All local jurisdictions must establish a community oversight board by January 1, 2025.  Local jurisdictions include all cities, towns, and counties with a law enforcement agency that has 15 or more officers and serves directly under the authority of the jurisdiction, rather than by contract or agreement with another jurisdiction.  As an alternative to establishing a stand-alone community oversight board, a combination of local jurisdictions that have an existing mutual aid agreement with one another for law enforcement services may establish a joint community oversight board by intergovernmental agreement. 
 
All community oversight boards must have certain powers and duties with respect to the law enforcement agency serving under the authority of the local jurisdiction, including:

• receiving complaints from community members regarding the conduct of law enforcement officers and civilian employees of the law enforcement agency;
• investigating and issuing findings on incidents that occur between the public and law enforcement officers or civilian employees, including incidents involving:  use of force by an officer; death of or serious injury to person in custody; serious abuse of authority or misconduct by an officer; allegedly discriminatory stops or other profiling activity; adversarial interactions occurring at public assemblies; and other adverse incidents related to the conduct of officers or civilian employees.  Community-reported complaints must be investigated whenever possible, and findings must be issued within 120 days.  If an investigation is not possible, the board must provide notice and reasoning to the complainant;
• making recommendations for officer or civilian employee discipline in cases involving serious breaches of departmental or professional standards.  Any recommendation must be accompanied by a report of supporting information and submitted to the employing agency and, if pertaining to an officer, to the Criminal Justice Training Commission;
• holding hearings and issuing subpoenas, if necessary, to compel any person to appear, give sworn testimony, or produce evidence relevant to a matter under inquiry;
• reviewing and making recommendations for changes to agency policies, practices, and procedures.  If the agency declines to implement any of the board's recommendations, it must produce a written public record detailing its rationale;
• reviewing internal investigations for accuracy, completeness, impartiality, and sufficiency of any resulting discipline;
• making budgetary recommendations to the local legislative body concerning future appropriations to the law enforcement agency;
• accessing crime scenes and related administrative investigations, including preliminary evidence and other information, as needed, provided that such access is in a manner that protects the integrity of the crime scene or investigation.  The board's access must not be more limited than the access granted to the press;
• making public reports on the activities of the board;
• participating on hiring panels for any vacancy in the position of chief of police; and
• undertaking other duties, as identified by the local jurisdiction, that are reasonably necessary for the board to effectuate its purposes.

 
Community oversight boards may not conduct criminal investigations, and community oversight board investigations must not take precedence over, or interfere with, any in-progress criminal or internal investigation conducted by a law enforcement agency or independent investigative team, or any other independent investigation body.  Law enforcement agencies and their officers are immune from civil liability for claims or damages arising solely out of the negligent actions or inactions of the corresponding community oversight board.

Each local jurisdiction must establish the policies and procedures for its community oversight board including, at a minimum, policies and procedures for:  the number of board members; composition and appointment of membership; meetings and hearings; communication with the public and receipt of complaints; access to files, records, and other information, and requirements for maintaining any confidentiality of those documents; training of board members; and the performance of the board's duties and other functions.  Boards must maintain multiple methods for submitting and reviewing the status of complaints, including both online and in-person methods.  

Each local jurisdiction must provide training for its community oversight board's members either by utilizing existing resources within the jurisdiction or by contracting with other jurisdictions or organizations.  At a minimum, training must include:  law enforcement ride-alongs; simulations, unless logistically or cost prohibitive; curriculum on relevant laws and available data; and anti-bias training.  As a condition of continued board membership, community oversight board members must complete the training within 90 days of initial appointment and any reappointment.  Local jurisdictions must also provide adequate funding for the community oversight board's staffing and for performance of the community oversight board's functions and duties. 
 
A portion of a community oversight board's positions must be filled by members of the public through a public posting and application process.  A community oversight board must, whenever possible, reflect the diversity of the community in which it is located and include members of families affected by law enforcement violence, justice-involved individuals, and representatives of civil rights advocacy organizations.  Certain persons are ineligible to serve on a community oversight board, including:  law enforcement officers and employees; immediate family members of law enforcement officers; and persons who receive payment pursuant to contract with, or work for an entity that receives payment pursuant to contract with, the law enforcement agency that the community oversight board oversees.  
 
The requirements for the powers, duties, and structure of community oversight boards apply to any newly created board.  Local jurisdictions with a similar oversight body in place at the time the bill takes effect must bring the body into compliance with the community oversight board framework by January 1, 2023, except to the extent that full compliance would violate a federal consent decree or other mandate.  "Similar oversight bodies" include any law enforcement oversight or advisory bodies that are external to the law enforcement agency being overseen, and may include, but are not limited to, police ombudsman offices and citizen advisory, review, and oversight boards.  If a local jurisdiction has multiple similar oversight bodies in place that collectively fulfill the community oversight board functions, the local jurisdiction may continue to maintain multiple oversight bodies instead of a singular community oversight board as long as each body complies with the community oversight board membership requirements. 
 
Local jurisdictions must report their compliance with the community oversight board requirements to the Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs (WASPC) by the full compliance date of January 1, 2025.  The WASPC must compile the information into a report to the Legislature by March 1, 2025.

(In support) Transparency and community oversight are critical components of just and fair governance, especially with respect to the exercise of law enforcement functions.  Recent events have sounded a call for a renewed and multifaceted approach to police accountability.  Establishing community oversight boards is one essential step, as current police oversight mechanisms have proven insufficient.  Far too often, calls for accountability have led to police investigating police and community complaints going unheard.  Fewer than one in 12 public complaints lead to disciplinary action.  Police do the right thing when being watched, and bad policing is often the result of bad policy.  Increased oversight will lead to better policies to avoid adverse incidents.  Successful oversight requires independence, resources, and power.  This bill will empower communities to hold law enforcement accountable.
 
The public's opinion matters with respect to these issues, and they should not have to fight this hard to be heard.  Existing advisory boards are symbolic or created by law enforcement, and members of the community are not at the table.  This creates a cycle of distrust, and the only way to disrupt it is with community oversight.  Some say communities should not have this much power, but if there was not police violence it would not be needed.  Unimpeded access to files continues to be a challenge.  The oversight agency must have a relationship to its core functions, which is why it should be able to subpoena documents and evidence.  National standards for civilian oversight have independence as one of the most important concepts, which is why the community oversight boards in the bill do not include law enforcement.  These changes are vital on the east side of the state, even in cities with established oversight.  These changes will build public trust and public safety, and will shift power back to the community.
 
There have been grave transgressions against communities of color.  There have been many incidents of people being killed, maimed, or shot at by the police; often these are ruled as justified and the police have not been held accountable.  When discipline happens it is often overturned through the arbitration process.  A horrific video was released of an officer plowing through a crowd of people, and the body that will investigate the incident is a local investigation team.  Officers should not be investigating officers.  Police have qualified immunity, police union contracts make firing and discipline difficult, and prosecutors have conflicts because they work closely with involved officers.  The community is hurting.  Change is needed to offer hope to the next generation and a point of contact for the community to move past the trauma that has been inflicted upon it.  In many communities the distrust between law enforcement and community members goes both ways, and leads to a lot of hurt and pain.  Accountability must be on both sides.
 
The funding threshold is excessive.  Allocating funding should be the work of the elected officials to ensure that funds are allocated in an equitable manner.  Access to crime scenes and matters related to privilege should be clarified.

(Opposed) Law enforcement strives to increase trust with communities, to provide professional and unbiased service, and to engage in active and ongoing communication.  Under existing structures, law enforcement already is subject to oversight in that sheriffs are elected and police chiefs are appointed by a mayor or city manager.  Communities can already establish oversight boards, but this bill requires communities to do so when they have chosen not to.  The structure in the bill also goes beyond the authority of current boards and micromanages departments.  The provisions relating to selection of candidates for chief of police are inappropriate.  These changes will do more to cause fractures in communities than they will lead to collaboration.
 
There are issues with the provision that allows boards to select outside counsel.  Constitutionally and statutorily the prosecuting attorney is the attorney for the county.  There is also no requirement for any factual basis behind allegations or investigations.  The subpoena authority raises significant concerns, both with respect to documents involved in active investigations and compelled testimony.  Current investigative teams are subject to confidentiality requirements related to access to reports and crime scenes.  Allowing retired law enforcement officers that never worked for the agency would be helpful in terms of adding members with relevant experience.
 
The budget component will cause further financial strain on cities that are already stretched.  This bill creates an unfunded mandate, as the new responsibilities with respect to creating oversight boards and funding private counsel are not funded.  There are also issues with maintaining local control.

(Other) This bill takes a step toward ensuring police management is held accountable and, if done properly, will show how professional law enforcement is.  Also, transparency is a good thing, and the communities served by law enforcement should have a voice.  However there are problems with the bill.  Specifically, the subpoena powers will cause problems, particularly with respect to active investigations.  There is an absence of qualifications for board members, which is problematic as these boards will have access to private and confidential information.  Components of the bill are unclear and overreach.
 
Civilians can do this work well, and some jurisdictions already have oversight bodies, but more can be done to ensure the bill satisfies the needs of communities.  Local jurisdictions should be given more flexibility in determining what entities they create, or to create more than one.  Also, caution should be taken to not have oversight boards that are advocates for either communities or the police.  It is also concerning that the boards are advisory and cannot compel action.

No new changes were recommended.

(In support) Far too often calls for accountability have resulted in police investigating police and public complaints being ignored.  Law enforcement has not held itself accountable when discipling officers for misconduct and this is fundamentally wrong.  Government agents have the ability to take life and liberty from the communities they serve.  Those communities deserve a voice in how they are policed.  This bill will help civilian issues to be heard and rectified.  It is recommended that local jurisdictions reallocate funds in their budgets to fund these oversight boards.  This investment will save the state resources in money, time, and lives.  This bill encourages law enforcement to work directly with their communities in a very real way.  The goal of this bill is to improve community and police relations. 

(Opposed) Washington already has the fewest number of commissioned officers per capita in the country.  This bill is an expensive redundancy as law enforcement already has community oversight in the form of mayors, councils, and voters.  This bill will require counties to establish and completely fund these new community oversight boards.  Unless these boards are funded by the state, this is an unfunded mandate.

A community oversight board can receive citizen complaints or begin an investigation or complaint on its own.  These boards can also conduct investigations, hold hearings, subpoena officers, and be present at crime scenes.  All these acts will consume money that could be better utilized in other ways such as behavioral health or treatment programs.  In addition, the bill promotes a board made up of people who have had a negative experiences with law enforcement.  There is no time, staff, or funds available for what appears to be a free-for-all scrutiny of the police officers by a group whose makeup is presumptively slanted against law enforcement.  This bill is a cumulative effort to punish law enforcement under the guise of reform.

(Other) There is support regarding a community oversight board's ability to communicate, contribute, engage in, and make recommendations on peace officers and agency policies, practices, and procedures.  This will help rebuild trust between police officers and the communities they serve.  However, there is opposition to the provisions of the bill relating to a community oversight board's ability to investigate, make recommendations on discipline, hold hearings, and to issue subpoenas on its own accord.