteen thousand eight hundred dollars per barrel multiplied by the percentage of the largest train of crude oil described in (e) of this subsection.
(e) For the purposes of this section, a reasonable worst case spill for railroads shall mean the percent of the largest train load of crude oil, as measured in barrels, moved by that company in the previous calendar year, as described below:
[(Maximum Operating Speed/65)2 = Reasonable Worst Case Percent]
(f) For the purposes of this section, maximum operating speed shall mean the top speed that the railroad company operates any train carrying crude oil in the state.
(3) Each year every railroad company is responsible for obtaining the proper report form from the commission. Reports must be completed for the preceding calendar year's operations. One copy of the completed annual report, along with the regulatory fee, must be submitted to the commission no later than May 1st of each year.
(((3))) (4) Regulatory fees. The railroad company regulatory fee for Class I railroads and companies that haul crude oil is set by statute at ((one)) two and one-half percent of gross intrastate operating revenue. The regulatory fee for all other railroad companies shall be set at one and one-half percent of gross intrastate operating revenue.
(a) The maximum regulatory fee is assessed each year, unless the commission issues an order establishing the regulatory fee at an amount less than the statutory maximum.
(b) The minimum regulatory fee that a railroad company must pay is twenty dollars.
(c) The twenty dollar minimum regulatory fee is waived for any railroad company with less than one thousand three hundred dollars in gross intrastate operating revenue.
(d) The commission does not grant extensions for payment of regulatory fees.
(e) If a company does not pay its regulatory fee by May 1st, the commission will assess an automatic late fee of two percent of the amount due, plus one percent interest for each month the fee remains unpaid.
Reviser's note: The brackets and enclosed material in the text of the above section occurred in the copy filed by the agency and appear in the Register pursuant to the requirements of RCW 34.08.040.