IN THE MATTER OF THE ETHICS 2003 COMMITTEE CHANGES TO THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (RPC), APR 8 (3 ALTERNATIVES) AND RELATED AMENDMENTS TO GR 25, APR 8, APR 15 PROCEDURAL RULE 5 AND ELC 1.5, 15.1, 15.4 AND 15.5	) ) ) ) ) ) ) )	ORDER NO. 25700-A-808

     The Washington State Bar Association having recommended the adoption of the proposed amendments to the Ethics 2003 Committee changes to the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC), APR 8 (3 Alternatives) and Related Amendments to GR 25, APR 8, APR 15 Procedural Rule 5 and ELC 1.5, 15.1, 15.4 and 15.5, and the Court having approved the proposed amendments for publication;

     Now, therefore, it is hereby

     ORDERED:

     (a) That pursuant to the provisions of GR 9(g), the proposed new rules and amendments as attached hereto are to be published for comment in the Washington Reports, Washington Register, Washington State Bar Association and Administrative Office of the Court's websites in January 2005.

     (b) The purpose statement as required by GR 9(e), is published solely for the information of the Bench, Bar and other interested parties.

     (c) Comments are to be submitted to the Clerk of the Supreme Court by either U.S. Mail or Internet E-Mail by no later than April 29, 2005. Comments may be sent to the following addresses: P.O. Box 40929, Olympia, Washington 98504-0929, or Lisa.Bausch@courts.wa.gov. Comments submitted by e-mail message must be limited to 1500 words.

     DATED at Olympia, Washington this 2nd day of December 2004.

	For the Court
	Gerry L. Alexander
	CHIEF JUSTICE

PREAMBLE AND SCOPE

Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities

Preliminary Statement.

Terminology Scope

Rule

1.0 Terminology

TITLE 1 CLIENT - LAWYER RELATIONSHIP

Rule

1.1	Competence
1.2	Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority
1.3	Diligence
1.4	Communication
1.5	Fees
1.6	Confidentiality of Information
1.7	Conflict of Interest; General Rule: Current Clients
1.8	Conflict of Interest; Prohibited Transactions;: Current Clients: Specific Rules
1.9	Conflict of Interest; Duties to Former Clients
1.10	Imputed Disqualification; Imputation of Conflicts of Interest: General Rule
1.11	Successive Government and Private Employment Special Conflicts of Interest for Former and Current Government Officers and Employees
1.12	Former Judge, Arbitrator, or Mediator or Other Third-Party Neutral
1.13	Organization as Client
1.13 1.14	Client Under a Disability with Diminished Capacity
1.14	Preserving Identity of Funds and Property of a Client 1.15A     Safeguarding Property 1.15B     Required Trust Account Records
1.15 1.16	Declining or Terminating Representation
1.17	Sale of Law Practice
1.18	Duties to Prospective Client

TITLE 2 COUNSELOR

2.1	Advisor
2.2	Intermediary (Deleted)
2.3	Evaluation for Use by Third Persons
2.4	Lawyer Serving as Third-Party Neutral

TITLE 3 ADVOCATE

3.1	Meritorious Claims and Contentions
3.2	Expediting Litigation
3.3	Candor Toward the Tribunal
3.4	Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel
3.5	Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal
3.6	Trial Publicity
3.7	Lawyer as Witness
3.8	Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor
3.9	Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceedings

TITLE 4 TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS OTHER THAN CLIENTS

4.1	Truthfulness in Statements to Others
4.2	Communication with Person Represented by Counsel
4.3	Dealing with Unrepresented Person
4.4	Respect for Rights of Third Persons

TITLE 5 LAW FIRMS AND ASSOCIATIONS

5.1	Responsibilities of a Partners, Managers, and or Supervisory Lawyers
5.2	Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer
5.3	Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants
5.4	Professional Independence of a Lawyer
5.5	Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of Law
5.6	Restrictions on Right to Practice
5.7	Responsibilities Regarding Law-Related Services
5.8	Misconduct Involving Disbarred, Suspended, Resigned, and Inactive Lawyers

TITLE 6 PUBLIC SERVICE

6.1	Pro Bono Publico Service
6.2	Accepting Appointments
6.3	Membership in Legal Services Organization
6.4	Law Reform Activities Affecting Client Interests
6.5	Nonprofit and Court-Annexed Limited Legal Services Programs

TITLE 7 INFORMATION ABOUT LEGAL SERVICES

7.1	Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services
7.2	Advertising
7.3	Direct Contact with Prospective Clients
7.4	Communication of Fields of Practice and Specialization
7.5	Firm Names and Designations Letterheads
7.6	Political Contributions to Obtain Government Legal Engagements or Appointments by Judges

TITLE 8 MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF THE PROFESSION

8.1	Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters
8.2	Judicial and Legal Officials
8.3	Reporting Professional Misconduct
8.4	Misconduct
8.5	Jurisdiction Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law

Appendix: Guidelines for Applying Rule 3.6

     The continued existence of a free and democratic society depends upon recognition of the concept that justice is based upon the rule of law grounded in respect for the dignity of the individual and the capacity through reason for enlightened self-government. Law so grounded makes justice possible, for only through such law does the dignity of the individual attain respect and protection. Without it, individual rights become subject to unrestrained power, respect for law is destroyed, and rational self-government is impossible.

     Lawyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the preservation of society. The fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of their relationship with and function in our legal system. A consequent obligation of lawyers is to maintain the highest standards of ethical conduct.

     In fulfilling professional responsibilities, a lawyer necessarily assumes various roles that require the performance of many difficult tasks. Not every situation which a lawyer may encounter can be foreseen, but fundamental ethical principles are always present as guidelines. Within the framework of these principles, a lawyer must with courage and foresight be able and ready to shape the body of the law to the ever-changing relationships of society.

     The Rules of Professional Conduct point the way to the aspiring and provide standards by which to judge the transgressor. Each lawyer must find within his or her own conscience the touchstone against which to test the extent to which his or her actions should rise above minimum standards. But in the last analysis it is the desire for the respect and confidence of the members of the legal profession and the society which the lawyer serves that should provide to a lawyer the incentive for the highest possible degree of ethical conduct. The possible loss of that respect and confidence is the ultimate sanction. So long as its practitioners are guided by these principles, the law will continue to be a noble profession. This is its greatness and its strength, which permit of no compromise.

     [13] Lawyers play a vital role in the preservation of society. The fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of their relationship to our legal system. The Rules of Professional Conduct, when properly applied, serve to define that relationship.

     [14] The Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason. They should be interpreted with reference to the purposes of legal representation and of the law itself. Some of the Rules are imperatives, cast in the terms "shall" or "shall not." These define proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline. Others, generally cast in the term "may," are permissive and define areas under the Rules in which the lawyer has discretion to exercise professional judgment. No disciplinary action should be taken when the lawyer chooses not to act or acts within the bounds of such discretion. Other Rules define the nature of relationships between the lawyer and others. The Rules are thus partly obligatory and disciplinary and partly constitutive and descriptive in that they define a lawyer's professional role. Many of the Comments use the term "should." Comments do not add obligations to the Rules but provide guidance for practicing in compliance with the Rules.

     [15] The Rules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer's role. That context includes court rules and statutes relating to matters of licensure, laws defining specific obligations of lawyers and substantive and procedural law in general. The Comments are sometimes used to alert lawyers to their responsibilities under such other law.

     [16] Compliance with the Rules, as with all law in an open society, depends primarily upon understanding and voluntary compliance, secondarily upon reinforcement by peer and public opinion and finally, when necessary, upon enforcement through disciplinary proceedings. The Rules do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules. The Rules simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of law.

     [17] [Washington revision] For purposes of determining the lawyer's authority and responsibility, principles of substantive law external to these Rules determine whether a client-lawyer relationship exists. Most of the duties flowing from the client-lawyer relationship attach only after the client-lawyer relationship is formed. But there are some duties, such as that of confidentiality under Rule 1.6, that may attach when the lawyer agrees to consider whether a client-lawyer relationship shall be established. See Rule 1.18 and Washington Comment [11] thereto. Whether a client-lawyer relationship exists for any specific purpose can depend on the circumstances and is a question of fact.

     [18] Under various legal provisions, including constitutional, statutory and common law, the responsibilities of government lawyers may include authority concerning legal matters that ordinarily reposes in the client in private client-lawyer relationships. For example, a lawyer for a government agency may have authority on behalf of the government to decide upon settlement or whether to appeal from an adverse judgment. Such authority in various respects is generally vested in the attorney general and the state's attorney in state government, and their federal counterparts, and the same may be true of other government law officers. Also, lawyers under the supervision of these officers may be authorized to represent several government agencies in intragovernmental legal controversies in circumstances where a private lawyer could not represent multiple private clients. These Rules do not abrogate any such authority.

     [19] Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a Rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary process. The Rules presuppose that disciplinary assessment of a lawyer's conduct will be made on the basis of the facts and circumstances as they existed at the time of the conduct in question and in recognition of the fact that a lawyer often has to act upon uncertain or incomplete evidence of the situation. Moreover, the Rules presuppose that whether or not discipline should be imposed for a violation, and the severity of a sanction, depend on all the circumstances, such as the willfulness and seriousness of the violation, extenuating factors and whether there have been previous violations.

     [20] Violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer nor should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been breached. In addition, violation of a Rule does not necessarily warrant any other nondisciplinary remedy, such as disqualification of a lawyer in pending litigation. The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the Rule. Nevertheless, since the Rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer's violation of a Rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of conduct.

     [21] The Comment accompanying each Rule explains and illustrates the meaning and purpose of the Rule. The Preamble and this note on Scope provide general orientation. The Comments are intended as guides to interpretation, but the text of each Rule is authoritative.

Additional Washington Comments (22 - 23)

     [22] Nothing in these Rules is intended to change existing Washington law on the use of the Rules of Professional Conduct in a civil action. See Hizey v. Carpenter, 119 Wn.2d 251, 830 P.2d 646 (1992).

     [23] The structure of these Rules generally parallels the structure of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The exceptions to this approach are Rule 1.15A, which varies substantially from Model Rule 1.15, and Rules 1.15B and 5.8, neither of which is found in the Model Rules. In other cases, when a provision has been wholly deleted from the counterpart Model Rule, the deletion is signaled by the phrase "Reserved." When a provision has been added, it is generally appended at the end of the Rule or the paragraph in which the variation appears. Whenever the text of a Comment varies materially from the text of its counterpart Comment in the Model Rules, the alteration is signaled by the phrase "Washington revision." Comments that have no counterpart in the Model Rules are compiled at the end of each Comment section under the heading "Additional Washington Comment(s)" and are consecutively numbered. As used herein, the term "former Washington RPC" refers to Washington's Rules of Professional Conduct (adopted effective September 1, 1985, with amendments through September 1, 2003). The term "Model Rule(s)" refers to the 2004 Edition of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct.

     "Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client.

     "Consents in writing" or "written consent" means either (a) a written consent executed by a client, or (b) oral consent given by a client which the lawyer confirms in writing in a manner which can be easily understood by the client and which is promptly transmitted to the client.

     "Consult" or "Consultation" denotes commun-ication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question.

     (b) "Confirmed in writing," when used in reference to the informed consent of a person, denotes informed consent that is given in writing by the person or a writing that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming an oral informed consent. See paragraph (e) for the definition of "informed consent." If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter.

     (c) "Firm" or "law firm" denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a private law firm partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law; or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization and lawyers employed in a legal services organization.

     (d) "Fraud" or "fraudulent" denotes conduct having that has a purpose to deceive and is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction, except that it is not merely negligent necessary that anyone has suffered damages or relied on the misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information inform.

     (e) "Informed consent" denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.

     (f) "Knowingly," "known," or "knows" denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.

     (g) "Partner" denotes a member of a partnership, and a shareholder in a law firm organized as a professional corporation, or a member of an association authorized to practice law.

     (h) "Reasonable" or "reasonably" when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.

     (i) "Reasonable belief" or "reasonably believes" when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.

     (j) "Reasonably should know" when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.

     "Secret" see "Confidence"

     (k) "Screened" denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these Rules or other law.

     (l) "Substantial" when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear and weighty importance.

     (m) "Tribunal" denotes a court, an arbitrator in a binding arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a binding legal judgment directly affecting a party's interests in a particular matter.

     (n) "Writing" or "written" denotes a tangible or electronic record of a communication or representation, including handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photography, audio or videorecording and e-mail. A "signed" writing includes an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a writing and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the writing.

Comment

Confirmed in Writing

     [1] If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit a written confirmation at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. If a lawyer has obtained a client's informed consent, the lawyer may act in reliance on that consent so long as it is confirmed in writing within a reasonable time thereafter.

Firm

     [2] Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within paragraph (c) can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way that suggests that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the Rules. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the Rule that is involved. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the Rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the Rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another.

     [3] [Washington revision] With respect to the law department of an organization, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Rules of Professional Conduct. There can be uncertainty, however, as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates.

     [4] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid and legal services organizations. Depending upon the structure of the organization, the entire organization or different components of it may constitute a firm or firms for purposes of these Rules.

Fraud

     [5] When used in these Rules, the terms "fraud" or "fraudulent" refer to conduct that is characterized as such under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive. This does not include merely negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant information. For purposes of these Rules, it is not necessary that anyone has suffered damages or relied on the misrepresentation or failure to inform.

Informed Consent

     [6] Many of the Rules of Professional Conduct require the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of a client or other person (e.g., a former client or, under certain circumstances, a prospective client) before accepting or continuing representation or pursuing a course of conduct. See, e.g., Rules 1.2(c), 1.6(a) and 1.7(b). The communication necessary to obtain such consent will vary according to the Rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the need to obtain informed consent. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client's or other person's options and alternatives. In some circumstances it may be appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client or other person to seek the advice of other counsel. A lawyer need not inform a client or other person of facts or implications already known to the client or other person; nevertheless, a lawyer who does not personally inform the client or other person assumes the risk that the client or other person is inadequately informed and the consent is invalid. In determining whether the information and explanation provided are reasonably adequate, relevant factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal matters generally and in making decisions of the type involved, and whether the client or other person is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally, such persons need less information and explanation than others, and generally a client or other person who is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent should be assumed to have given informed consent.

     [7] [Washington revision] Obtaining informed consent will usually require an affirmative response by the client or other person. In general, a lawyer may not assume consent from a client's or other person's silence. Consent may be inferred, however, from the conduct of a client or other person who has reasonably adequate information about the matter. A number of Rules require that a person's consent be confirmed in writing. See Rules 1.7(b) and 1.9(a). For a definition of "writing" and "confirmed in writing," see paragraphs (n) and (b). Rule 1.8(a) requires that a client's consent be obtained in a writing signed by the client. See also Rule 1.5 (c)(1) (requiring that a contingent fee agreement be "in a writing signed by the client"). For a definition of "signed," see paragraph (n).

Screened

     [8] [Washington revision] This definition applies to situations where screening of a personally disqualified lawyer is permitted to remove imputation of a conflict of interest under Rules 1.10, 1.11, 1.12, 1.18, or 6.5.

     [9] The purpose of screening is to assure the affected parties that confidential information known by the personally disqualified lawyer remains protected. The personally disqualified lawyer should acknowledge the obligation not to communicate with any of the other lawyers in the firm with respect to the matter. Similarly, other lawyers in the firm who are working on the matter should be informed that the screening is in place and that they may not communicate with the personally disqualified lawyer with respect to the matter. Additional screening measures that are appropriate for the particular matter will depend on the circumstances. To implement, reinforce and remind all affected lawyers of the presence of the screening, it may be appropriate for the firm to undertake such procedures as a written undertaking by the screened lawyer to avoid any communication with other firm personnel and any contact with any firm files or other materials relating to the matter, written notice and instructions to all other firm personnel forbidding any communication with the screened lawyer relating to the matter, denial of access by the screened lawyer to firm files or other materials relating to the matter and periodic reminders of the screen to the screened lawyer and all other firm personnel.

     [10] In order to be effective, screening measures must be implemented as soon as practical after a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know that there is a need for screening.

Additional Washington Comments (11 – 16)

Confirmed in Writing

     [11] Informed consent requires that the writing be articulated in a manner that can be easily understood by the client.

Firm

     [12] Although the definition of "firm" or "law firm" in Rule 1.0(c) differs from the definition set forth in the Terminology section of Washington's former Rules of Professional Conduct, there is no intent to change the scope of the definition or to alter existing Washington law on the application of the Rules of Professional Conduct to lawyers in a government office.

Fraud

     [13] Model Rule 1.0(d) was modified to clarify that the terms "fraud" and "fraudulent" in the Rules of Professional Conduct do not include an element of damage or reliance.

Informed Consent

     [14] In order for the communication to the client to be adequate it must be accomplished in a manner that can be easily understood by the client.

Screened

     [15] See Rules 1.10 and 6.5 for specific screening requirements under the circumstances covered by those Rules.

Other

     [16] For the scope of the phrase "information relating to the representation of a client," which is not defined in Rule 1.0, see Comment [19] to Rule 1.6.

Comment

Legal Knowledge and Skill

     [1] In determining whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter, relevant factors include the relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer's general experience, the lawyer's training and experience in the field in question, the preparation and study the lawyer is able to give the matter and whether it is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or consult with, a lawyer of established competence in the field in question. In many instances, the required proficiency is that of a general practitioner. Expertise in a particular field of law may be required in some circumstances.

     [2] A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. A newly admitted lawyer can be as competent as a practitioner with long experience. Some important legal skills, such as the analysis of precedent, the evaluation of evidence and legal drafting, are required in all legal problems. Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill consists of determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill that necessarily transcends any particular specialized knowledge. A lawyer can provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study. Competent representation can also be provided through the association of a lawyer of established competence in the field in question.

     [3] In an emergency a lawyer may give advice or assistance in a matter in which the lawyer does not have the skill ordinarily required where referral to or consultation or association with another lawyer would be impractical. Even in an emergency, however, assistance should be limited to that reasonably necessary in the circumstances, for ill-considered action under emergency conditions can jeopardize the client's interest.

     [4] A lawyer may accept representation where the requisite level of competence can be achieved by reasonable preparation. This applies as well to a lawyer who is appointed as counsel for an unrepresented person. See also Rule 6.2.

Thoroughness and Preparation

     [5] Competent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners. It also includes adequate preparation. The required attention and preparation are determined in part by what is at stake; major litigation and complex transactions ordinarily require more extensive treatment than matters of lesser complexity and consequence. An agreement between the lawyer and the client regarding the scope of the representation may limit the matters for which the lawyer is responsible. See Rule 1.2(c).

Maintaining Competence

     [6] To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, engage in continuing study and education and comply with all continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is subject.

     (b) A lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities.

     (c) A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client consents after consultation gives informed consent. An agreement limiting the scope of a representation shall consider the applicability of rule 4.2 to the representation.

     (d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.

     (e) When a lawyer knows that a client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law, the lawyer shall consult with the client regarding the relevant limitations on the lawyer's conduct.

     (f) A lawyer shall not willfully purport to act as a lawyer for any person without the authority of that person.

Comment

Allocation of Authority between Client and Lawyer

     [1] Paragraph (a) confers upon the client the ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer's professional obligations. The decisions specified in paragraph (a), such as whether to settle a civil matter, must also be made by the client. See Rule 1.4 (a)(1) for the lawyer's duty to communicate with the client about such decisions. With respect to the means by which the client's objectives are to be pursued, the lawyer shall consult with the client as required by Rule 1.4 (a)(2) and may take such action as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation.

     [2] On occasion, however, a lawyer and a client may disagree about the means to be used to accomplish the client's objectives. Clients normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to the means to be used to accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical matters. Conversely, lawyers usually defer to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons who might be adversely affected. Because of the varied nature of the matters about which a lawyer and client might disagree and because the actions in question may implicate the interests of a tribunal or other persons, this Rule does not prescribe how such disagreements are to be resolved. Other law, however, may be applicable and should be consulted by the lawyer. The lawyer should also consult with the client and seek a mutually acceptable resolution of the disagreement. If such efforts are unavailing and the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement with the client, the lawyer may withdraw from the representation. See Rule 1.16 (b)(4). Conversely, the client may resolve the disagreement by discharging the lawyer. See Rule 1.16 (a)(3).

     [3] At the outset of a representation, the client may authorize the lawyer to take specific action on the client's behalf without further consultation. Absent a material change in circumstances and subject to Rule 1.4, a lawyer may rely on such an advance authorization. The client may, however, revoke such authority at any time.

     [4] In a case in which the client appears to be suffering diminished capacity, the lawyer's duty to abide by the client's decisions is to be guided by reference to Rule 1.14.

Independence from Client's Views or Activities

     [5] Legal representation should not be denied to people who are unable to afford legal services, or whose cause is controversial or the subject of popular disapproval. By the same token, representing a client does not constitute approval of the client's views or activities.

Agreements Limiting Scope of Representation

     [6] The scope of services to be provided by a lawyer may be limited by agreement with the client or by the terms under which the lawyer's services are made available to the client. When a lawyer has been retained by an insurer to represent an insured, for example, the representation may be limited to matters related to the insurance coverage. A limited representation may be appropriate because the client has limited objectives for the representation. In addition, the terms upon which representation is undertaken may exclude specific means that might otherwise be used to accomplish the client's objectives. Such limitations may exclude actions that the client thinks are too costly or that the lawyer regards as repugnant or imprudent.

     [7] Although this Rule affords the lawyer and client substantial latitude to limit the representation, the limitation must be reasonable under the circumstances. If, for example, a client's objective is limited to securing general information about the law the client needs in order to handle a common and typically uncomplicated legal problem, the lawyer and client may agree that the lawyer's services will be limited to a brief telephone consultation. Such a limitation, however, would not be reasonable if the time allotted was not sufficient to yield advice upon which the client could rely. Although an agreement for a limited representation does not exempt a lawyer from the duty to provide competent representation, the limitation is a factor to be considered when determining the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. See Rule 1.1.

     [8] All agreements concerning a lawyer's representation of a client must accord with the Rules of Professional Conduct and other law. See, e.g., Rules 1.1, 1.8 and 5.6.

Criminal, Fraudulent and Prohibited Transactions

     [9] Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly counseling or assisting a client to commit a crime or fraud. This prohibition, however, does not preclude the lawyer from giving an honest opinion about the actual consequences that appear likely to result from a client's conduct. Nor does the fact that a client uses advice in a course of action that is criminal or fraudulent of itself make a lawyer a party to the course of action. There is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal aspects of questionable conduct and recommending the means by which a crime or fraud might be committed with impunity.

     [10] When the client's course of action has already begun and is continuing, the lawyer's responsibility is especially delicate. The lawyer is required to avoid assisting the client, for example, by drafting or delivering documents that the lawyer knows are fraudulent or by suggesting how the wrongdoing might be concealed. A lawyer may not continue assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer originally supposed was legally proper but then discovers is criminal or fraudulent. The lawyer must, therefore, withdraw from the representation of the client in the matter. See Rule 1.16(a). In some cases, withdrawal alone might be insufficient. It may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation or the like. See Rule 4.1.

     [11] Where the client is a fiduciary, the lawyer may be charged with special obligations in dealings with a beneficiary.

     [12] Paragraph (d) applies whether or not the defrauded party is a party to the transaction. Hence, a lawyer must not participate in a transaction to effectuate criminal or fraudulent avoidance of tax liability. Paragraph (d) does not preclude undertaking a criminal defense incident to a general retainer for legal services to a lawful enterprise. The last clause of paragraph (d) recognizes that determining the validity or interpretation of a statute or regulation may require a course of action involving disobedience of the statute or regulation or of the interpretation placed upon it by governmental authorities.

     [13] If a lawyer comes to know or reasonably should know that a client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law or if the lawyer intends to act contrary to the client's instructions, the lawyer must consult with the client regarding the limitations on the lawyer's conduct. See Rule 1.4 (a)(5).

Additional Washington Comment (14)

Agreements Limiting Scope of Representation

     [14] An agreement limiting the scope of a representation shall consider the applicability of Rule 4.2 to the representation. (The provisions of this Comment were taken from former Washington RPC 1.2(c).) See also Comment [11] to Rule 4.2 for specific considerations pertaining to contact with an otherwise represented person to whom limited representation is being or has been provided.

Comment

     [1] A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf. A lawyer is not bound, however, to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client. For example, a lawyer may have authority to exercise professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be pursued. See Rule 1.2. The lawyer's duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require the use of offensive tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in the legal process with courtesy and respect.

     [2] A lawyer's work load must be controlled so that each matter can be handled competently.

     [3] Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than procrastination. A client's interests often can be adversely affected by the passage of time or the change of conditions; in extreme instances, as when a lawyer overlooks a statute of limitations, the client's legal position may be destroyed. Even when the client's interests are not affected in substance, however, unreasonable delay can cause a client needless anxiety and undermine confidence in the lawyer's trustworthiness. A lawyer's duty to act with reasonable promptness, however, does not preclude the lawyer from agreeing to a reasonable request for a postponement that will not prejudice the lawyer's client.

     [4] Unless the relationship is terminated as provided in Rule 1.16, a lawyer should carry through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a client. If a lawyer's employment is limited to a specific matter, the relationship terminates when the matter has been resolved. If a lawyer has served a client over a substantial period in a variety of matters, the client sometimes may assume that the lawyer will continue to serve on a continuing basis unless the lawyer gives notice of withdrawal. Doubt about whether a client-lawyer relationship still exists should be clarified by the lawyer, preferably in writing, so that the client will not mistakenly suppose the lawyer is looking after the client's affairs when the lawyer has ceased to do so. For example, if a lawyer has handled a judicial or administrative proceeding that produced a result adverse to the client and the lawyer and the client have not agreed that the lawyer will handle the matter on appeal, the lawyer must consult with the client about the possibility of appeal before relinquishing responsibility for the matter. See Rule 1.4 (a)(2). Whether the lawyer is obligated to prosecute the appeal for the client depends on the scope of the representation the lawyer has agreed to provide to the client. See Rule 1.2.

     [5] [Washington revision] To prevent neglect of client matters in the event of a sole practitioner's death or disability, the duty of diligence may require that each sole practitioner prepare a plan, in conformity with applicable rules, that designates another competent lawyer to review client files, notify each client of the lawyer's death or disability, and determine whether there is a need for immediate protective action. Cf. Rule for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct 7.7 (authorizing appointment of a custodian to protect clients' interests in the event of a lawyer's death, disability, or disappearance).

     (1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e), is required by these Rules;

     (2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished;

     (3) keep a the client reasonably informed about the status of a the matter; and

     (4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and

     (5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.

     (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

Comment

     [1] Reasonable communication between the lawyer and the client is necessary for the client effectively to participate in the representation.

Communicating with Client

     [2] If these Rules require that a particular decision about the representation be made by the client, paragraph (a)(1) requires that the lawyer promptly consult with and secure the client's consent prior to taking action unless prior discussions with the client have resolved what action the client wants the lawyer to take. For example, a lawyer who receives from opposing counsel an offer of settlement in a civil controversy or a proffered plea bargain in a criminal case must promptly inform the client of its substance unless the client has previously indicated that the proposal will be acceptable or unacceptable or has authorized the lawyer to accept or to reject the offer. See Rule 1.2(a).

     [3] Paragraph (a)(2) requires the lawyer to reasonably consult with the client about the means to be used to accomplish the client's objectives. In some situations - depending on both the importance of the action under consideration and the feasibility of consulting with the client - this duty will require consultation prior to taking action. In other circumstances, such as during a trial when an immediate decision must be made, the exigency of the situation may require the lawyer to act without prior consultation. In such cases the lawyer must nonetheless act reasonably to inform the client of actions the lawyer has taken on the client's behalf. Additionally, paragraph (a)(3) requires that the lawyer keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter, such as significant developments affecting the timing or the substance of the representation.

     [4] A lawyer's regular communication with clients will minimize the occasions on which a client will need to request information concerning the representation. When a client makes a reasonable request for information, however, paragraph (a)(4) requires prompt compliance with the request, or if a prompt response is not feasible, that the lawyer, or a member of the lawyer's staff, acknowledge receipt of the request and advise the client when a response may be expected. Client telephone calls should be promptly returned or acknowledged.

Explaining Matters

     [5] The client should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so. Adequacy of communication depends in part on the kind of advice or assistance that is involved. For example, when there is time to explain a proposal made in a negotiation, the lawyer should review all important provisions with the client before proceeding to an agreement. In litigation a lawyer should explain the general strategy and prospects of success and ordinarily should consult the client on tactics that are likely to result in significant expense or to injure or coerce others. On the other hand, a lawyer ordinarily will not be expected to describe trial or negotiation strategy in detail. The guiding principle is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for information consistent with the duty to act in the client's best interests, and the client's overall requirements as to the character of representation. In certain circumstances, such as when a lawyer asks a client to consent to a representation affected by a conflict of interest, the client must give informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e).

     [6] Ordinarily, the information to be provided is that appropriate for a client who is a comprehending and responsible adult. However, fully informing the client according to this standard may be impracticable, for example, where the client is a child or suffers from diminished capacity. See Rule 1.14. When the client is an organization or group, it is often impossible or inappropriate to inform every one of its members about its legal affairs; ordinarily, the lawyer should address communications to the appropriate officials of the organization. See Rule 1.13. Where many routine matters are involved, a system of limited or occasional reporting may be arranged with the client.

Withholding Information

     [7] In some circumstances, a lawyer may be justified in delaying transmission of information when the client would be likely to react imprudently to an immediate communication. Thus, a lawyer might withhold a psychiatric diagnosis of a client when the examining psychiatrist indicates that disclosure would harm the client. A lawyer may not withhold information to serve the lawyer's own interest or convenience or the interests or convenience of another person. Rules or court orders governing litigation may provide that information supplied to a lawyer may not be disclosed to the client. Rule 3.4(c) directs compliance with such rules or orders.

     (1) Tthe time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the terms of the fee agreement between the lawyer and client;

     (2) Tthe likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;

     (3) Tthe fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;

     (4) Tthe amount involved in the matter on which legal services are rendered and the results obtained;

     (5) Tthe time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;

     (6) Tthe nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;

     (7) Tthe experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and

     (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; and

     (9) the terms of the fee agreement between the lawyer and the client, including Wwhether the fee agreement or confirming writing demonstrates that the client had received a reasonable and fair disclosure of material elements of the fee agreement and of the lawyer's billing practices.

     (b) When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, or if the fee agreement is substantially different than that previously used by the parties, The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee or factors involved in determining the charges and expenses for legal services and the lawyer's billing practices which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client. Upon the request of the client in any matter, the lawyer shall communicate to the client in writing the basis or rate of the fee.

     (c)     A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by section paragraph (d) or other law. If a fee is contingent on the outcome of a matter, a lawyer shall comply with the following:

     (1) A contingent fee agreement shall be in a writing and signed by the client;

     (2) A contingent fee agreement shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal,; litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery,; and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated. The agreement must clearly notify the client of any expenses for which the client will be liable, whether or not the client is the prevailing party;

     (3) Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination.; and

     (24) A contingent fee consisting of a percentage of the monetary amount recovered for a claimant, in which all or part of the recovery is to be paid in the future, shall be paid only

     (i) by applying the percentage to the amounts recovered as they are received by the client; or

     (ii) by applying the percentage to the actual cost of the settlement or award to the defendant.

     (d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:

     (1) Aany fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a dissolution or annulment of marriage or upon the amount of maintenance or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof (except in post dissolution proceedings); or

     (2) Aa contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.

     (e)     A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if:

     (1)(i) the division is in proportion to the services provided by each lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation;

     (ii) the client agrees to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive, and the agreement is confirmed in writing; and

     (iii) the total fee is reasonable; or

     (2) Tthe division is between the lawyer and a duly authorized lawyer referral service of either the Washington State Bar Association or of one of the county bar associations of this state; or.

     (2) The division is in proportion to the services provided by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation; the client is advised of and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved; and the total fee is reasonable.

Comment

Reasonableness of Fee and Expenses

     [1] Paragraph (a) requires that lawyers charge fees that are reasonable under the circumstances. The factors specified in (1) through (9) are not exclusive. Nor will each factor be relevant in each instance. Paragraph (a) also requires that expenses for which the client will be charged must be reasonable. A lawyer may seek reimbursement for the cost of services performed in-house, such as copying, or for other expenses incurred in-house, such as telephone charges, either by charging a reasonable amount to which the client has agreed in advance or by charging an amount that reasonably reflects the cost incurred by the lawyer.

Basis or Rate of Fee

     [2] When the lawyer has regularly represented a client, they ordinarily will have evolved an understanding concerning the basis or rate of the fee and the expenses for which the client will be responsible. In a new client-lawyer relationship, however, an understanding as to fees and expenses must be promptly established. Generally, it is desirable to furnish the client with at least a simple memorandum or copy of the lawyer's customary fee arrangements that states the general nature of the legal services to be provided, the basis, rate or total amount of the fee and whether and to what extent the client will be responsible for any costs, expenses or disbursements in the course of the representation. A written statement concerning the terms of the engagement reduces the possibility of misunderstanding.

     [3] [Washington revision] Contingent fees, like any other fees, are subject to the reasonableness standard of paragraph (a) of this Rule. In determining whether a particular contingent fee is reasonable, or whether it is reasonable to charge any form of contingent fee, a lawyer must consider the factors that are relevant under the circumstances. Applicable law may impose limitations on contingent fees, such as a ceiling on the percentage allowable, or may require a lawyer to offer clients an alternative basis for the fee. Applicable law also may apply to situations other than a contingent fee, for example, government regulations regarding fees in certain tax matters. See, e.g., RCW 4.24.005.

Terms of Payment

     [4] A lawyer may require advance payment of a fee, but is obliged to return any unearned portion. See Rule 1.16(d). A lawyer may accept property in payment for services, such as an ownership interest in an enterprise, providing this does not involve acquisition of a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of the litigation contrary to Rule 1.8 (i). However, a fee paid in property instead of money may be subject to the requirements of Rule 1.8(a) because such fees often have the essential qualities of a business transaction with the client.

     [5] An agreement may not be made whose terms might induce the lawyer improperly to curtail services for the client or perform them in a way contrary to the client's interest. For example, a lawyer should not enter into an agreement whereby services are to be provided only up to a stated amount when it is foreseeable that more extensive services probably will be required, unless the situation is adequately explained to the client. Otherwise, the client might have to bargain for further assistance in the midst of a proceeding or transaction. However, it is proper to define the extent of services in light of the client's ability to pay. A lawyer should not exploit a fee arrangement based primarily on hourly charges by using wasteful procedures.

Prohibited Contingent Fees

     [6] [Washington revision] Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from charging a contingent fee in a domestic relations matter when payment is contingent upon the securing of a dissolution or annulment of marriage or upon the amount of maintenance or support or property settlement to be obtained. This provision does not preclude a contract for a contingent fee for legal representation in connection with the recovery of post-judgment balances due under support, maintenance or other financial orders because such contracts do not implicate the same policy concerns.

Division of Fee

     [7] A division of fee is a single billing to a client covering the fee of two or more lawyers who are not in the same firm. A division of fee facilitates association of more than one lawyer in a matter in which neither alone could serve the client as well, and most often is used when the fee is contingent and the division is between a referring lawyer and a trial specialist. Paragraph (e) permits the lawyers to divide a fee either on the basis of the proportion of services they render or if each lawyer assumes responsibility for the representation as a whole. In addition, the client must agree to the arrangement, including the share that each lawyer is to receive, and the agreement must be confirmed in writing. Contingent fee agreements must be in a writing signed by the client and must otherwise comply with paragraph (c) of this Rule. Joint responsibility for the representation entails financial and ethical responsibility for the representation as if the lawyers were associated in a partnership. A lawyer should only refer a matter to a lawyer whom the referring lawyer reasonably believes is competent to handle the matter. See Rule 1.1.

     [8] Paragraph (e) does not prohibit or regulate division of fees to be received in the future for work done when lawyers were previously associated in a law firm.

Disputes over Fees

     [9] If a procedure has been established for resolution of fee disputes, such as an arbitration or mediation procedure established by the bar, the lawyer must comply with the procedure when it is mandatory, and, even when it is voluntary, the lawyer should conscientiously consider submitting to it. Law may prescribe a procedure for determining a lawyer's fee, for example, in representation of an executor or administrator, a class or a person entitled to a reasonable fee as part of the measure of damages. The lawyer entitled to such a fee and a lawyer representing another party concerned with the fee should comply with the prescribed procedure.

Additional Washington Comments (10 - 11)

Reasonableness of Fee and Expenses

     [10] Every fee agreed to, charged, or collected, including a fee denominated as "nonrefundable" or "earned upon receipt," is subject to Rule 1.5(a) and may not be unreasonable.

     [11] Under paragraph (a)(9), one factor in determining whether a fee is reasonable is whether the fee agreement or confirming writing demonstrates that the client received a reasonable and fair disclosure of material elements of the fee agreement. Lawyers are encouraged to use written fee agreements that fully and fairly disclose all material terms in a manner easily understood by the client.

     (b) A lawyer may reveal such confidences or secrets information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:

     (1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;

     (12) Tto prevent the client from committing a crime; or

     (3) to prevent the client from committing a fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services;

     (4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these Rules;

     (25) Tto establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client; or pursuant to

     (6) to comply with a court order.; or

     (c7) A lawyer may reveal to the inform a tribunal confidences or secrets which disclose about any client's breach of fiduciary responsibility by when a the client who is serving as a court-appointed fiduciary such as a guardian, personal representative, or receiver, or other court appointed fiduciary.

Comment

     [1] This Rule governs the disclosure by a lawyer of information relating to the representation of a client during the lawyer's representation of the client. See Rule 1.18 for the lawyer's duties with respect to information provided to the lawyer by a prospective client, Rule 1.9 (c)(2) for the lawyer's duty not to reveal information relating to the lawyer's prior representation of a former client and Rules 1.8(b) and 1.9 (c)(1) for the lawyer's duties with respect to the use of such information to the disadvantage of clients and former clients.

     [2] A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the absence of the client's informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal information relating to the representation. See Rule 1.0(e) for the definition of informed consent. This contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship. The client is thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter. The lawyer needs this information to represent the client effectively and, if necessary, to advise the client to refrain from wrongful conduct. Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to determine their rights and what is, in the complex of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and correct. Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld.

     [3] The principle of client-lawyer confidentiality is given effect by related bodies of law: the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine and the rule of confidentiality established in professional ethics. The attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine apply in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a client. The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law. The confidentiality rule, for example, applies not only to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information relating to the representation, whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose such information except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. See also Scope.

     [4] Paragraph (a) prohibits a lawyer from revealing information relating to the representation of a client. This prohibition also applies to disclosures by a lawyer that do not in themselves reveal protected information but could reasonably lead to the discovery of such information by a third person. A lawyer's use of a hypothetical to discuss issues relating to the representation is permissible so long as there is no reasonable likelihood that the listener will be able to ascertain the identity of the client or the situation involved.

Authorized Disclosure

     [5] Except to the extent that the client's instructions or special circumstances limit that authority, a lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures about a client when appropriate in carrying out the representation. In some situations, for example, a lawyer may be impliedly authorized to admit a fact that cannot properly be disputed or to make a disclosure that facilitates a satisfactory conclusion to a matter. Lawyers in a firm may, in the course of the firm's practice, disclose to each other information relating to a client of the firm, unless the client has instructed that particular information be confined to specified lawyers.

Disclosure Adverse to Client

     [6] Although the public interest is usually best served by a strict rule requiring lawyers to preserve the confidentiality of information relating to the representation of their clients, the confidentiality rule is subject to limited exceptions. Paragraph (b)(1) recognizes the overriding value of life and physical integrity and permits disclosure reasonably necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm. Such harm is reasonably certain to occur if it will be suffered imminently or if there is a present and substantial threat that a person will suffer such harm at a later date if the lawyer fails to take action necessary to eliminate the threat. Thus, a lawyer who knows that a client has accidentally discharged toxic waste into a town's water supply may reveal this information to the authorities if there is a present and substantial risk that a person who drinks the water will contract a life-threatening or debilitating disease and the lawyer's disclosure is necessary to eliminate the threat or reduce the number of victims.

     [7] [Reserved. See Washington Comments [20] & [21].]

     [8] [Reserved. See Washington Comments [20] & [21].]

     [9] A lawyer's confidentiality obligations do not preclude a lawyer from securing confidential legal advice about the lawyer's personal responsibility to comply with these Rules. In most situations, disclosing information to secure such advice will be impliedly authorized for the lawyer to carry out the representation. Even when the disclosure is not impliedly authorized, paragraph (b)(4) permits such disclosure because of the importance of a lawyer's compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct.

     [10] Where a legal claim or disciplinary charge alleges complicity of the lawyer in a client's conduct or other misconduct of the lawyer involving representation of the client, the lawyer may respond to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to establish a defense. The same is true with respect to a claim involving the conduct or representation of a former client. Such a charge can arise in a civil, criminal, disciplinary or other proceeding and can be based on a wrong allegedly committed by the lawyer against the client or on a wrong alleged by a third person, for example, a person claiming to have been defrauded by the lawyer and client acting together. The lawyer's right to respond arises when an assertion of such complicity has been made. Paragraph (b)(5) does not require the lawyer to await the commencement of an action or proceeding that charges such complicity, so that the defense may be established by responding directly to a third party who has made such an assertion. The right to defend also applies, of course, where a proceeding has been commenced.

     [11] A lawyer entitled to a fee is permitted by paragraph (b)(5) to prove the services rendered in an action to collect it. This aspect of the Rule expresses the principle that the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship may not exploit it to the detriment of the fiduciary.

     [12] [Reserved.]

     [13] [Washington revision] A lawyer may be ordered to reveal information relating to the representation of a client by a court. Absent informed consent of the client to do otherwise, the lawyer should assert on behalf of the client all nonfrivolous claims that the information sought is protected against disclosure by the attorney-client privilege or other applicable law. In the event of an adverse ruling, the lawyer must consult with the client about the possibility of appeal to the extent required by Rule 1.4. Unless review is sought, however, paragraph (b)(6) permits the lawyer to comply with the court's order.

     [14] Paragraph (b) permits disclosure only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary to accomplish one of the purposes specified. Where practicable, the lawyer should first seek to persuade the client to take suitable action to obviate the need for disclosure. In any case, a disclosure adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to accomplish the purpose. If the disclosure will be made in connection with a judicial proceeding, the disclosure should be made in a manner that limits access to the information to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable.

     [15] [Washington revision] Paragraph (b) permits but does not require the disclosure of information relating to a client's representation to accomplish the purposes specified in paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(7). In exercising the discretion conferred by this Rule, the lawyer may consider such factors as the nature of the lawyer's relationship with the client and with those who might be injured by the client, the lawyer's own involvement in the transaction and factors that may extenuate the conduct in question. A lawyer's decision not to disclose as permitted by paragraph (b) does not violate this Rule. Disclosure may be required, however, by other Rules. Some Rules require disclosure only if such disclosure would be permitted by paragraph (b). See Rules 1.2(d), 4.1(b), and 8.1. Rule 3.3, on the other hand, requires disclosure in some circumstances regardless of whether such disclosure is permitted by this Rule. See Rule 3.3(c). See also Rule 1.13(c), which permits disclosure in some circumstances whether or not Rule 1.6 permits the disclosure.

Acting Competently to Preserve Confidentiality

     [16] A lawyer must act competently to safeguard information relating to the representation of a client against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or other persons who are participating in the representation of the client or who are subject to the lawyer's supervision. See Rules 1.1, 5.1 and 5.3.

     [17] When transmitting a communication that includes information relating to the representation of a client, the lawyer must take reasonable precautions to prevent the information from coming into the hands of unintended recipients. This duty, however, does not require that the lawyer use special security measures if the method of communication affords a reasonable expectation of privacy. Special circumstances, however, may warrant special precautions. Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer's expectation of confidentiality include the sensitivity of the information and the extent to which the privacy of the communication is protected by law or by a confidentiality agreement. A client may require the lawyer to implement special security measures not required by this Rule or may give informed consent to the use of a means of communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this Rule.

Former Client

     [18] The duty of confidentiality continues after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated. See Rule 1.9 (c)(2). See Rule 1.9 (c)(1) for the prohibition against using such information to the disadvantage of the former client.

Additional Washington Comments (19 - 25)

     [19] The phrase "information relating to the representation" should be interpreted broadly. The "information" protected by this Rule includes, but is not necessarily limited to, confidences and secrets. "Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney client privilege under applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client.

Disclosure Adverse to Client

     [20] Washington's Rule 1.6 (b)(2), which authorizes disclosure to prevent a client from committing a crime, is significantly broader than the corresponding exception in the Model Rule. While the Model Rule permits a lawyer to reveal information relating to the representation to prevent the client from "committing a crime... that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer's services," Washington's Rule permits the lawyer to reveal such information to prevent the commission of any crime.

     [21] Washington's Rule 1.6 (b)(3) is identical to Model Rule 1.6 (b)(2) with respect to disclosure of fraud. This is a limited exception that permits the lawyer to reveal information to the extent necessary to enable affected persons or appropriate authorities to prevent the client from committing a fraud, as defined in Rule 1.0(d), that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial or property interests of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services. Similarly, paragraph (b)(2) is a limited exception that permits the lawyer to reveal information to the extent necessary to enable affected persons or appropriate authorities to prevent the client from committing a crime. In both instances, such a serious abuse of the client-lawyer relationship by the client forfeits the protection of this Rule. The client can, of course, prevent such disclosure by refraining from the wrongful conduct. Although paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3) do not require the lawyer to reveal the client's misconduct, the lawyer may not counsel or assist the client in conduct the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. See Rule 1.2(d). See also Rule 1.16 with respect to the lawyer's obligation or right to withdraw from the representation of the client in such circumstances, and Rule 1.13(c), which permits the lawyer to reveal information relating to the representation of an organizational client in limited circumstances.

     [22] Washington has not adopted Model Rule 1.6 (b)(3), which permits a lawyer to reveal information relating to the representation not only to prevent but also to "mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client's commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer's services." If a crime or fraud is still ongoing, a lawyer is permitted to disclose under Rule 1.6 (b)(2) or (b)(3). Once the crime or fraud has been completed, there is less of an urgent need for disclosure. If the crime or fraud has been completed, the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege may permit the lawyer to reveal the information, but only pursuant to a court order. This approach strikes an appropriate balance between the public interest in acquiring significant information and the need for judicial supervision over lawyer decisions about whether such information should be revealed.

     [23] The exceptions to the general rule prohibiting unauthorized disclosure of information relating to the representation "should not be carelessly invoked." In re Boelter, 139 Wn.2d 81, 91, 985 P.2d 328 (1999). A lawyer must make every effort practicable to avoid unnecessary disclosure of information relating to a representation, to limit disclosure to those having the need to know it, and to obtain protective orders or make other arrangements minimizing the risk of avoidable disclosure.

     [24] Washington has not adopted that portion of Model Rule 1.6 (b)(6) permitting a lawyer to reveal information related to the representation to comply with "other law." Washington's omission of this phrase arises from a concern that it would authorize the lawyer to decide whether a disclosure is required by "other law," even though the right to confidentiality and the right to waive confidentiality belong to the client. The decision to waive confidentiality should only be made by a fully informed client after consultation with the client's lawyer or by a court of competent jurisdiction. Limiting the exception to compliance with a court order protects the client's interest in maintaining confidentiality while insuring that any determination about the legal necessity of revealing confidential information will be made by a court. It is the need for a judicial resolution of such issues that necessitates the omission of "other law" from this Rule.

Withdrawal

     [25] After withdrawal the lawyer is required to refrain from disclosing the client's confidences, except as otherwise permitted by Rules 1.6 or 1.9. A lawyer is not prohibited from giving notice of the fact of withdrawal by this Rule, Rule 1.8(b), or Rule 1.9(c). If the lawyer's services will be used by the client in furthering a course of criminal or fraudulent conduct, the lawyer must withdraw. See Rule 1.16 (a)(1). Upon withdrawal from the representation in such circumstances, the lawyer may also disaffirm or withdraw any opinion, document, affirmation, or the like. If the client is an organization, the lawyer may be in doubt about whether contemplated conduct will actually be carried out by the organization. When a lawyer requires guidance about compliance with this Rule in connection with an organizational client, the lawyer may proceed under the provisions of Rule 1.13(b).

Other

     [26] This Rule does not relieve a lawyer of his or her obligations under Rule 5.4(b) of the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct.

     (1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client, unless:; or

     (1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and

     (2) Each client consents in writing after consultation and a full disclosure of the material facts (following authorization from the other client to make such a disclosure).

     (b2) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients may will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or to a third person, or by a personal interest of the lawyer's own interests, unless:.

     (1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and

     (2) The client consents in writing after consultation and a full disclosure of the material facts (following authorization from the other client to make such a disclosure). When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks involved.

     (c) For purposes of this rule, when a lawyer who is not a public officer or employee represents a discrete governmental agency or unit that is part of a broader governmental entity, the lawyer's client is the particular governmental agency or unit represented, and not the broader governmental entity of which the agency or unit is a part, unless:

     (1) Otherwise provided in a written agreement between the lawyer and the governmental agency or unit; or

     (2) The broader governmental entity gives the lawyer timely written notice to the contrary, in which case the client shall be designated by such entity. Notice under this subsection shall be given by the person designated by law as the chief legal officer of the broader governmental entity, or in absence of such designation, by the chief executive officer of the entity.

     (b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:

     (1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client;

     (2) the representation is not prohibited by law;

     (3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and

     (4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing (following authorization from the other client to make any required disclosures).

Comment

General Principles

     [1] Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client. Concurrent conflicts of interest can arise from the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or from the lawyer's own interests. For specific Rules regarding certain concurrent conflicts of interest, see Rule 1.8. For former client conflicts of interest, see Rule 1.9. For conflicts of interest involving prospective clients, see Rule 1.18. For definitions of "informed consent" and "confirmed in writing," see Rule 1.0 (e) and (b).

     [2] Resolution of a conflict of interest problem under this Rule requires the lawyer to: 1) clearly identify the client or clients; 2) determine whether a conflict of interest exists; 3) decide whether the representation may be undertaken despite the existence of a conflict, i.e., whether the conflict is consentable; and 4) if so, consult with the clients affected under paragraph (a) and obtain their informed consent, confirmed in writing. The clients affected under paragraph (a) include both of the clients referred to in paragraph (a)(1) and the one or more clients whose representation might be materially limited under paragraph (a)(2).

     [3] A conflict of interest may exist before representation is undertaken, in which event the representation must be declined, unless the lawyer obtains the informed consent of each client under the conditions of paragraph (b). To determine whether a conflict of interest exists, a lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and type of firm and practice, to determine in both litigation and non-litigation matters the persons and issues involved. See also Comment to Rule 5.1. Ignorance caused by a failure to institute such procedures will not excuse a lawyer's violation of this Rule. As to whether a client-lawyer relationship exists or, having once been established, is continuing, see Comment to Rule 1.3 and Scope.

     [4] If a conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer ordinarily must withdraw from the representation, unless the lawyer has obtained the informed consent of the client under the conditions of paragraph (b). See Rule 1.16. Where more than one client is involved, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the clients is determined both by the lawyer's ability to comply with duties owed to the former client and by the lawyer's ability to represent adequately the remaining client or clients, given the lawyer's duties to the former client. See Rule 1.9. See also Comments [5] and [29].

     [5] Unforeseeable developments, such as changes in corporate and other organizational affiliations or the addition or realignment of parties in litigation, might create conflicts in the midst of a representation, as when a company sued by the lawyer on behalf of one client is bought by another client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter. Depending on the circumstances, the lawyer may have the option to withdraw from one of the representations in order to avoid the conflict. The lawyer must seek court approval where necessary and take steps to minimize harm to the clients. See Rule 1.16. The lawyer must continue to protect the confidences of the client from whose representation the lawyer has withdrawn. See Rule 1.9(c).

Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Directly Adverse

     [6] Loyalty to a current client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that client's informed consent. Thus, absent consent, a lawyer may not act as an advocate in one matter against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even when the matters are wholly unrelated. The client as to whom the representation is directly adverse is likely to feel betrayed, and the resulting damage to the client-lawyer relationship is likely to impair the lawyer's ability to represent the client effectively. In addition, the client on whose behalf the adverse representation is undertaken reasonably may fear that the lawyer will pursue that client's case less effectively out of deference to the other client, i.e., that the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's interest in retaining the current client. Similarly, a directly adverse conflict may arise when a lawyer is required to cross-examine a client who appears as a witness in a lawsuit involving another client, as when the testimony will be damaging to the client who is represented in the lawsuit. On the other hand, simultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only economically adverse, such as representation of competing economic enterprises in unrelated litigation, does not ordinarily constitute a conflict of interest and thus may not require consent of the respective clients.

     [7] Directly adverse conflicts can also arise in transactional matters. For example, if a lawyer is asked to represent the seller of a business in negotiations with a buyer represented by the lawyer, not in the same transaction but in another, unrelated matter, the lawyer could not undertake the representation without the informed consent of each client.

Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Material Limitation

     [8] Even where there is no direct adverseness, a conflict of interest exists if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's ability to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client will be materially limited as a result of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. For example, a lawyer asked to represent several individuals seeking to form a joint venture is likely to be materially limited in the lawyer's ability to recommend or advocate all possible positions that each might take because of the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the others. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client. The mere possibility of subsequent harm does not itself require disclosure and consent. The critical questions are the likelihood that a difference in interests will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client.

Lawyer's Responsibilities to Former Clients and Other Third Persons

     [9] In addition to conflicts with other current clients, a lawyer's duties of loyalty and independence may be materially limited by responsibilities to former clients under Rule 1.9 or by the lawyer's responsibilities to other persons, such as fiduciary duties arising from a lawyer's service as a trustee, executor or corporate director.

Personal Interest Conflicts

     [10] The lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client. For example, if the probity of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice. Similarly, when a lawyer has discussions concerning possible employment with an opponent of the lawyer's client, or with a law firm representing the opponent, such discussions could materially limit the lawyer's representation of the client. In addition, a lawyer may not allow related business interests to affect representation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed financial interest. See Rule 1.8 for specific Rules pertaining to a number of personal interest conflicts, including business transactions with clients. See also Rule 1.10 (personal interest conflicts under Rule 1.7 ordinarily are not imputed to other lawyers in a law firm).

     [11] [Washington revision] When lawyers representing different clients in the same matter or in substantially related matters are related as parent, child, sibling, or spouse, or if the lawyers have some other close familial relationship or if the lawyers are in a personal intimate relationship with one another, there may be a significant risk that client confidences will be revealed and that the lawyer's family or other familial or intimate relationship will interfere with both loyalty and independent professional judgment. See Rule 1.8(l). As a result, each client is entitled to know of the existence and implications of the relationship between the lawyers before the lawyer agrees to undertake the representation. Thus, a lawyer so related to another lawyer ordinarily may not represent a client in a matter where that lawyer is representing another party, unless each client gives informed consent. The disqualification arising from such relationships is personal and ordinarily is not imputed to members of firms with whom the lawyers are associated. See Rules 1.8(k) and 1.10.

     [12] A lawyer is prohibited from engaging in sexual relationships with a client unless the sexual relationship predates the formation of the client-lawyer relationship. See Rule 1.8(j).

Interest of Person Paying for a Lawyer's Service

     [13] A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, including a co-client, if the client is informed of that fact and consents and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty or independent judgment to the client. See Rule 1.8(f). If acceptance of the payment from any other source presents a significant risk that the lawyer's representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's own interest in accommodating the person paying the lawyer's fee or by the lawyer's responsibilities to a payer who is also a co-client, then the lawyer must comply with the requirements of paragraph (b) before accepting the representation, including determining whether the conflict is consentable and, if so, that the client has adequate information about the material risks of the representation.

Prohibited Representations

     [14] Ordinarily, clients may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However, as indicated in paragraph (b), some conflicts are nonconsentable, meaning that the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's consent. When the lawyer is representing more than one client, the question of consentability must be resolved as to each client.

     [15] Consentability is typically determined by considering whether the interests of the clients will be adequately protected if the clients are permitted to give their informed consent to representation burdened by a conflict of interest. Thus, under paragraph (b)(1), representation is prohibited if in the circumstances the lawyer cannot reasonably conclude that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation. See Rule 1.1 (Competence) and Rule 1.3 (Diligence).

     [16] [Washington revision] Paragraph (b)(2) describes conflicts that are nonconsentable because the representation is prohibited by applicable law. For example, in some states substantive law provides that the same lawyer may not represent more than one defendant in a capital case, even with the consent of the clients, and under federal criminal statutes certain representations by a former government lawyer are prohibited, despite the informed consent of the former client. In addition, decisional law in some states other than Washington limits the ability of a governmental client, such as a municipality, to consent to a conflict of interest. See Washington Comment [38].

     [17] Paragraph (b)(3) describes conflicts that are nonconsentable because of the institutional interest in vigorous development of each client's position when the clients are aligned directly against each other in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal. Whether clients are aligned directly against each other within the meaning of this paragraph requires examination of the context of the proceeding. Although this paragraph does not preclude a lawyer's multiple representation of adverse parties to a mediation (because mediation is not a proceeding before a "tribunal" under Rule 1.0(m)), such representation may be precluded by paragraph (b)(1).

Informed Consent

     [18] Informed consent requires that each affected client be aware of the relevant circumstances and of the material and reasonably foreseeable ways that the conflict could have adverse effects on the interests of that client. See Rule 1.0(e) (informed consent). The information required depends on the nature of the conflict and the nature of the risks involved. When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the information must include the implications of the common representation, including possible effects on loyalty, confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege and the advantages and risks involved. See Comments [30] and [31] (effect of common representation on confidentiality).

     [19] Under some circumstances it may be impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain consent. For example, when the lawyer represents different clients in related matters and one of the clients refuses to consent to the disclosure necessary to permit the other client to make an informed decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to consent. In some cases the alternative to common representation can be that each party may have to obtain separate representation with the possibility of incurring additional costs. These costs, along with the benefits of securing separate representation, are factors that may be considered by the affected client in determining whether common representation is in the client's interests.

Consent Confirmed in Writing

     [20] Paragraph (b) requires the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of the client, confirmed in writing. Such a writing may consist of a document executed by the client or one that the lawyer promptly records and transmits to the client following an oral consent. See Rule 1.0(b). See also Rule 1.0(n) (writing includes electronic transmission). If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. See Rule 1.0(b). The requirement of a writing does not supplant the need in most cases for the lawyer to talk with the client, to explain the risks and advantages, if any, of representation burdened with a conflict of interest, as well as reasonably available alternatives, and to afford the client a reasonable opportunity to consider the risks and alternatives and to raise questions and concerns. Rather, the writing is required in order to impress upon clients the seriousness of the decision the client is being asked to make and to avoid disputes or ambiguities that might later occur in the absence of a writing.

Revoking Consent

     [21] A client who has given consent to a conflict may revoke the consent and, like any other client, may terminate the lawyer's representation at any time. Whether revoking consent to the client's own representation precludes the lawyer from continuing to represent other clients depends on the circumstances, including the nature of the conflict, whether the client revoked consent because of a material change in circumstances, the reasonable expectations of the other client and whether material detriment to the other clients or the lawyer would result.

Consent to Future Conflict

     [22] Whether a lawyer may properly request a client to waive conflicts that might arise in the future is subject to the test of paragraph (b). The effectiveness of such waivers is generally determined by the extent to which the client reasonably understands the material risks that the waiver entails. The more comprehensive the explanation of the types of future representations that might arise and the actual and reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences of those representations, the greater the likelihood that the client will have the requisite understanding. Thus, if the client agrees to consent to a particular type of conflict with which the client is already familiar, then the consent ordinarily will be effective with regard to that type of conflict. If the consent is general and open-ended, then the consent ordinarily will be ineffective, because it is not reasonably likely that the client will have understood the material risks involved. On the other hand, if the client is an experienced user of the legal services involved and is reasonably informed regarding the risk that a conflict may arise, such consent is more likely to be effective, particularly if, e.g., the client is independently represented by other counsel in giving consent and the consent is limited to future conflicts unrelated to the subject of the representation. In any case, advance consent cannot be effective if the circumstances that materialize in the future are such as would make the conflict nonconsentable under paragraph (b).

Conflicts in Litigation

     [23] Paragraph (b)(3) prohibits representation of opposing parties in the same litigation, regardless of the clients' consent. On the other hand, simultaneous representation of parties whose interests in litigation may conflict, such as coplaintiffs or codefendants, is governed by paragraph (a)(2). A conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question. Such conflicts can arise in criminal cases as well as civil. The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant. On the other hand, common representation of persons having similar interests in civil litigation is proper if the requirements of paragraph (b) are met.

     [24] Ordinarily a lawyer may take inconsistent legal positions in different tribunals at different times on behalf of different clients. The mere fact that advocating a legal position on behalf of one client might create precedent adverse to the interests of a client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter does not create a conflict of interest. A conflict of interest exists, however, if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's action on behalf of one client will materially limit the lawyer's effectiveness in representing another client in a different case; for example, when a decision favoring one client will create a precedent likely to seriously weaken the position taken on behalf of the other client. Factors relevant in determining whether the clients need to be advised of the risk include: where the cases are pending, whether the issue is substantive or procedural, the temporal relationship between the matters, the significance of the issue to the immediate and long-term interests of the clients involved and the clients' reasonable expectations in retaining the lawyer. If there is significant risk of material limitation, then absent informed consent of the affected clients, the lawyer must refuse one of the representations or withdraw from one or both matters.

     [25] When a lawyer represents or seeks to represent a class of plaintiffs or defendants in a class-action lawsuit, unnamed members of the class are ordinarily not considered to be clients of the lawyer for purposes of applying paragraph (a)(1) of this Rule. Thus, the lawyer does not typically need to get the consent of such a person before representing a client suing the person in an unrelated matter. Similarly, a lawyer seeking to represent an opponent in a class action does not typically need the consent of an unnamed member of the class whom the lawyer represents in an unrelated matter.

Nonlitigation Conflicts

     [26] Conflicts of interest under paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) arise in contexts other than litigation. For a discussion of directly adverse conflicts in transactional matters, see Comment [7]. Relevant factors in determining whether there is significant potential for material limitation include the duration and intimacy of the lawyer's relationship with the client or clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that disagreements will arise and the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict. The question is often one of proximity and degree. See Comment [8].

     [27] For example, conflict questions may arise in estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called upon to prepare wills for several family members, such as husband and wife, and, depending upon the circumstances, a conflict of interest may be present. In estate administration the identity of the client may be unclear under the law of a particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or trust, including its beneficiaries. In order to comply with conflict of interest rules, the lawyer should make clear the lawyer's relationship to the parties involved.

     [28] Whether a conflict is consentable depends on the circumstances. For example, a lawyer may not represent multiple parties to a negotiation whose interests are fundamentally antagonistic to each other, but common representation is permissible where the clients are generally aligned in interest even though there is some difference in interest among them. Thus, a lawyer may seek to establish or adjust a relationship between clients on an amicable and mutually advantageous basis; for example, in helping to organize a business in which two or more clients are entrepreneurs, working out the financial reorganization of an enterprise in which two or more clients have an interest or arranging a property distribution in settlement of an estate. The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially adverse interests by developing the parties' mutual interests. Otherwise, each party might have to obtain separate representation, with the possibility of incurring additional cost, complication or even litigation. Given these and other relevant factors, the clients may prefer that the lawyer act for all of them.

Special Considerations in Common Representation

     [29] In considering whether to represent multiple clients in the same matter, a lawyer should be mindful that if the common representation fails because the potentially adverse interests cannot be reconciled, the result can be additional cost, embarrassment and recrimination. Ordinarily, the lawyer will be forced to withdraw from representing all of the clients if the common representation fails. In some situations, the risk of failure is so great that multiple representation is plainly impossible. For example, a lawyer cannot undertake common representation of clients where contentious litigation or negotiations between them are imminent or contemplated. Moreover, because the lawyer is required to be impartial between commonly represented clients, representation of multiple clients is improper when it is unlikely that impartiality can be maintained. Generally, if the relationship between the parties has already assumed antagonism, the possibility that the clients' interests can be adequately served by common representation is not very good. Other relevant factors are whether the lawyer subsequently will represent both parties on a continuing basis and whether the situation involves creating or terminating a relationship between the parties.

     [30] A particularly important factor in determining the appropriateness of common representation is the effect on client-lawyer confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege. With regard to the attorney-client privilege, the prevailing rule is that, as between commonly represented clients, the privilege does not attach. Hence, it must be assumed that if litigation eventuates between the clients, the privilege will not protect any such communications, and the clients should be so advised.

     [31] As to the duty of confidentiality, continued common representation will almost certainly be inadequate if one client asks the lawyer not to disclose to the other client information relevant to the common representation. This is so because the lawyer has an equal duty of loyalty to each client, and each client has the right to be informed of anything bearing on the representation that might affect that client's interests and the right to expect that the lawyer will use that information to that client's benefit. See Rule 1.4. The lawyer should, at the outset of the common representation and as part of the process of obtaining each client's informed consent, advise each client that information will be shared and that the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client decides that some matter material to the representation should be kept from the other. In limited circumstances, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to proceed with the representation when the clients have agreed, after being properly informed, that the lawyer will keep certain information confidential. For example, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that failure to disclose one client's trade secrets to another client will not adversely affect representation involving a joint venture between the clients and agree to keep that information confidential with the informed consent of both clients.

     [32] When seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between clients, the lawyer should make clear that the lawyer's role is not that of partisanship normally expected in other circumstances and, thus, that the clients may be required to assume greater responsibility for decisions than when each client is separately represented. Any limitations on the scope of the representation made necessary as a result of the common representation should be fully explained to the clients at the outset of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c).

     [33] Subject to the above limitations, each client in the common representation has the right to loyal and diligent representation and the protection of Rule 1.9 concerning the obligations to a former client. The client also has the right to discharge the lawyer as stated in Rule 1.16.

Organizational Clients

     [34] A lawyer who represents a corporation or other organization does not, by virtue of that representation, necessarily represent any constituent or affiliated organization, such as a parent or subsidiary. See Rule 1.13(a). Thus, the lawyer for an organization is not barred from accepting representation adverse to an affiliate in an unrelated matter, unless the circumstances are such that the affiliate should also be considered a client of the lawyer, there is an understanding between the lawyer and the organizational client that the lawyer will avoid representation adverse to the client's affiliates, or the lawyer's obligations to either the organizational client or the new client are likely to limit materially the lawyer's representation of the other client.

     [35] A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its board of directors should determine whether the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict. The lawyer may be called on to advise the corporation in matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to the frequency with which such situations may arise, the potential intensity of the conflict, the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board and the possibility of the corporation's obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in such situations. If there is material risk that the dual role will compromise the lawyer's independence of professional judgment, the lawyer should not serve as a director or should cease to act as the corporation's lawyer when conflicts of interest arise. The lawyer should advise the other members of the board that in some circumstances matters discussed at board meetings while the lawyer is present in the capacity of director might not be protected by the attorney-client privilege and that conflict of interest considerations might require the lawyer's recusal as a director or might require the lawyer and the lawyer's firm to decline representation of the corporation in a matter.

Additional Washington Comments (36 - 41)

General Principles

     [36] Notwithstanding Comment [3], lawyers providing short-term limited legal services to a client under the auspices of a program sponsored by a nonprofit organization or court are not normally required to systematically screen for conflicts of interest before undertaking a representation. See Comment [1] to Rule 6.5. See Rule 1.2(c) for requirements applicable to the provision of limited legal services.

Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Material Limitation

     [37] Use of the term "significant risk" in paragraph (a)(2) is not intended to be a substantive change or diminishment in the standard required under former Washington RPC 1.7(b), i.e., that "the representation of the client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests."

Prohibited Representations

     [38] In Washington, a governmental client is not prohibited from properly consenting to a representational conflict of interest.

Informed Consent

     [39] Paragraph (b)(4) of the Rule differs slightly from the Model Rule in that it expressly requires authorization from the other client before any required disclosure of information relating to that client can be made. Authorization to make a disclosure of information relating to the representation requires the client's informed consent. See Rule 1.6(a).

Nonlitigation Conflicts

     [40] Under Washington case law, in estate administration matters the client is the personal representative of the estate.

Special Considerations in Common Representation

     [41] Various legal provisions, including constitutional, statutory and common law, may define the duties of government lawyers in representing public officers, employees, and agencies and should be considered in evaluating the nature and propriety of common representation.

     (a) A lawyer Sshall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:

     (1) Tthe transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which that can be reasonably understood by the client;

     (2) Tthe client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel in on the transaction; and

     (3) Tthe client consents thereto gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer's role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the client in the transaction.

     (b) A lawyer Sshall not use information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client consents in writing after consultation gives informed consent, except as permitted or required by these Rules.

     (c) A lawyer Sshall not solicit any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, or prepare on behalf of a client an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as parent, child, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, except where the client unless the lawyer or other recipient of the gift is related to the donee client. For purposes of this paragraph, related persons include a spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent or other relative or individual with whom the lawyer or the client maintains a close, familial relationship.

     (d) Shall not, Pprior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in substantial part on information relating to the representation.

     (e) A lawyer Sshall not, while representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending litigation, advance or guarantee financial assistance to his or her client, except that:

     (1) Aa lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, including court costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of medical examination, and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, provided that, except as provided in paragraphs (e)(2) and (e)(3), the client shall remains ultimately liable for such expenses; and

     (2) a lawyer, law firm or provider of legal services for the ecomically disadvantaged or indigent, may pay court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of such economically disadvantaged or indigent clients, where such services are provided without expectation of a fee from the client;

     (3) Iin matters maintained as class actions only, repayment of expenses of litigation may be contingent on the outcome of the matter.

     (f) A lawyer Sshall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless:

     (1) Tthe client consents after consultation gives informed consent;

     (2) Tthere is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and

     (3) Iinformation relating to representation of a client is protected as required by rRule 1.6.

     (g) Shall not, while representing A lawyer who represents two or more clients, shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients, or in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client consents after consultation gives informed consent, including confirmed in writing. The lawyer's disclosure of shall include the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement.

     (h) A lawyer Sshall not:

     (1) make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently represented in making the agreement,; or

     (2) settle a claim or potential claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or former client without first advising unless that person is advised in writing that of the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent representation is appropriate legal counsel in connection therewith.

     (i) Shall not, if related to another lawyer as parent, child, sibling or spouse, represent a client in a representation directly adverse to a person who the lawyer knows is represented by the other lawyer except upon consent by the client after consultation regarding the relationship.

     (ji) A lawyer Sshall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:

     (1) Aacquire a lien granted authorized by law to secure the lawyer's fee or expenses; and

     (2) Ccontract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.

     (kj) A lawyer Sshall not:

     (1) have sexual relations with a current client of the lawyer unless a consensual sexual relationship existed between them at the time the lawyer/client-lawyer relationship commenced; or

     (2) have sexual relations with a representative of a current client if the sexual relations would, or would likely, damage or prejudice the client in the representation.

     (3) For purposes of rRule 1.8(kj), "lawyer" means any lawyer who assists in the representation of the client, but does not include other firm members who provide no such assistance.

     (k) While lawyers are associated in a firm, a prohibition in the foregoing paragraphs (a) through (i) that applies to any one of them shall apply to all of them.

     (l) A lawyer who is related to another lawyer as parent, child, sibling, or spouse, or who has any other close familial or intimate relationship with another lawyer, shall not represent a client in a matter directly adverse to a person who the lawyer knows is represented by the related lawyer unless:

     (1) the client gives informed consent to the representation; and

     (2) the representation is not otherwise prohibited by Rule 1.7.

Comment

Business Transactions Between Client and Lawyer

     [1] A lawyer's legal skill and training, together with the relationship of trust and confidence between lawyer and client, create the possibility of overreaching when the lawyer participates in a business, property or financial transaction with a client, for example, a loan or sales transaction or a lawyer investment on behalf of a client. The requirements of paragraph (a) must be met even when the transaction is not closely related to the subject matter of the representation, as when a lawyer drafting a will for a client learns that the client needs money for unrelated expenses and offers to make a loan to the client. The Rule applies to lawyers engaged in the sale of goods or services related to the practice of law, for example, the sale of title insurance or investment services to existing clients of the lawyer's legal practice. See Rule 5.7. It also applies to lawyers purchasing property from estates they represent. It does not apply to ordinary fee arrangements between client and lawyer, which are governed by Rule 1.5, although its requirements must be met when the lawyer accepts an interest in the client's business or other nonmonetary property as payment of all or part of a fee. In addition, the Rule does not apply to standard commercial transactions between the lawyer and the client for products or services that the client generally markets to others, for example, banking or brokerage services, medical services, products manufactured or distributed by the client, and utilities' services. In such transactions, the lawyer has no advantage in dealing with the client, and the restrictions in paragraph (a) are unnecessary and impracticable.

     [2] Paragraph (a)(1) requires that the transaction itself be fair to the client and that its essential terms be communicated to the client, in writing, in a manner that can be reasonably understood. Paragraph (a)(2) requires that the client also be advised, in writing, of the desirability of seeking the advice of independent legal counsel. It also requires that the client be given a reasonable opportunity to obtain such advice. Paragraph (a)(3) requires that the lawyer obtain the client's informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, both to the essential terms of the transaction and to the lawyer's role. When necessary, the lawyer should discuss both the material risks of the proposed transaction, including any risk presented by the lawyer's involvement, and the existence of reasonably available alternatives and should explain why the advice of independent legal counsel is desirable. See Rule 1.0(e) (definition of informed consent).

     [3] The risk to a client is greatest when the client expects the lawyer to represent the client in the transaction itself or when the lawyer's financial interest otherwise poses a significant risk that the lawyer's representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's financial interest in the transaction. Here the lawyer's role requires that the lawyer must comply, not only with the requirements of paragraph (a), but also with the requirements of Rule 1.7. Under that Rule, the lawyer must disclose the risks associated with the lawyer's dual role as both legal adviser and participant in the transaction, such as the risk that the lawyer will structure the transaction or give legal advice in a way that favors the lawyer's interests at the expense of the client. Moreover, the lawyer must obtain the client's informed consent. In some cases, the lawyer's interest may be such that Rule 1.7 will preclude the lawyer from seeking the client's consent to the transaction.

     [4] If the client is independently represented in the transaction, paragraph (a)(2) of this Rule is inapplicable, and the paragraph (a)(1) requirement for full disclosure is satisfied either by a written disclosure by the lawyer involved in the transaction or by the client's independent counsel. The fact that the client was independently represented in the transaction is relevant in determining whether the agreement was fair and reasonable to the client as paragraph (a)(1) further requires.

Use of Information Related to Representation

     [5] [Washington revision] Use of information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the client violates the lawyer's duty of loyalty. Paragraph (b) applies when the information is used to benefit either the lawyer or a third person, such as another client or business associate of the lawyer. For example, if a lawyer learns that a client intends to purchase and develop several parcels of land, the lawyer may not use that information to purchase one of the parcels in competition with the client or to recommend that another client make such a purchase. The Rule does not prohibit uses that do not disadvantage the client. For example, a lawyer who learns a government agency's interpretation of trade legislation during the representation of one client may properly use that information to benefit other clients. Paragraph (b) prohibits disadvantageous use of client information unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted or required by these Rules. See Rules 1.2(d), 1.6, 1.9(c), 3.3, 4.1(b), and 8.1.

Gifts to Lawyers

     [6] A lawyer may accept a gift from a client, if the transaction meets general standards of fairness. For example, a simple gift such as a present given at a holiday or as a token of appreciation is permitted. If a client offers the lawyer a more substantial gift, paragraph (c) does not prohibit the lawyer from accepting it, although such a gift may be voidable by the client under the doctrine of undue influence, which treats client gifts as presumptively fraudulent. In any event, due to concerns about overreaching and imposition on clients, a lawyer may not suggest that a substantial gift be made to the lawyer or for the lawyer's benefit, except where the lawyer is related to the client as set forth in paragraph (c).

     [7] If effectuation of a substantial gift requires preparing a legal instrument such as a will or conveyance the client should have the detached advice that another lawyer can provide. The sole exception to this Rule is where the client is a relative of the donee.

     [8] This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from seeking to have the lawyer or a partner or associate of the lawyer named as executor of the client's estate or to another potentially lucrative fiduciary position. Nevertheless, such appointments will be subject to the general conflict of interest provision in Rule 1.7 when there is a significant risk that the lawyer's interest in obtaining the appointment will materially limit the lawyer's independent professional judgment in advising the client concerning the choice of an executor or other fiduciary. In obtaining the client's informed consent to the conflict, the lawyer should advise the client concerning the nature and extent of the lawyer's financial interest in the appointment, as well as the availability of alternative candidates for the position.

Literary Rights

     [9] An agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary or media rights concerning the conduct of the representation creates a conflict between the interests of the client and the personal interests of the lawyer. Measures suitable in the representation of the client may detract from the publication value of an account of the representation. Paragraph (d) does not prohibit a lawyer representing a client in a transaction concerning literary property from agreeing that the lawyer's fee shall consist of a share in ownership in the property, if the arrangement conforms to Rule 1.5 and paragraphs (a) and (i).

Financial Assistance

     [10] [Washington revision] Lawyers may not subsidize lawsuits or administrative proceedings brought on behalf of their clients, including making or guaranteeing loans to their clients for living expenses, because to do so would encourage clients to pursue lawsuits that might not otherwise be brought and because such assistance gives lawyers too great a financial stake in the litigation. See Washington Comments [21] & [22].

Person Paying for a Lawyer's Services

     [11] Lawyers are frequently asked to represent a client under circumstances in which a third person will compensate the lawyer, in whole or in part. The third person might be a relative or friend, an indemnitor (such as a liability insurance company) or a co-client (such as a corporation sued along with one or more of its employees). Because third-party payers frequently have interests that differ from those of the client, including interests in minimizing the amount spent on the representation and in learning how the representation is progressing, lawyers are prohibited from accepting or continuing such representations unless the lawyer determines that there will be no interference with the lawyer's independent professional judgment and there is informed consent from the client. See also Rule 5.4(c) (prohibiting interference with a lawyer's professional judgment by one who recommends, employs or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another).

     [12] Sometimes, it will be sufficient for the lawyer to obtain the client's informed consent regarding the fact of the payment and the identity of the third-party payer. If, however, the fee arrangement creates a conflict of interest for the lawyer, then the lawyer must comply with Rule. 1.7. The lawyer must also conform to the requirements of Rule 1.6 concerning confidentiality. Under Rule 1.7(a), a conflict of interest exists if there is significant risk that the lawyer's representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's own interest in the fee arrangement or by the lawyer's responsibilities to the third-party payer (for example, when the third-party payer is a co-client). Under Rule 1.7(b), the lawyer may accept or continue the representation with the informed consent of each affected client, unless the conflict is nonconsentable under that paragraph. Under Rule 1.7(b), the informed consent must be confirmed in writing.

Aggregate Settlements

     [13] Differences in willingness to make or accept an offer of settlement are among the risks of common representation of multiple clients by a single lawyer. Under Rule 1.7, this is one of the risks that should be discussed before undertaking the representation, as part of the process of obtaining the clients' informed consent. In addition, Rule 1.2(a) protects each client's right to have the final say in deciding whether to accept or reject an offer of settlement and in deciding whether to enter a guilty or nolo contendere plea in a criminal case. The rule stated in this paragraph is a corollary of both these Rules and provides that, before any settlement offer or plea bargain is made or accepted on behalf of multiple clients, the lawyer must inform each of them about all the material terms of the settlement, including what the other clients will receive or pay if the settlement or plea offer is accepted. See also Rule 1.0(e) (definition of informed consent). Lawyers representing a class of plaintiffs or defendants, or those proceeding derivatively, may not have a full client-lawyer relationship with each member of the class; nevertheless, such lawyers must comply with applicable rules regulating notification of class members and other procedural requirements designed to ensure adequate protection of the entire class.

Limiting Liability and Settling Malpractice Claims

     [14] Agreements prospectively limiting a lawyer's liability for malpractice are prohibited unless the client is independently represented in making the agreement because they are likely to undermine competent and diligent representation. Also, many clients are unable to evaluate the desirability of making such an agreement before a dispute has arisen, particularly if they are then represented by the lawyer seeking the agreement. This paragraph does not, however, prohibit a lawyer from entering into an agreement with the client to arbitrate legal malpractice claims, provided such agreements are enforceable and the client is fully informed of the scope and effect of the agreement. Nor does this paragraph limit the ability of lawyers to practice in the form of a limited-liability entity, where permitted by law, provided that each lawyer remains personally liable to the client for his or her own conduct and the firm complies with any conditions required by law, such as provisions requiring client notification or maintenance of adequate liability insurance. Nor does it prohibit an agreement in accordance with Rule 1.2 that defines the scope of the representation, although a definition of scope that makes the obligations of representation illusory will amount to an attempt to limit liability.

     [15] Agreements settling a claim or a potential claim for malpractice are not prohibited by this Rule. Nevertheless, in view of the danger that a lawyer will take unfair advantage of an unrepresented client or former client, the lawyer must first advise such a person in writing of the appropriateness of independent representation in connection with such a settlement. In addition, the lawyer must give the client or former client a reasonable opportunity to find and consult independent counsel.

Acquiring Proprietary Interest in Litigation

     [16] Paragraph (i) states the traditional general rule that lawyers are prohibited from acquiring a proprietary interest in litigation. Like paragraph (e), the general rule has its basis in common law champerty and maintenance and is designed to avoid giving the lawyer too great an interest in the representation. In addition, when the lawyer acquires an ownership interest in the subject of the representation, it will be more difficult for a client to discharge the lawyer if the client so desires. The Rule is subject to specific exceptions developed in decisional law and continued in these Rules. The exception for certain advances of the costs of litigation is set forth in paragraph (e). In addition, paragraph (i) sets forth exceptions for liens authorized by law to secure the lawyer's fees or expenses and contracts for reasonable contingent fees. The law of each jurisdiction determines which liens are authorized by law. These may include liens granted by statute, liens originating in common law and liens acquired by contract with the client. When a lawyer acquires by contract a security interest in property other than that recovered through the lawyer's efforts in the litigation, such an acquisition is a business or financial transaction with a client and is governed by the requirements of paragraph (a). Contracts for contingent fees in civil cases are governed by Rule 1.5.

Client-Lawyer Sexual Relationships

     [17] The relationship between lawyer and client is a fiduciary one in which the lawyer occupies the highest position of trust and confidence. The relationship is almost always unequal; thus, a sexual relationship between lawyer and client can involve unfair exploitation of the lawyer's fiduciary role, in violation of the lawyer's basic ethical obligation not to use the trust of the client to the client's disadvantage. In addition, such a relationship presents a significant danger that, because of the lawyer's emotional involvement, the lawyer will be unable to represent the client without impairment of the exercise of independent professional judgment. Moreover, a blurred line between the professional and personal relationships may make it difficult to predict to what extent client confidences will be protected by the attorney-client evidentiary privilege, since client confidences are protected by privilege only when they are imparted in the context of the client-lawyer relationship. Because of the significant danger of harm to client interests and because the client's own emotional involvement renders it unlikely that the client could give adequate informed consent, this Rule prohibits the lawyer from having sexual relations with a client regardless of whether the relationship is consensual and regardless of the absence of prejudice to the client.

     [18] Sexual relationships that predate the client-lawyer relationship are not prohibited. Issues relating to the exploitation of the fiduciary relationship and client dependency are diminished when the sexual relationship existed prior to the commencement of the client-lawyer relationship. However, before proceeding with the representation in these circumstances, the lawyer should consider whether the lawyer's ability to represent the client will be materially limited by the relationship. See Rule 1.7(a)(2).

     [19] [Washington revision] When the client is an organization, paragraph (j) of this Rule applies to a lawyer for the organization (whether inside or outside counsel). For purposes of this Rule, "representative of a current client" will generally be a constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly consults with that lawyer on the organization's legal matters. See Comment [1] to Rule 1.13 (identifying the constituents of an organizational client).

Imputation of Prohibitions

     [20] Under paragraph (k), a prohibition on conduct by an individual lawyer in paragraphs (a) through (i) also applies to all lawyers associated in a firm with the personally prohibited lawyer. For example, one lawyer in a firm may not enter into a business transaction with a client of another member of the firm without complying with paragraph (a), even if the first lawyer is not personally involved in the representation of the client. The prohibition set forth in paragraph (j) is personal and is not applied to associated lawyers.

Additional Washington Comments (21-25)

Financial Assistance

     [21] Paragraph (e) of Washington's Rule differs from the Model Rule. Paragraph (e) is a revised version of former Washington RPC 1.8(e). The Rule retains the general prohibition on advancing or guaranteeing financial assistance to a client, a practice that has historically been prohibited in Washington in order to preclude a detrimental shift in the allocation of authority between client and lawyer that may ensue when a client becomes indebted to the lawyer for financial support. See Rule 1.2(a) (describing allocation of authority between client and lawyer). Paragraph (e)(1) preserves the ability of a lawyer to advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, provided that the client remains ultimately liable for such expenses. This approach, which ensures a proper degree of client accountability in the management of his or her case, strikes an appropriate balance between enhancing access to the courts and discouraging excessive economic entanglement between lawyer and client. Because the client must at all times remain "ultimately liable" for such expenses, no communication about the lawyer's services shall state or imply that the client has no obligation to pay expenses; such a communication would be misleading and therefore is not permitted under Rule 7.1. Nevertheless, under Washington law the lawyer has no affirmative duty to collect such expenses; at the conclusion of a matter, a lawyer may exercise his or her discretion to refrain from initiating collection proceedings against the client for unpaid advances. Former Washington RPC 1.8(e)(2), the exception for contingent repayment of costs in class actions, is retained in paragraph (e)(3).

     [22] Paragraph (e)(2), which is partly based on Model Rule 1.8(e)(2), permits a lawyer to pay court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of economically disadvantaged or indigent clients. Paragraph (e)(2) specifically limits application of the exception to situations in which the lawyer's services are provided "without expectation of a fee" from the client. This language is intended to minimize ambiguities inherent in the terms "indigent" and "economically disadvantaged" in order to confine the exception to its limited purpose of promoting access to justice through pro bono publico representation and nonprofit legal services programs by easing the financial burden of litigation borne by truly indigent and economically disadvantaged clients.

Client-Lawyer Sexual Relationships

     [23] Paragraph (j)(2) of Washington's Rule, which prohibits sexual relationships with a representative of an organizational client, differs from the Model Rule. Comment [19] to Model Rule 1.8 was revised to be consistent with the Washington Rule.

     [24] Paragraph (j)(3) of the Rule specifies that the prohibition applies with equal force to any lawyer who assists in the representation of the client, but the prohibition expressly does not apply to other members of a firm who have not assisted in the representation.

Personal Relationships

     [25] Model Rule 1.8 does not contain a provision equivalent to paragraph (l) of Washington's Rule. Paragraph (l) prohibits representations based on a lawyer's personal conflict arising from his or her relationship with another lawyer. Paragraph (l) is a revised version of former Washington RPC 1.8(i). See also Comment [11] to Rule 1.7.

     (b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously represented a client

     (1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and

     (2) about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter;

unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.

     (c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:

     (b1) Uuse confidences or secrets information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client, except as rule 1.6 these Rules would permit or require with respect to a client, or when the information has become generally known; or

     (2) reveal information relating to the representation except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a client.

Comment

     [1] After termination of a client-lawyer relationship, a lawyer has certain continuing duties with respect to confidentiality and conflicts of interest and thus may not represent another client except in conformity with this Rule. Under this Rule, for example, a lawyer could not properly seek to rescind on behalf of a new client a contract drafted on behalf of the former client. So also a lawyer who has prosecuted an accused person could not properly represent the accused in a subsequent civil action against the government concerning the same transaction. Nor could a lawyer who has represented multiple clients in a matter represent one of the clients against the others in the same or a substantially related matter after a dispute arose among the clients in that matter, unless all affected clients give informed consent. See Comment [9]. Current and former government lawyers must comply with this Rule to the extent required by Rule 1.11.

     [2] The scope of a "matter" for purposes of this Rule depends on the facts of a particular situation or transaction. The lawyer's involvement in a matter can also be a question of degree. When a lawyer has been directly involved in a specific transaction, subsequent representation of other clients with materially adverse interests in that transaction clearly is prohibited. On the other hand, a lawyer who recurrently handled a type of problem for a former client is not precluded from later representing another client in a factually distinct problem of that type even though the subsequent representation involves a position adverse to the prior client. Similar considerations can apply to the reassignment of military lawyers between defense and prosecution functions within the same military jurisdictions. The underlying question is whether the lawyer was so involved in the matter that the subsequent representation can be justly regarded as a changing of sides in the matter in question.

     [3] Matters are "substantially related" for purposes of this Rule if they involve the same transaction or legal dispute or if there otherwise is a substantial risk that confidential factual information as would normally have been obtained in the prior representation would materially advance the client's position in the subsequent matter. For example, a lawyer who has represented a businessperson and learned extensive private financial information about that person may not then represent that person's spouse in seeking a divorce. Similarly, a lawyer who has previously represented a client in securing environmental permits to build a shopping center would be precluded from representing neighbors seeking to oppose rezoning of the property on the basis of environmental considerations; however, the lawyer would not be precluded, on the grounds of substantial relationship, from defending a tenant of the completed shopping center in resisting eviction for nonpayment of rent. Information that has been disclosed to the public or to other parties adverse to the former client ordinarily will not be disqualifying. Information acquired in a prior representation may have been rendered obsolete by the passage of time, a circumstance that may be relevant in determining whether two representations are substantially related. In the case of an organizational client, general knowledge of the client's policies and practices ordinarily will not preclude a subsequent representation; on the other hand, knowledge of specific facts gained in a prior representation that are relevant to the matter in question ordinarily will preclude such a representation. A former client is not required to reveal the confidential information learned by the lawyer in order to establish a substantial risk that the lawyer has confidential information to use in the subsequent matter. A conclusion about the possession of such information may be based on the nature of the services the lawyer provided the former client and information that would in ordinary practice be learned by a lawyer providing such services.

Lawyers Moving Between Firms

     [4] When lawyers have been associated within a firm but then end their association, the question of whether a lawyer should undertake representation is more complicated. There are several competing considerations. First, the client previously represented by the former firm must be reasonably assured that the principle of loyalty to the client is not compromised. Second, the rule should not be so broadly cast as to preclude other persons from having reasonable choice of legal counsel. Third, the rule should not unreasonably hamper lawyers from forming new associations and taking on new clients after having left a previous association. In this connection, it should be recognized that today many lawyers practice in firms, that many lawyers to some degree limit their practice to one field or another, and that many move from one association to another several times in their careers. If the concept of imputation were applied with unqualified rigor, the result would be radical curtailment of the opportunity of lawyers to move from one practice setting to another and of the opportunity of clients to change counsel.

     [5] [Washington revision] Paragraph (b) operates to disqualify the lawyer only when the lawyer involved has actual knowledge of information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c). Thus, if a lawyer while with one firm acquired no knowledge or information relating to a particular client of the firm, and that lawyer later joined another firm, neither the lawyer individually nor the second firm is disqualified from representing another client in the same or a related matter even though the interests of the two clients conflict. See Rule 1.10 (e) and (b) for the restrictions on a firm when a lawyer initiates an association with the firm or has terminated an association with the firm.

     [6] Application of paragraph (b) depends on a situation's particular facts, aided by inferences, deductions or working presumptions that reasonably may be made about the way in which lawyers work together. A lawyer may have general access to files of all clients of a law firm and may regularly participate in discussions of their affairs; it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to all information about all the firm's clients. In contrast, another lawyer may have access to the files of only a limited number of clients and participate in discussions of the affairs of no other clients; in the absence of information to the contrary, it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to information about the clients actually served but not those of other clients. In such an inquiry, the burden of proof should rest upon the firm whose disqualification is sought.

     [7] Independent of the question of disqualification of a firm, a lawyer changing professional association has a continuing duty to preserve confidentiality of information about a client formerly represented. See Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c).

     [8] Paragraph (c) provides that information acquired by the lawyer in the course of representing a client may not subsequently be used or revealed by the lawyer to the disadvantage of the client. However, the fact that a lawyer has once served a client does not preclude the lawyer from using generally known information about that client when later representing another client.

     [9] The provisions of this Rule are for the protection of former clients and can be waived if the client gives informed consent, which consent must be confirmed in writing under paragraphs (a) and (b). See Rule 1.0(e). With regard to the effectiveness of an advance waiver, see Comment [22] to Rule 1.7. With regard to disqualification of a firm with which a lawyer is or was formerly associated, see Rule 1.10.

     (b) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that lawyer ("the personally disqualified lawyer"), or a firm with which the lawyer was associated, had previously represented a client whose interests are materially adverse to that person and about whom the lawyer had acquired confidences or secrets protected by rules 1.6 and 1.9 (b) that are material to the matter; provided that the prohibition on the firm shall not apply if:

     (1) The personally disqualified lawyer is screened by effective means from participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom;

     (2) The former client of the personally disqualified lawyer receives notice of the conflict and the screening mechanism used to prohibit dissemination of confidential or secret information;

     (3) The firm is able to demonstrate by convincing evidence that no confidences or secrets that are material were transmitted by the personally disqualified lawyer before implementation of the screening mechanism and notice to the former client.

     Any presumption that confidences or secrets of the former client have been or will be transmitted may be rebutted if the personally disqualified lawyer serves on his or her former law firm and former client an affidavit attesting that the personally disqualified lawyer will not participate in the matter and will not discuss the matter or the representation with any other lawyer or employee of his or her current law firm, and attesting that during the period of the lawyer's personal disqualification those lawyers or employees who do participate in the matter will be apprised that the personally disqualified lawyer is screened from participating in or discussing the matter. Such affidavit shall describe the procedures being used effectively to screen the personally disqualified lawyer. Upon request of the former client, such affidavit shall be updated periodically to show actual compliance with the screening procedures. The law firm, the personally disqualified lawyer, or the former client may seek judicial review in a court of general jurisdiction of the screening mechanism used, or may seek court supervision to ensure that implementation of the screening procedures has occurred and that effective actual compliance has been achieved.

     (cb) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer and not currently represented by the firm, unless:

     (1) Tthe matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and

     (2) Aany lawyer remaining in the firm has acquired confidences or secrets information protected by rRules 1.6 and 1.9(bc) that are is material to the matter.

     (dc) A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in rRule 1.7.

     (d) The disqualification of lawyers associated in a firm with former or current government lawyers is governed by Rule 1.11.

     (e) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, no other lawyer in the firm shall knowingly represent a person in a matter in which that lawyer is disqualified under Rule 1.9 unless:

     (1) the personally disqualified lawyer is screened by effective means from participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom;

     (2) the former client of the personally disqualified lawyer receives notice of the conflict and the screening mechanism used to prohibit dissemination of information relating to the former representation;

     (3) the firm is able to demonstrate by convincing evidence that no material information relating to the former representation was transmitted by the personally disqualified lawyer before implementation of the screening mechanism and notice to the former client.

     Any presumption that information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) has been or will be transmitted may be rebutted if the personally disqualified lawyer serves on his or her former law firm and former client an affidavit attesting that the personally disqualified lawyer will not participate in the matter and will not discuss the matter or the representation with any other lawyer or employee of his or her current law firm, and attesting that during the period of the lawyer's personal disqualification those lawyers or employees who do participate in the matter will be apprised that the personally disqualified lawyer is screened from participating in or discussing the matter. Such affidavit shall describe the procedures being used effectively to screen the personally disqualified lawyer. Upon request of the former client, such affidavit shall be updated periodically to show actual compliance with the screening procedures. The law firm, the personally disqualified lawyer, or the former client may seek judicial review in a court of general jurisdiction of the screening mechanism used, or may seek court supervision to ensure that implementation of the screening procedures has occurred and that effective actual compliance has been achieved.

Comment

Definition of "Firm"

     [1] For purposes of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the term "firm" denotes lawyers in a law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law; or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization. See Rule 1.0(c). Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within this definition can depend on the specific facts. See Rule 1.0, Comments [2] - [4].

Principles of Imputed Disqualification

     [2] [Washington revision] The rule of imputed disqualification stated in paragraph (a) gives effect to the principle of loyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers who practice in a law firm. Such situations can be considered from the premise that a firm of lawyers is essentially one lawyer for purposes of the rules governing loyalty to the client, or from the premise that each lawyer is vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated. Paragraph (a) operates only among the lawyers currently associated in a firm. When a lawyer moves from one firm to another, the situation is governed by Rules 1.9(b) and 1.10 (b) and (e).

     [3] The rule in paragraph (a) does not prohibit representation where neither questions of client loyalty nor protection of confidential information are presented. Where one lawyer in a firm could not effectively represent a given client because of strong political beliefs, for example, but that lawyer will do no work on the case and the personal beliefs of the lawyer will not materially limit the representation by others in the firm, the firm should not be disqualified. On the other hand, if an opposing party in a case were owned by a lawyer in the law firm, and others in the firm would be materially limited in pursuing the matter because of loyalty to that lawyer, the personal disqualification of the lawyer would be imputed to all others in the firm.

     [4] [Reserved. See Washington Comment [11].]

     [5] Rule 1.10(b) operates to permit a law firm, under certain circumstances, to represent a person with interests directly adverse to those of a client represented by a lawyer who formerly was associated with the firm. The Rule applies regardless of when the formerly associated lawyer represented the client. However, the law firm may not represent a person with interests adverse to those of a present client of the firm, which would violate Rule 1.7. Moreover, the firm may not represent the person where the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client and any other lawyer currently in the firm has material information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c).

     [6] Rule 1.10(c) removes imputation with the informed consent of the affected client or former client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7. The conditions stated in Rule 1.7 require the lawyer to determine that the representation is not prohibited by Rule 1.7(b) and that each affected client or former client has given informed consent to the representation, confirmed in writing. In some cases, the risk may be so severe that the conflict may not be cured by client consent. For a discussion of the effectiveness of client waivers of conflicts that might arise in the future, see Rule 1.7, Comment [22]. For a definition of informed consent, see Rule 1.0(e).

     [7] Where a lawyer has joined a private firm after having represented the government, imputation is governed by Rule 1.11 (b) and (c), not this Rule. Under Rule 1.11(d), where a lawyer represents the government after having served clients in private practice, nongovernmental employment or in another government agency, former-client conflicts are not imputed to government lawyers associated with the individually disqualified lawyer.

     [8] Where a lawyer is prohibited from engaging in certain transactions under Rule 1.8, paragraph (k) of that Rule, and not this Rule, determines whether that prohibition also applies to other lawyers associated in a firm with the personally prohibited lawyer.

Additional Washington Comments (9 - 13)

Principles of Imputed Disqualification

     [9] Former Washington RPC 1.10 differed significantly from the Model Rule. This difference was attributable in part to a 1989 amendment to Model Rule 1.10 that recodified conflicts based on a lawyer's former association with a firm into Model Rule 1.9, and in part to Washington's adoption of a screening rule in 1993. Washington's Rule has been restructured to make it and Rule 1.9 more consistent with the Model Rules. The conflicts that arise based on a lawyer's former association with a firm are now addressed in Rules 1.9 (a) and (b), while Rule 1.10 addresses solely imputation of that conflict. Under Rule 1.9(a), such a lawyer need not have actually acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9 to be disqualified personally, but because acquisition of confidential information is presumed in Washington, see, e.g., Teja v. Saran, 68 Wn. App. 793, 846 P.2d 1375 (1993), review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1008, 859 P.2d 604 (1993); Kurbitz v. Kurbitz, 77 Wn.2d 943, 468 P.2d 673 (1970), the recodification does not represent a change in Washington law. The Rule preserves prior Washington practice with respect to screening by allowing a personally disqualified lawyer to be screened from a representation to be undertaken by other members of the firm under the circumstances set forth in paragraph (e). See Washington Comment [10].

     [10] Washington's RPC 1.10 was amended in 1993 to permit representation with screening under certain circumstances. Model Rule 1.10 does not contain a screening mechanism. Rule 1.10(e) retains the screening mechanism adopted as Washington RPC 1.10(b) in 1993, thus allowing a firm to represent a client with whom a lawyer in the firm has a conflict based on his or her association with a prior firm if the lawyer is effectively screened from participation in the representation, is apportioned no part of the fee earned from the representation and the client of the former firm receives notice of the conflict and the screening mechanism. However, prior to undertaking the representation, non-disqualified firm members must evaluate the firm's ability to provide competent representation even if the disqualified member can be screened in accordance with this Rule. While Rule 1.10 does not specify the screening mechanism to be used, the law firm must be able to demonstrate that it is adequate to prevent the personally disqualified lawyer from receiving or transmitting any confidential information or from participating in the representation in any way. The screening mechanism must be in place over the life of the representation at issue and is subject to judicial review at the request of any of the affected clients, law firms, or lawyers. However, a lawyer or law firm may rebut the presumption that information relating to the representation has been transmitted by serving an affidavit describing the screening mechanism and affirming that the requirements of the Rule have been met.

     [11] Under Rule 5.3, this Rule also applies to nonlawyer assistants and lawyers who previously worked as nonlawyers at a law firm. See Daines v. Alcatel, 194 F.R.D. 678 (E.D. Wash. 2000); Richard v. Jain, 168 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (W.D. Wash. 2001).

     [12] In serving an affidavit permitted by paragraph (e), a lawyer may serve the affidavit on the former law firm alone (without simultaneously serving the former client directly) if the former law firm continues to represent the former client and the lawyer contemporaneously requests in writing that the former law firm provide a copy of the affidavit to the former client. If the former client is no longer represented by the former law firm or if the lawyer has reason to believe the former law firm will not promptly provide the former client with a copy of the affidavit, then the affidavit must be served directly on the former client also. Serving the affidavit on a represented former client does not violate Rule 4.2 because the communication with the former client is not about the "subject of the representation" and the notice is "authorized... by law," i.e., the Rules of Professional Conduct.

     [13] Rule 1.8(l) conflicts are not imputed to other members of a firm under paragraph (a) of this Rule unless the relationship creates a conflict of interest for the individual lawyer under Rule 1.7 and also presents a significant risk of materially limiting the representation of the client by the remaining lawyers in the firm.

     (2) shall not otherwise represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the appropriate government agency consents after consultation gives its informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the representation.

     (b) When a lawyer is disqualified from representation under paragraph (a), Nno lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter unless:

     (1) Tthe disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and

     (2) Wwritten notice is promptly given to the appropriate government agency to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rRule.

     (bc) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer having information that the lawyer knows is confidential government information about a person acquired when the lawyer was a public officer or employee, may not represent a private client whose interests are adverse to that person in a matter in which the information could be used to the material disadvantage of that person. As used in this Rule the term "confidential government information" means information that has been obtained under governmental authority and which, at the time this Rule is applied, the government is prohibited by law from disclosing to the public or has a legal privilege not to disclose and which is not otherwise available to the public. A firm with which that lawyer is associated may undertake or continue representation in the matter only if the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom.

     (cd) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer currently serving as a public officer or employee:

     (1) is subject to Rules 1.7 and 1.9; and

     (2) shall not:

     (1i) Pparticipate in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially while in private practice or nongovernmental employment, unless under applicable law no one is, or by lawful delegation may be, authorized to act in the lawyer's stead in the matter the appropriate government agency gives its informed consent, confirmed writing; or

     (2ii) Nnegotiate for private employment with any person who is involved as a party or as attorney lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially, except that a lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for private employment as permitted by Rule 1.12(b) and subject to the conditions stated in Rule 1.12(b).

     (de) As used in this rRule, the term "matter" includes:

     (1) Aany judicial or other proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest or other particular matter involving a specific party or parties;, and

     (2) Aany other matter covered by the conflict of interest rules of the appropriate government agency.

     (e) As used in this rule, the term "confidential government information" means information which has been obtained under governmental authority and which, at the time this rule is applied, the government is prohibited by law from disclosing to the public or has a legal privilege not to disclose, and which is not otherwise available to the public.

Comment

     [1] A lawyer who has served or is currently serving as a public officer or employee is personally subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct, including the prohibition against concurrent conflicts of interest stated in Rule 1.7. In addition, such a lawyer may be subject to statutes and government regulations regarding conflict of interest. Such statutes and regulations may circumscribe the extent to which the government agency may give consent under this Rule. See Rule 1.0(e) for the definition of informed consent.

     [2] Paragraphs (a)(1), (a)(2) and (d)(1) restate the obligations of an individual lawyer who has served or is currently serving as an officer or employee of the government toward a former government or private client. Rule 1.10 is not applicable to the conflicts of interest addressed by this Rule. Rather, paragraph (b) sets forth a special imputation rule for former government lawyers that provides for screening and notice. Because of the special problems raised by imputation within a government agency, paragraph (d) does not impute the conflicts of a lawyer currently serving as an officer or employee of the government to other associated government officers or employees, although ordinarily it will be prudent to screen such lawyers.

     [3] Paragraphs (a)(2) and (d)(2) apply regardless of whether a lawyer is adverse to a former client and are thus designed not only to protect the former client, but also to prevent a lawyer from exploiting public office for the advantage of another client. For example, a lawyer who has pursued a claim on behalf of the government may not pursue the same claim on behalf of a later private client after the lawyer has left government service, except when authorized to do so by the government agency under paragraph (a). Similarly, a lawyer who has pursued a claim on behalf of a private client may not pursue the claim on behalf of the government, except when authorized to do so by paragraph (d). As with paragraphs (a)(1) and (d)(1), Rule 1.10 is not applicable to the conflicts of interest addressed by these paragraphs.

     [4] This Rule represents a balancing of interests. On the one hand, where the successive clients are a government agency and another client, public or private, the risk exists that power or discretion vested in that agency might be used for the special benefit of the other client. A lawyer should not be in a position where benefit to the other client might affect performance of the lawyer's professional functions on behalf of the government. Also, unfair advantage could accrue to the other client by reason of access to confidential government information about the client's adversary obtainable only through the lawyer's government service. On the other hand, the rules governing lawyers presently or formerly employed by a government agency should not be so restrictive as to inhibit transfer of employment to and from the government. The government has a legitimate need to attract qualified lawyers as well as to maintain high ethical standards. Thus a former government lawyer is disqualified only from particular matters in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially. The provisions for screening and waiver in paragraph (b) are necessary to prevent the disqualification rule from imposing too severe a deterrent against entering public service. The limitation of disqualification in paragraphs (a)(2) and (d)(2) to matters involving a specific party or parties, rather than extending disqualification to all substantive issues on which the lawyer worked, serves a similar function.

     [5] When a lawyer has been employed by one government agency and then moves to a second government agency, it may be appropriate to treat that second agency as another client for purposes of this Rule, as when a lawyer is employed by a city and subsequently is employed by a federal agency. However, because the conflict of interest is governed by paragraph (d), the latter agency is not required to screen the lawyer as paragraph (b) requires a law firm to do. The question of whether two government agencies should be regarded as the same or different clients for conflict of interest purposes is beyond the scope of these Rules. See Rule 1.13, Comment [9].

     [6] Paragraphs (b) and (c) contemplate a screening arrangement. See Rule 1.0(k) (requirements for screening procedures). These paragraphs do not prohibit a lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior independent agreement, but that lawyer may not receive compensation directly relating the lawyer's compensation to the fee in the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified.

     [7] Notice, including a description of the screened lawyer's prior representation and of the screening procedures employed, generally should be given as soon as practicable after the need for screening becomes apparent.

     [8] Paragraph (c) operates only when the lawyer in question has knowledge of the information, which means actual knowledge; it does not operate with respect to information that merely could be imputed to the lawyer.

     [9] Paragraphs (a) and (d) do not prohibit a lawyer from jointly representing a private party and a government agency when doing so is permitted by Rule 1.7 and is not otherwise prohibited by law.

     [10] For purposes of paragraph (e) of this Rule, a "matter" may continue in another form. In determining whether two particular matters are the same, the lawyer should consider the extent to which the matters involve the same basic facts, the same or related parties, and the time elapsed.

     (b) A lawyer shall not negotiate for employment with any person who is involved as a party or as attorney lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer, or as an arbitrator, mediator or other third-party neutral. A lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, or other adjudicative officer, arbitrator, or mediator may negotiate for employment with a party or attorney lawyer involved in a matter in which the clerk is participating personally and substantially, but only after the lawyer has notified the judge, or other adjudicative officer, arbitrator, or mediator.

     (c) If a lawyer is disqualified by section paragraph (a), no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in the matter unless:

     (1) Tthe disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and

     (2) Wwritten notice is promptly given to the parties and any appropriate tribunal to enable it them to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rRule.

     (d) An arbitrator selected as a partisan of a party in a multi-member multimember arbitration panel is not prohibited from subsequently representing that party.

Comment

     [1] [Washington revision] This Rule generally parallels Rule 1.11. The term "personally and substantially" signifies that a judge who was a member of a multimember court, and thereafter left judicial office to practice law, is not prohibited from representing a client in a matter pending in the court, but in which the former judge did not participate. So also the fact that a former judge exercised administrative responsibility in a court does not prevent the former judge from acting as a lawyer in a matter where the judge had previously exercised remote or incidental administrative responsibility that did not affect the merits. Compare the Comment to Rule 1.11. The term "adjudicative officer" includes such officials as judges pro tempore, referees, special masters, hearing officers and other parajudicial officers, and also lawyers who serve as part-time judges. There are corresponding provisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct. See CJC paragraphs (A)(1)(b) and (2)(b) (application of the Code of Judicial Conduct to part-time and pro tempore judges).

     [2] Like former judges, lawyers who have served as arbitrators, mediators or other third-party neutrals may be asked to represent a client in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially. This Rule forbids such representation unless all of the parties to the proceedings give their informed consent, confirmed in writing. See Rule 1.0 (e) and (b). Other law or codes of ethics governing third-party neutrals may impose more stringent standards of personal or imputed disqualification. See Rule 2.4.

     [3] Although lawyers who serve as third-party neutrals do not have information concerning the parties that is protected under Rule 1.6, they typically owe the parties an obligation of confidentiality under law or codes of ethics governing third-party neutrals. Thus, paragraph (c) provides that conflicts of the personally disqualified lawyer will be imputed to other lawyers in a law firm unless the conditions of this paragraph are met.

     [4] Requirements for screening procedures are stated in Rule 1.0(k). Paragraph (c)(1) does not prohibit the screened lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior independent agreement, but that lawyer may not receive compensation directly related to the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified.

     [5] Notice, including a description of the screened lawyer's prior representation and of the screening procedures employed, generally should be given as soon as practicable after the need for screening becomes apparent.

     [15] Paragraph (h) was taken from former Washington RPC 1.7(c); it addresses the obligations of a lawyer who is not a public officer or employee but is representing a discrete governmental agency or unit.

     (b) When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken and cannot adequately act in the client's own interest, a the lawyer may seek take reasonably necessary protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or take other protective action with respect to a client guardian.

     (c) Information relating to the representation of a client with diminished capacity is protected by Rule 1.6. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized under Rule 1.6(a) to reveal information about the client, but only to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the client's interests.

Comment

     [1] The normal client-lawyer relationship is based on the assumption that the client, when properly advised and assisted, is capable of making decisions about important matters. When the client is a minor or suffers from a diminished mental capacity, however, maintaining the ordinary client-lawyer relationship may not be possible in all respects. In particular, a severely incapacitated person may have no power to make legally binding decisions. Nevertheless, a client with diminished capacity often has the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting the client's own well-being. For example, children as young as five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal proceedings concerning their custody. So also, it is recognized that some persons of advanced age can be quite capable of handling routine financial matters while needing special legal protection concerning major transactions.

     [2] The fact that a client suffers a disability does not diminish the lawyer's obligation to treat the client with attention and respect. Even if the person has a legal representative, the lawyer should as far as possible accord the represented person the status of client, particularly in maintaining communication.

     [3] The client may wish to have family members or other persons participate in discussions with the lawyer. When necessary to assist in the representation, the presence of such persons generally does not affect the applicability of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. Nevertheless, the lawyer must keep the client's interests foremost and, except for protective action authorized under paragraph (b), must to look to the client, and not family members, to make decisions on the client's behalf.

     [4] [Washington revision] If a legal representative has already been appointed for the client, the lawyer should ordinarily look to the representative for decisions on behalf of the client. In matters involving a minor, whether the lawyer should look to the parents as natural guardians may depend on the type of proceeding or matter in which the lawyer is representing the minor. If the lawyer represents the guardian as distinct from the ward, and is aware that the guardian is acting adversely to the ward's interest, the lawyer may have an obligation to prevent or rectify the guardian's misconduct. See Rules 1.2(d) and 1.6 (b)(7).

Taking Protective Action

     [5] If a lawyer reasonably believes that a client is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken, and that a normal client-lawyer relationship cannot be maintained as provided in paragraph (a) because the client lacks sufficient capacity to communicate or to make adequately considered decisions in connection with the representation, then paragraph (b) permits the lawyer to take protective measures deemed necessary. Such measures could include: consulting with family members, using a reconsideration period to permit clarification or improvement of circumstances, using voluntary surrogate decisionmaking tools such as durable powers of attorney or consulting with support groups, professional services, adult-protective agencies or other individuals or entities that have the ability to protect the client. In taking any protective action, the lawyer should be guided by such factors as the wishes and values of the client to the extent known, the client's best interests and the goals of intruding into the client's decisionmaking autonomy to the least extent feasible, maximizing client capacities and respecting the client's family and social connections.

     [6] In determining the extent of the client's diminished capacity, the lawyer should consider and balance such factors as: the client's ability to articulate reasoning leading to a decision, variability of state of mind and ability to appreciate consequences of a decision; the substantive fairness of a decision; and the consistency of a decision with the known long-term commitments and values of the client. In appropriate circumstances, the lawyer may seek guidance from an appropriate diagnostician.

     [7] If a legal representative has not been appointed, the lawyer should consider whether appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian is necessary to protect the client's interests. Thus, if a client with diminished capacity has substantial property that should be sold for the client's benefit, effective completion of the transaction may require appointment of a legal representative. In addition, rules of procedure in litigation sometimes provide that minors or persons with diminished capacity must be represented by a guardian or next friend if they do not have a general guardian. In many circumstances, however, appointment of a legal representative may be more expensive or traumatic for the client than circumstances in fact require. Evaluation of such circumstances is a matter entrusted to the professional judgment of the lawyer. In considering alternatives, however, the lawyer should be aware of any law that requires the lawyer to advocate the least restrictive action on behalf of the client.

Disclosure of the Client's Condition

     [8] Disclosure of the client's diminished capacity could adversely affect the client's interests. For example, raising the question of diminished capacity could, in some circumstances, lead to proceedings for involuntary commitment. Information relating to the representation is protected by Rule 1.6. Therefore, unless authorized to do so, the lawyer may not disclose such information. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized to make the necessary disclosures, even when the client directs the lawyer to the contrary. Nevertheless, given the risks of disclosure, paragraph (c) limits what the lawyer may disclose in consulting with other individuals or entities or seeking the appointment of a legal representative. At the very least, the lawyer should determine whether it is likely that the person or entity consulted with will act adversely to the client's interests before discussing matters related to the client. The lawyer's position in such cases is an unavoidably difficult one.

Emergency Legal Assistance

     [9] In an emergency where the health, safety or a financial interest of a person with seriously diminished capacity is threatened with imminent and irreparable harm, a lawyer may take legal action on behalf of such a person even though the person is unable to establish a client-lawyer relationship or to make or express considered judgments about the matter, when the person or another acting in good faith on that person's behalf has consulted with the lawyer. Even in such an emergency, however, the lawyer should not act unless the lawyer reasonably believes that the person has no other lawyer, agent or other representative available. The lawyer should take legal action on behalf of the person only to the extent reasonably necessary to maintain the status quo or otherwise avoid imminent and irreparable harm. A lawyer who undertakes to represent a person in such an exigent situation has the same duties under these Rules as the lawyer would with respect to a client.

     [10] A lawyer who acts on behalf of a person with seriously diminished capacity in an emergency should keep the confidences of the person as if dealing with a client, disclosing them only to the extent necessary to accomplish the intended protective action. The lawyer should disclose to any tribunal involved and to any other counsel involved the nature of his or her relationship with the person. The lawyer should take steps to regularize the relationship or implement other protective solutions as soon as possible. Normally, a lawyer would not seek compensation for such emergency actions taken.

     (4) Promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by a client the funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of the lawyer which the client is entitled to receive.

     (a) This Rule applies to (1) property of clients or third persons in a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation and (2) escrow and other funds held by a lawyer incident to the closing of any real estate or personal property.

     (b) A lawyer must not use, convert, borrow or pledge client or third person property for the lawyer's own use.

     (c) A lawyer must hold property of clients and third persons separate from the lawyer's own property.

     (1) A lawyer must deposit and hold in a trust account funds subject to this Rule pursuant to paragraph (h) of this Rule.

     (2) A lawyer must identify, label and appropriately safeguard any property of clients or third persons other than funds. The lawyer must keep records of such property that identify the property, the client or third person, the date of receipt and the location of safekeeping. The lawyer must preserve the records for seven years after return of the property.

     (d) A lawyer must promptly notify a client or third person of receipt of the client or third person's property.

     (e) A lawyer must promptly provide a written accounting to a client or third person after distribution of property or upon request. A lawyer must provide at least annually a written accounting to a client or third person for whom the lawyer is holding property.

     (f) Except as stated in this Rule, a lawyer must promptly pay or deliver to the client or third person the property which the client or third person is entitled to receive.

     (g) If a lawyer possesses property in which two or more persons (one of which may be the lawyer) claim interests, the lawyer must maintain the property in trust until the dispute is resolved. The lawyer must promptly distribute all undisputed portions of the property. The lawyer must take reasonable action to resolve the dispute, including, when appropriate, interpleading the disputed funds.

     (c) Each trust account referred to in section (a) shall be an interest-bearing trust account in any bank, credit union or savings and loan association, selected by a lawyer in the exercise of ordinary prudence, authorized by federal or state law to do business in Washington and insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund, the Washington Credit Union Share Guaranty Association, or the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, or which is a qualified public depository as defined in RCW 39.58.010(2), which bank, credit union, savings and loan association or qualified public depository has filed an agreement with the Disciplinary Board pursuant to rule 15.4 of the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct. Interest-bearing trust funds shall be placed in accounts in which withdrawals or transfers can be made without delay when such funds are required, subject only to any notice period which the depository institution is required to reserve by law or regulation.

     (1) A lawyer who receives client funds shall maintain a pooled interest-bearing trust account for deposit of client funds that are nominal in amount or expected to be held for a short period of time. The interest accruing on this account, net of reasonable check and deposit processing charges which shall only include items deposited charge, monthly maintenance fee, per item check charge, and per deposit charge, shall be paid to The Legal Foundation of Washington, as established by the Supreme Court of Washington. All other fees and transaction costs shall be paid by the lawyer. A lawyer may, but shall not be required to, notify the client of the intended use of such funds.

     (2) All client funds shall be deposited in the account specified in subsection (1) unless they are deposited in:

     (i) a separate interest-bearing trust account for the particular client or client's matter on which the interest will be paid to the client; or

     (ii) a pooled interest-bearing trust account with sub-accounting that will provide for computation of interest earned by each client's funds and the payment thereof to the client.

     (3) In determining whether to use the account specified in subsection (1) or an account specified in subsection (2), a lawyer shall consider only whether the funds to be invested could be utilized to provide a positive net return to the client, as determined by taking into consideration the following factors:

     (i) the amount of interest that the funds would earn during the period they are expected to be deposited;

     (ii) the cost of establishing and administering the account, including the cost of the lawyer's services and the cost of preparing any tax reports required for interest accruing to a client's benefit; and

     (iii) the capability of financial institutions to calculate and pay interest to individual clients.

     (4) As to accounts created under subsection (c)(1), lawyers or law firms shall direct the depository institution:

     (i) to remit interest or dividends, net of reasonable check and deposit processing charges which shall only include items deposited charge, monthly maintenance fee, per item check charge, and per deposit charge, on the average monthly balance in the account, or as otherwise computed in accordance with an institution's standard accounting practice, at least quarterly, to the Legal Foundation of Washington. Other fees and transaction costs will be directed to the lawyer;

     (ii) to transmit with each remittance to the Foundation a statement showing the name of the lawyer or law firm for whom the remittance is sent, the rate of interest applied, and the amount of service charges deducted, if any, and the account balance(s) of the period in which the report is made, with a copy of such statement to be transmitted to the depositing lawyer or law firm.

     (5) The Foundation shall prepare an annual report to the Supreme Court of Washington that summarizes the Foundation's income, grants and operating expenses, implementation of its corporate purposes, and any problems arising in the administration of the program established by section (c) of this rule.

     (6) The provisions of section (c) shall not relieve a lawyer or law firm from any obligation imposed by these rules with respect to safekeeping of clients' funds, including the requirements of section (b) that a lawyer shall promptly notify a client of the receipt of his or her funds and shall promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested all funds in the possession of the lawyer which the client is entitled to receive.

     (h) A lawyer must comply with the following for all trust accounts:

     (1) No funds belonging to the lawyer may be deposited or retained in a trust account except as follows:

     (i) funds to pay bank charges, but only in an amount reasonably sufficient for that purpose;

     (ii) funds belonging in part to a client or third person and in part presently or potentially to the lawyer must be deposited and retained in a trust account, but any portion belonging to the lawyer must be withdrawn at the earliest reasonable time; or

     (iii) funds necessary to restore appropriate balances.

     (2) A lawyer must keep complete records as required by Rule 1.15B.

     (3) A lawyer may withdraw funds when necessary to pay client costs. The lawyer may withdraw earned fees only after giving reasonable notice to the client of the intent to do so, through a billing statement or other document.

     (4) Receipts must be deposited intact.

     (5) All withdrawals must be made only to a named payee and not to cash. Withdrawals must be made by check or by bank transfer.

     (6) Trust account records must be reconciled as often as bank statements are generated or at least quarterly. The lawyer must reconcile the check register balance to the bank statement balance and reconcile the check register balance to the combined total of all client ledger records required by Rule 1.15B (a)(2).

     (7) A lawyer must not disburse funds from a trust account until deposits have cleared the banking process and been collected, unless the lawyer and the bank have a written agreement by which the lawyer personally guarantees all disbursements from the account without recourse to the trust account.

     (8) Disbursements on behalf of a client or third person may not exceed the funds of that person on deposit. The funds of a client or third person must not be used on behalf of anyone else.

     (9) Only a lawyer admitted to practice law may be an authorized signatory on the account.

     (i) Trust accounts must be interest-bearing and allow withdrawals or transfers without any delay other than notice periods that are required by law or regulation. In the exercise of ordinary prudence, a lawyer may select any bank, savings bank, or savings and loan association that is insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, is authorized by law to do business in Washington and has filed the agreement required by ELC 15.4. Trust account funds must not be placed in mutual funds, stocks, bonds, or similar investments.

     (1) When client or third-person funds will not produce a positive net return to the client or third person because the funds are nominal in amount or expected to be held for a short period of time the funds must be placed in a pooled interest-bearing trust account known as an Interest on Lawyer's Trust Account or IOLTA. The interest accruing on the IOLTA account, net of reasonable check and deposit processing charges which may only include items deposited charge, monthly maintenance fee, per item check charge, and per deposit charge, must be paid to the Legal Foundation of Washington. Any other fees and transaction costs must be paid by the lawyer.

     (2) Client or third-person funds that will produce a positive net return to the client or third person must be placed in one of the following unless the client or third person requests that the funds be deposited in an IOLTA account:

     (i) a separate interest-bearing trust account for the particular client or third person with earned interest paid to the client or third person; or

     (ii) a pooled interest-bearing trust account with sub-accounting that allows for computation of interest earned by each client or third person's funds with the interest paid to the appropriate client or third person.

     (3) In determining whether to use the account specified in paragraph (i)(1) or an account specified in paragraph (i)(2), a lawyer must consider only whether the funds will produce a positive net return to the client or third person, as determined by the following factors:

     (i) the amount of interest the funds would earn based on the current rate of interest and the expected period of deposit;

     (ii) the cost of establishing and administering the account, including the cost of the lawyer's services and the cost of preparing any tax reports required for interest accruing to a client or third person's benefit; and

     (iii) the capability of financial institutions to calculate and pay interest to individual clients or third persons if the account in paragraph (i)(2)(ii) is used.

     (4) As to IOLTA accounts created under paragraph (i)(1), lawyers or law firms must direct the depository institution:

     (i) to remit interest or dividends, net of charges authorized by paragraph (i)(1), on the average monthly balance in the account, or as otherwise computed in accordance with an institution's standard accounting practice, monthly, to the Legal Foundation of Washington;

     (ii) to transmit with each remittance to the Foundation a statement, on a form authorized by the Washington State Bar Association, showing details about the account, including but not limited to the name of the lawyer or law firm for whom the remittance is sent, the rate of interest applied, and the amount of service charges deducted, if any, and the balance used to compute the interest, with a copy of such statement to be transmitted to the depositing lawyer or law firm; and

     (iii) to bill fees and transaction costs not authorized by paragraph (i)(1) to the lawyer or law firm.

     (5) The provisions of paragraph (i) do not relieve a lawyer or law firm from any obligation imposed by these Rules.

     (j) The Legal Foundation of Washington must prepare an annual report to the Supreme Court of Washington that summarizes the Foundation's income, grants and operating expenses, implementation of its corporate purposes, and any problems arising in the administration of the program established by paragraph (i) of this Rule.

     (d) Escrow and other funds held by a lawyer incident to the closing of any real estate or personal property transaction are client funds subject to this rule regardless of whether the lawyer, the law firm, or the parties view the funds as belonging to clients or non-clients.

Washington Comments

     [1] A lawyer must also comply with the recordkeeping rule for trust accounts, Rule 1.15B.

     [2] Client funds include, but are not limited to, the following: legal fees and costs that have been paid in advance, funds received on behalf of a client, funds to be paid by a client to a third party through the lawyer, other funds subject to attorney and other liens, and payments received in excess of amounts billed for fees.

     [3] This Rule applies to property held in any fiduciary capacity in connection with a representation, whether as trustee, agent, escrow agent, guardian, personal representative, executor, or otherwise.

     [4] The inclusion of ethical obligations to third persons in the handling of trust funds and property is not intended to expand or otherwise affect existing law regarding a Washington lawyer's liability to third parties other than clients. See, e.g., Trask v. Butler, 123 Wn.2d 835, 872 P.2d 1080 (1994); Hetzel v. Parks, 93 Wn. App. 929, 971 P.2d 115 (1999).

     [5] Property covered by this Rule includes original documents affecting legal rights such as wills or deeds.

     [6] A lawyer has a duty to take reasonable steps to locate a client or third person for whom the lawyer is holding funds or property. If after taking reasonable steps, the lawyer is still unable to locate the client or third person, the lawyer should treat the funds as unclaimed property under the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act, RCW 63.29.

     [7] A lawyer may not use as a trust account an account in which funds are periodically transferred by the bank between a trust account and an uninsured account or other account that would not qualify as a trust account under this Rule.

     [8] If a lawyer accepts payment of an advanced fee deposit by credit card, the payment must be deposited directly into the trust account. It cannot be deposited into a general account and then transferred to the trust account. Similarly, credit card payments of earned fees cannot be deposited into the trust account and then transferred to another account.

     [9] Under paragraph (g), the extent of the efforts that a lawyer is obligated to take to resolve a dispute depend on the amount in dispute, the availability of methods for alternative dispute resolution, and the likelihood of informal resolution.

     [10] The requirement in paragraph (h)(4) that receipts must be deposited intact means that a lawyer cannot deposit one check or negotiable instrument into two or more accounts at the same time, commonly known as a split deposit.

     [11] Paragraph (h)(7) permits Washington lawyers to enter into written agreements with the trust account financial institution to provide for disbursement of trust deposits prior to formal notice of dishonor or collection. In essence the trust account bank is agreeing to or has guaranteed a loan to the lawyer and the client for the amount of the trust deposit pending collection of that deposit from the institution upon which the instrument was written. A Washington lawyer may only enter into such an arrangement if 1) there is a formal written agreement between the attorney and the trust account institution, and 2) the trust account financial institution provides the lawyer with written assurance that in the event of dishonor of the deposited instrument or other difficulty in collecting the deposited funds, the financial institution will not have recourse to the trust account to obtain the funds to reimburse the financial institution. A lawyer must never use one client's money to pay for withdrawals from the trust account on behalf of another client who is paid subject to the lawyer's guarantee. The trust account financial institution must agree that the institution will not seek to fund the guaranteed withdrawal from the trust account, but will instead look to the lawyer for payment of uncollectible funds. Any such agreement must ensure that the trust account funds or deposits of any other client's or third person's money into the trust account would not be affected by the guarantee.

     [12] The Legal Foundation of Washington was established by Order of the Supreme Court of Washington.

     [13] A lawyer may, but is not required to, notify the client of the intended use of funds paid to the Foundation.

     [14] If the client or third person requests that funds that would be deposited in a separate interest-bearing account instead be held in the IOLTA account, the lawyer should document this request in the lawyer's trust account records and preferably should confirm the request in writing to the client or third person.

     [15] A lawyer may not receive from financial institutions earnings credits or any other benefit from the financial institution based on the balance maintained in a trust account.

     [3] Paragraph (a)(9) does not require a lawyer to retain the entire client file for a period of seven years, although many lawyers will choose to do so for other reasons. Rather, under this paragraph, the lawyer must retain only those portions of the file necessary for a complete understanding of the financial transactions. For example, if a lawyer received proceeds of a settlement on a client's behalf, the lawyer would need to retain a copy of the settlement agreement. In many cases, there will be nothing in the client file that needs to be retained other than the specific documents listed in paragraphs (a)(2)-(8).

     (1) Tthe representation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;

     (2) Tthe lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs his the lawyer's ability to represent the client; or

     (3) Tthe lawyer is discharged.

     (b) Except as stated in section paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if:

     (1) withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client, or if:;

     (12) Tthe client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;

     (23) Tthe client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud;

     (34) Tthe client insists upon pursuing an objective taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement;

     (45) Tthe client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;

     (56) Tthe representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or

     (67) Oother good cause for withdrawal exists.

     (c) A lawyer must comply with applicable law requiring notice to or permission of a tribunal when terminating a representation. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation.

     (d) Upon termination of representation, Aa lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law.

Comment

     [1] A lawyer should not accept representation in a matter unless it can be performed competently, promptly, without improper conflict of interest and to completion. Ordinarily, a representation in a matter is completed when the agreed-upon assistance has been concluded. See Rules 1.2(c) and 6.5. See also Rule 1.3, Comment [4].

Mandatory Withdrawal

     [2] A lawyer ordinarily must decline or withdraw from representation if the client demands that the lawyer engage in conduct that is illegal or violates the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. The lawyer is not obliged to decline or withdraw simply because the client suggests such a course of conduct; a client may make such a suggestion in the hope that a lawyer will not be constrained by a professional obligation.

     [3] When a lawyer has been appointed to represent a client, withdrawal ordinarily requires approval of the appointing authority. See also Rule 6.2. Similarly, court approval or notice to the court is often required by applicable law before a lawyer withdraws from pending litigation. Difficulty may be encountered if withdrawal is based on the client's demand that the lawyer engage in unprofessional conduct. The court may request an explanation for the withdrawal, while the lawyer may be bound to keep confidential the facts that would constitute such an explanation. The lawyer's statement that professional considerations require termination of the representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient. Lawyers should be mindful of their obligations to both clients and the court under Rules 1.6 and 3.3.

Discharge

     [4] A client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for payment for the lawyer's services. Where future dispute about the withdrawal may be anticipated, it may be advisable to prepare a written statement reciting the circumstances.

     [5] Whether a client can discharge appointed counsel may depend on applicable law. A client seeking to do so should be given a full explanation of the consequences. These consequences may include a decision by the appointing authority that appointment of successor counsel is unjustified, thus requiring self-representation by the client.

     [6] If the client has severely diminished capacity, the client may lack the legal capacity to discharge the lawyer, and in any event the discharge may be seriously adverse to the client's interests. The lawyer should make special effort to help the client consider the consequences and may take reasonably necessary protective action as provided in Rule 1.14.

Optional Withdrawal

     [7] A lawyer may withdraw from representation in some circumstances. The lawyer has the option to withdraw if it can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the client's interests. Withdrawal is also justified if the client persists in a course of action that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent, for a lawyer is not required to be associated with such conduct even if the lawyer does not further it. Withdrawal is also permitted if the lawyer's services were misused in the past even if that would materially prejudice the client. The lawyer may also withdraw where the client insists on taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement.

     [8] A lawyer may withdraw if the client refuses to abide by the terms of an agreement relating to the representation, such as an agreement concerning fees or court costs or an agreement limiting the objectives of the representation.

Assisting the Client upon Withdrawal

     [9] Even if the lawyer has been unfairly discharged by the client, a lawyer must take all reasonable steps to mitigate the consequences to the client. The lawyer may retain papers as security for a fee only to the extent permitted by law. See Rule 1.15A.

Additional Washington Comment (16)

     [16] If, at the time the notice under paragraph (c) is given, the buyer or seller knows of a conflict that would preclude the buyer from representing a client of the seller, the notice to that client should inform the client of the conflict and the need for the client to obtain substitute counsel or retrieve the file. When such a conflict exists, the notice described in paragraph (c)(3) cannot be given because there can be no presumption that the client's file will be transferred to the buyer.

     [13] Pursuant to statute or other law, government officers and employees may be entitled to defense and indemnification by the government. In these circumstances, a government lawyer may find it necessary to obtain information from a government officer or employee to determine if he or she meets the criteria for representation and indemnification. In this situation, the government lawyer is acting on behalf of the government entity as the client, and this Rule would not apply. The government lawyer shall comply with Rule 4.3 in obtaining such information.

Comment

Scope of Advice

     [1] A client is entitled to straightforward advice expressing the lawyer's honest assessment. Legal advice often involves unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client may be disinclined to confront. In presenting advice, a lawyer endeavors to sustain the client's morale and may put advice in as acceptable a form as honesty permits. However, a lawyer should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client.

     [2] Advice couched in narrow legal terms may be of little value to a client, especially where practical considerations, such as cost or effects on other people, are predominant. Purely technical legal advice, therefore, can sometimes be inadequate. It is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations in giving advice. Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor as such, moral and ethical considerations impinge upon most legal questions and may decisively influence how the law will be applied.

     [3] A client may expressly or impliedly ask the lawyer for purely technical advice. When such a request is made by a client experienced in legal matters, the lawyer may accept it at face value. When such a request is made by a client inexperienced in legal matters, however, the lawyer's responsibility as advisor may include indicating that more may be involved than strictly legal considerations.

     [4] Matters that go beyond strictly legal questions may also be in the domain of another profession. Family matters can involve problems within the professional competence of psychiatry, clinical psychology or social work; business matters can involve problems within the competence of the accounting profession or of financial specialists. Where consultation with a professional in another field is itself something a competent lawyer would recommend, the lawyer should make such a recommendation. At the same time, a lawyer's advice at its best often consists of recommending a course of action in the face of conflicting recommendations of experts.

Offering Advice

     [5] In general, a lawyer is not expected to give advice until asked by the client. However, when a lawyer knows that a client proposes a course of action that is likely to result in substantial adverse legal consequences to the client, the lawyer's duty to the client under Rule 1.4 may require that the lawyer offer advice if the client's course of action is related to the representation. Similarly, when a matter is likely to involve litigation, it may be necessary under Rule 1.4 to inform the client of forms of dispute resolution that might constitute reasonable alternatives to litigation. A lawyer ordinarily has no duty to initiate investigation of a client's affairs or to give advice that the client has indicated is unwanted, but a lawyer may initiate advice to a client when doing so appears to be in the client's interest.

     (c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so requests, or if any of the conditions stated in section (a) is no longer satisfied. Upon withdrawal, the lawyer shall not continue to represent any of the clients in the matter that was the subject of the intermediation.

Washington Comment

     [1] Former Washington RPC 2.2 governed lawyers acting as intermediaries between clients. When representing multiple clients in the same matter, a lawyer must comply with Rule 1.7. A number of special considerations apply when a lawyer acts as an intermediary and represents multiple clients in the same matter. See Comments [29] – [33] to Rule 1.7.

     (2) The client consents after consultation.

     (b) When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the evaluation is likely to affect the client's interests materially and adversely, the lawyer shall not provide the evaluation unless the client gives informed consent.

     (bc) Except as disclosure is required authorized in connection with a report of an evaluation, information relating to the evaluation is otherwise protected by rRule 1.6.

Comment

Definition

     [1] An evaluation may be performed at the client's direction or when impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation. See Rule 1.2. Such an evaluation may be for the primary purpose of establishing information for the benefit of third parties; for example, an opinion concerning the title of property rendered at the behest of a vendor for the information of a prospective purchaser, or at the behest of a borrower for the information of a prospective lender. In some situations, the evaluation may be required by a government agency; for example, an opinion concerning the legality of the securities registered for sale under the securities laws. In other instances, the evaluation may be required by a third person, such as a purchaser of a business.

     [2] A legal evaluation should be distinguished from an investigation of a person with whom the lawyer does not have a client-lawyer relationship. For example, a lawyer retained by a purchaser to analyze a vendor's title to property does not have a client-lawyer relationship with the vendor. So also, an investigation into a person's affairs by a government lawyer, or by special counsel by a government lawyer, or by special counsel employed by the government, is not an evaluation as that term is used in this Rule. The question is whether the lawyer is retained by the person whose affairs are being examined. When the lawyer is retained by that person, the general rules concerning loyalty to client and preservation of confidences apply, which is not the case if the lawyer is retained by someone else. For this reason, it is essential to identify the person by whom the lawyer is retained. This should be made clear not only to the person under examination, but also to others to whom the results are to be made available.

Duties Owed to Third Person and Client

     [3] When the evaluation is intended for the information or use of a third person, a legal duty to that person may or may not arise. That legal question is beyond the scope of this Rule. However, since such an evaluation involves a departure from the normal client-lawyer relationship, careful analysis of the situation is required. The lawyer must be satisfied as a matter of professional judgment that making the evaluation is compatible with other functions undertaken in behalf of the client. For example, if the lawyer is acting as advocate in defending the client against charges of fraud, it would normally be incompatible with that responsibility for the lawyer to perform an evaluation for others concerning the same or a related transaction. Assuming no such impediment is apparent, however, the lawyer should advise the client of the implications of the evaluation, particularly the lawyer's responsibilities to third persons and the duty to disseminate the findings.

Access to and Disclosure of Information

     [4] The quality of an evaluation depends on the freedom and extent of the investigation upon which it is based. Ordinarily a lawyer should have whatever latitude of investigation seems necessary as a matter of professional judgment. Under some circumstances, however, the terms of the evaluation may be limited. For example, certain issues or sources may be categorically excluded, or the scope of search may be limited by time constraints or the noncooperation of persons having relevant information. Any such limitations that are material to the evaluation should be described in the report. If after a lawyer has commenced an evaluation, the client refuses to comply with the terms upon which it was understood the evaluation was to have been made, the lawyer's obligations are determined by law, having reference to the terms of the client's agreement and the surrounding circumstances. In no circumstances is the lawyer permitted to knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law in providing an evaluation under this Rule. See Rule 4.1.

Obtaining Client's Informed Consent

     [5] Information relating to an evaluation is protected by Rule 1.6. In many situations, providing an evaluation to a third party poses no significant risk to the client; thus, the lawyer may be impliedly authorized to disclose information to carry out the representation. See Rule 1.6(a). Where, however, it is reasonably likely that providing the evaluation will affect the client's interests materially and adversely, the lawyer must first obtain the client's consent after the client has been adequately informed concerning the important possible effects on the client's interests. See Rules 1.6(a) and 1.0(e).

Financial Auditors' Requests for Information

     [6] When a question concerning the legal situation of a client arises at the instance of the client's financial auditor and the question is referred to the lawyer, the lawyer's response may be made in accordance with procedures recognized in the legal profession. Such a procedure is set forth in the American Bar Association Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information, adopted in 1975.

     [5] Lawyers who represent clients in alternative dispute-resolution processes are governed by the Rules of Professional Conduct. When the dispute-resolution process takes place before a tribunal, as in binding arbitration (see Rule 1.0(m)), the lawyer's duty of candor is governed by Rule 3.3. Otherwise, the lawyer's duty of candor toward both the third-party neutral and other parties is governed by Rule 4.1.

Comment

     [1] The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client's cause, but also a duty not to abuse legal procedure. The law, both procedural and substantive, establishes the limits within which an advocate may proceed. However, the law is not always clear and never is static. Accordingly, in determining the proper scope of advocacy, account must be taken of the law's ambiguities and potential for change.

     [2] The filing of an action or defense or similar action taken for a client is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully substantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence only by discovery. What is required of lawyers, however, is that they inform themselves about the facts of their clients' cases and the applicable law and determine that they can make good faith arguments in support of their clients' positions. Such action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client's position ultimately will not prevail. The action is frivolous, however, if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.

     [3] The lawyer's obligations under this Rule are subordinate to federal or state constitutional law that entitles a defendant in a criminal matter to the assistance of counsel in presenting a claim or contention that otherwise would be prohibited by this Rule.

Comment

     [1] Dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Although there will be occasions when a lawyer may properly seek a postponement for personal reasons, it is not proper for a lawyer to routinely fail to expedite litigation solely for the convenience of the advocates. Nor will a failure to expedite be reasonable if done for the purpose of frustrating an opposing party's attempt to obtain rightful redress or repose. It is not a justification that similar conduct is often tolerated by the bench and bar. The question is whether a competent lawyer acting in good faith would regard the course of action as having some substantial purpose other than delay. Realizing financial or other benefit from otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest of the client.

     (1) Mmake a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer;

     (2) Fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client unless such disclosure is prohibited by rule 1.6;

     (32) Ffail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or

     (43) Ooffer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer's client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.

     (b) The duties stated in section (a) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding.

     (b) A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, withdrawal or disclosure to the tribunal.

     (c) If the lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall promptly disclose this fact to the tribunal unless such disclosure is prohibited by rule 1.6.

     (c) The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.

     (d) If the lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, and disclosure of this fact is prohibited by rule 1.6, the lawyer shall promptly make reasonable efforts to convince the client to consent to disclosure. If the client refuses to consent to disclosure, the lawyer may seek to withdraw from the representation in accordance with rule 1.l5.(e).

     (e) A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.

     (fd) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all relevant material facts known to the lawyer that should he disclosed to permit will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.

     (g) Constitutional law defining the right to assistance of counsel in criminal cases may supersede the obligations stated in this rule.

Comment

     [1] This Rule governs the conduct of a lawyer who is representing a client in the proceedings of a tribunal. See Rule 1.0(m) for the definition of "tribunal." It also applies when the lawyer is representing a client in an ancillary proceeding conducted pursuant to the tribunal's adjudicative authority, such as a deposition. Thus, for example, paragraph (a)(3) requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures if the lawyer comes to know that a client who is testifying in a deposition has offered evidence that is false.

     [2] This Rule sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process. A lawyer acting as an advocate in an adjudicative proceeding has an obligation to present the client's case with persuasive force. Performance of that duty while maintaining confidences of the client, however, is qualified by the advocate's duty of candor to the tribunal. Consequently, although a lawyer in an adversary proceeding is not required to present an impartial exposition of the law or to vouch for the evidence submitted in a cause, the lawyer must not allow the tribunal to be misled by false statements of law or fact or evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.

Representations by a Lawyer

     [3] [Washington revision] An advocate is responsible for pleadings and other documents prepared for litigation, but is usually not required to have personal knowledge of matters asserted therein, for litigation documents ordinarily present assertions by the client, or by someone on the client's behalf, and not assertions by the lawyer. Compare Rule 3.1. However, an assertion purporting to be on the lawyer's own knowledge, as in an affidavit by the lawyer or in a statement in open court, may properly be made only when the lawyer knows the assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis of a reasonably diligent inquiry. There are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation. The obligation prescribed in Rule 1.2(d) not to counsel a client to commit or assist the client in committing a fraud applies in litigation. Regarding compliance with Rule 1.2(d), see the Comment to that Rule. See also Comment [4] to Rule 8.4.

Legal Argument

     [4] Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes dishonesty toward the tribunal. A lawyer is not required to make a disinterested exposition of the law, but must recognize the existence of pertinent legal authorities. Furthermore, as stated in paragraph (a)(2), an advocate has a duty to disclose directly adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction that has not been disclosed by the opposing party. The underlying concept is that legal argument is a discussion seeking to determine the legal premises properly applicable to the case.

Offering Evidence

     [5] Paragraph (a)(3) requires that the lawyer refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false, regardless of the client's wishes. This duty is premised on the lawyer's obligation as an officer of the court to prevent the trier of fact from being misled by false evidence. A lawyer does not violate this Rule if the lawyer offers the evidence for the purpose of establishing its falsity.

     [6] If a lawyer knows that the client intends to testify falsely or wants the lawyer to introduce false evidence, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client that the evidence should not be offered. If the persuasion is ineffective and the lawyer continues to represent the client, the lawyer must refuse to offer the false evidence. If only a portion of a witness's testimony will be false, the lawyer may call the witness to testify but may not elicit or otherwise permit the witness to present the testimony that the lawyer knows is false.

     [7] [Washington revision] The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) apply to all lawyers, including defense counsel in criminal cases. In some jurisdictions other than Washington, however, courts have required counsel to present the accused as a witness or to give a narrative statement if the accused so desires, even if counsel knows that the testimony or statement will be false. The obligation of the advocate under the Rules of Professional Conduct is subordinate to such requirements. See State v. Berrysmith, 87 Wn. App. 268, 944 P.2d 397 (1997), review denied, 134 Wn.2d 1008, 954 P.2d 277 (1998). See also Comment [9].

     [8] The prohibition against offering false evidence only applies if the lawyer knows that the evidence is false. A lawyer's reasonable belief that evidence is false does not preclude its presentation to the trier of fact. A lawyer's knowledge that evidence is false, however, can be inferred from the circumstances. See Rule 1.0(f). Thus, although a lawyer should resolve doubts about the veracity of testimony or other evidence in favor of the client, the lawyer cannot ignore an obvious falsehood.

     [9] Although paragraph (a)(3) only prohibits a lawyer from offering evidence the lawyer knows to be false, it permits the lawyer to refuse to offer testimony or other proof that the lawyer reasonably believes is false. Offering such proof may reflect adversely on the lawyer's ability to discriminate in the quality of evidence and thus impair the lawyer's effectiveness as an advocate. Because of the special protections historically provided criminal defendants, however, this Rule does not permit a lawyer to refuse to offer the testimony of such a client where the lawyer reasonably believes but does not know that the testimony will be false. Unless the lawyer knows the testimony will be false, the lawyer must honor the client's decision to testify. See also Comment [7].

Remedial Measures

     [10] Having offered material evidence in the belief that it was true, a lawyer may subsequently come to know that the evidence is false. Or, a lawyer may be surprised when the lawyer's client, or another witness called by the lawyer, offers testimony the lawyer knows to be false, either during the lawyer's direct examination or in response to cross-examination by the opposing lawyer. In such situations or if the lawyer knows of the falsity of testimony elicited from the client during a deposition, the lawyer must take reasonable remedial measures. In such situations, the advocate's proper course is to remonstrate with the client confidentially, advise the client of the lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal and seek the client's cooperation with respect to the withdrawal or correction of the false statements or evidence. If that fails, the advocate must take further remedial action. If withdrawal from the representation is not permitted or will not undo the effect of the false evidence, the advocate must make such disclosure to the tribunal as is reasonably necessary to remedy the situation, even if doing so requires the lawyer to reveal information that otherwise would be protected by Rule 1.6. It is for the tribunal then to determine what should be done -- making a statement about the matter to the trier of fact, ordering a mistrial or perhaps nothing.

     [11] The disclosure of a client's false testimony can result in grave consequences to the client, including not only a sense of betrayal but also loss of the case and perhaps a prosecution for perjury. But the alternative is that the lawyer cooperate in deceiving the court, thereby subverting the truth-finding process which the adversary system is designed to implement. See Rule 1.2(d). Furthermore, unless it is clearly understood that the lawyer will act upon the duty to disclose the existence of false evidence, the client can simply reject the lawyer's advice to reveal the false evidence and insist that the lawyer keep silent. Thus the client could in effect coerce the lawyer into being a party to fraud on the court.

Preserving Integrity of Adjudicative Process

     [12] Lawyers have a special obligation to protect a tribunal against criminal or fraudulent conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process, such as bribing, intimidating or otherwise unlawfully communicating with a witness, juror, court official or other participant in the proceeding, unlawfully destroying or concealing documents or other evidence or failing to disclose information to the tribunal when required by law to do so. Thus, paragraph (b) requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures, including disclosure if necessary, whenever the lawyer knows that a person, including the lawyer's client, intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding.

Duration of Obligation

     [13] A practical time limit on the obligation to rectify false evidence or false statements of law and fact has to be established. The conclusion of the proceeding is a reasonably definite point for the termination of the obligation. A proceeding has concluded within the meaning of this Rule when a final judgment in the proceeding has been affirmed on appeal or the time for review has passed.

Ex Parte Proceedings

     [14] Ordinarily, an advocate has the limited responsibility of presenting one side of the matters that a tribunal should consider in reaching a decision; the conflicting position is expected to be presented by the opposing party. However, in any ex parte proceeding, such as an application for a temporary restraining order, there is no balance of presentation by opposing advocates. The object of an ex parte proceeding is nevertheless to yield a substantially just result. The judge has an affirmative responsibility to accord the absent party just consideration. The lawyer for the represented party has the correlative duty to make disclosures of material facts known to the lawyer and that the lawyer reasonably believes are necessary to an informed decision.

Withdrawal

     [15] Normally, a lawyer's compliance with the duty of candor imposed by this Rule does not require that the lawyer withdraw from the representation of a client whose interests will be or have been adversely affected by the lawyer's disclosure. The lawyer may, however, be required by Rule 1.16(a) to seek permission of the tribunal to withdraw if the lawyer's compliance with this Rule's duty of candor results in such an extreme deterioration of the client-lawyer relationship that the lawyer can no longer competently represent the client. See also Rule 1.16(b) for the circumstances in which a lawyer will be permitted to seek a tribunal's permission to withdraw. In connection with a request for permission to withdraw that is premised on a client's misconduct, a lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation only to the extent reasonably necessary to comply with this Rule or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6.

     (a) Uunlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act;

     (b) Ffalsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law;

     (c) Kknowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists;

     (d) Iin pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party; or

     (e) Iin trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, or assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness;, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused.

     (f) In trial, state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused, but the lawyer may argue, on his or her analysis of the evidence, for any position or conclusion with respect to the matters stated herein. [Reserved.]

Comment

     [1] The procedure of the adversary system contemplates that the evidence in a case is to be marshalled competitively by the contending parties. Fair competition in the adversary system is secured by prohibitions against destruction or concealment of evidence, improperly influencing witnesses, obstructive tactics in discovery procedure, and the like.

     [2] Documents and other items of evidence are often essential to establish a claim or defense. Subject to evidentiary privileges, the right of an opposing party, including the government, to obtain evidence through discovery or subpoena is an important procedural right. The exercise of that right can be frustrated if relevant material is altered, concealed or destroyed. Applicable law in many jurisdictions makes it an offense to destroy material for purpose of impairing its availability in a pending proceeding or one whose commencement can be foreseen. Falsifying evidence is also generally a criminal offense. Paragraph (a) applies to evidentiary material generally, including computerized information. Applicable law may permit a lawyer to take temporary possession of physical evidence of client crimes for the purpose of conducting a limited examination that will not alter or destroy material characteristics of the evidence. In such a case, applicable law may require the lawyer to turn the evidence over to the police or other prosecuting authority, depending on the circumstances.

     [3] With regard to paragraph (b), it is not improper to pay a witness's expenses or to compensate an expert witness on terms permitted by law. The common law rule in most jurisdictions is that it is improper to pay an occurrence witness any fee for testifying and that it is improper to pay an expert witness a contingent fee.

     [4] [Reserved.]

Additional Washington Comment (5)

     [5] Washington did not adopt Model Rule 3.4(f), which delineates circumstances in which a lawyer may request that a person other than a client refrain from voluntarily giving information to another party, because the Model Rule is inconsistent with Washington law. See Wright v. Group Health Hospital, 103 Wn.2d 192, 691 P.2d 564 (1994). Advising or requesting that a person other than a client refrain from voluntarily giving information to another party may violate other Rules. See, e.g., Rule 8.4(d).

     (a) Sseek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law;

     (b) Ccommunicate ex parte with such a person except as permitted during the proceeding unless authorized to do so by law or court order; or

     (c) communicate with a juror or prospective juror after discharge of the jury if:

     (1) the communication is prohibited by law or court order;

     (2) the juror has made known to the lawyer a desire not to communicate; or

     (3) the communication involves misrepresentation, coercion, duress or harassment; or

     (d) Eengage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.

Comment

     [1] [Washington revision] Many forms of improper influence upon a tribunal are proscribed by criminal law. Others are specified in the Washington Code of Judicial Conduct, with which an advocate should be familiar. A lawyer is required to avoid contributing to a violation of such provisions.

     [2] During a proceeding a lawyer may not communicate ex parte with persons serving in an official capacity in the proceeding, such as judges, masters or jurors, unless authorized to do so by law or court order.

     [3] A lawyer may on occasion want to communicate with a juror or prospective juror after the jury has been discharged. The lawyer may do so unless the communication is prohibited by law or a court order but must respect the desire of the juror not to talk with the lawyer. The lawyer may not engage in improper conduct during the communication.

     [4] The advocate's function is to present evidence and argument so that the cause may be decided according to law. Refraining from abusive or obstreperous conduct is a corollary of the advocate's right to speak on behalf of litigants. A lawyer may stand firm against abuse by a judge but should avoid reciprocation; the judge's default is no justification for similar dereliction by an advocate. An advocate can present the cause, protect the record for subsequent review and preserve professional integrity by patient firmness no less effectively than by belligerence or theatrics.

     [5] The duty to refrain from disruptive conduct applies to any proceeding of a tribunal, including a deposition. See Rule 1.0(m).

     (b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may state:

     (1) the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved;

     (2) information contained in a public record;

     (3) that an investigation of a matter is in progress;

     (4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;

     (5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto;

     (6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest; and

     (7) in a criminal case, in addition to subparagraphs (1) through (6):

     (i) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused;

     (ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in apprehension of that person;

     (iii) the fact, time and place of arrest; and

     (iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the investigation.

     (c) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may make a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer's client. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity.

     (d) No lawyer associated in a firm or government agency with a lawyer subject to paragraph (a) shall make a statement prohibited by paragraph (a).

     (iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the investigation.

II. Civil.

     The kind of statement referred to in rule 3.6 which may potentially prejudice civil matters triable to a jury is a statement designed to influence the jury or to detract from the impartiality of the proceedings.

Comment

     [1] It is difficult to strike a balance between protecting the right to a fair trial and safeguarding the right of free expression. Preserving the right to a fair trial necessarily entails some curtailment of the information that may be disseminated about a party prior to trial, particularly where trial by jury is involved. If there were no such limits, the result would be the practical nullification of the protective effect of the rules of forensic decorum and the exclusionary rules of evidence. On the other hand, there are vital social interests served by the free dissemination of information about events having legal consequences and about legal proceedings themselves. The public has a right to know about threats to its safety and measures aimed at assuring its security. It also has a legitimate interest in the conduct of judicial proceedings, particularly in matters of general public concern. Furthermore, the subject matter of legal proceedings is often of direct significance in debate and deliberation over questions of public policy.

     [2] Special rules of confidentiality may validly govern proceedings in juvenile, domestic relations and mental disability proceedings, and perhaps other types of litigation. Rule 3.4(c) requires compliance with such rules.

     [3] The Rule sets forth a basic general prohibition against a lawyer's making statements that the lawyer knows or should know will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. Recognizing that the public value of informed commentary is great and the likelihood of prejudice to a proceeding by the commentary of a lawyer who is not involved in the proceeding is small, the Rule applies only to lawyers who are, or who have been involved in the investigation or litigation of a case, and their associates.

     [4] Paragraph (b) identifies specific matters about which a lawyer's statements would not ordinarily be considered to present a substantial likelihood of material prejudice, and should not in any event be considered prohibited by the general prohibition of paragraph (a). Paragraph (b) is not intended to be an exhaustive listing of the subjects upon which a lawyer may make a statement, but statements on other matters may be subject to paragraph (a).

     [5] There are, on the other hand, certain subjects that are more likely than not to have a material prejudicial effect on a proceeding, particularly when they refer to a civil matter triable to a jury, a criminal matter, or any other proceeding that could result in incarceration. These subjects relate to:

     (1) the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party, suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of a witness, or the expected testimony of a party or witness;

     (2) in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by a defendant or suspect or that person's refusal or failure to make a statement;

     (3) the performance or results of any examination or test or the refusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or test, or the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be presented;

     (4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration;

     (5) information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and that would, if disclosed, create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial; or

     (6) the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there is included therein a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.

     [6] Another relevant factor in determining prejudice is the nature of the proceeding involved. Criminal jury trials will be most sensitive to extrajudicial speech. Civil trials may be less sensitive. Non-jury hearings and arbitration proceedings may be even less affected. The Rule will still place limitations on prejudicial comments in these cases, but the likelihood of prejudice may be different depending on the type of proceeding.

     [7] Finally, extrajudicial statements that might otherwise raise a question under this Rule may be permissible when they are made in response to statements made publicly by another party, another party's lawyer, or third persons, where a reasonable lawyer would believe a public response is required in order to avoid prejudice to the lawyer's client. When prejudicial statements have been publicly made by others, responsive statements may have the salutary effect of lessening any resulting adverse impact on the adjudicative proceeding. Such responsive statements should be limited to contain only such information as is necessary to mitigate undue prejudice created by the statements made by others.

     [8] See Rule 3.8(f) for additional duties of prosecutors in connection with extrajudicial statements about criminal proceedings.

Additional Washington Comment (9)

     [9] For additional guidance in applying this Rule, see the Guidelines for Applying Rule 3.6, reproduced in the Appendix to the Rules of Professional Conduct.

     (a1) Tthe testimony relates to an issue that is either uncontested or a formality issue;

     (b2) Tthe testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case;

     (3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client; or

     (c4) Tthe lawyer has been called by the opposing party and the court rules that the lawyer may continue to act as an advocate; or.

     (d) The trial judge finds that disqualification of the lawyer would work a substantial hardship on the client and that the likelihood of the lawyer being a necessary witness was not reasonably foreseeable before trial.

     (b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9.

Comment

     [1] Combining the roles of advocate and witness can prejudice the tribunal and the opposing party and can also involve a conflict of interest between the lawyer and client.

Advocate-Witness Rule

     [2] The tribunal has proper objection when the trier of fact may be confused or misled by a lawyer serving as both advocate and witness. The opposing party has proper objection where the combination of roles may prejudice that party's rights in the litigation. A witness is required to testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others. It may not be clear whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof.

     [3] [Washington revision] To protect the tribunal, paragraph (a) prohibits a lawyer from simultaneously serving as advocate and necessary witness except in those circumstances specified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(4). Paragraph (a)(1) recognizes that if the testimony will be uncontested, the ambiguities in the dual role are purely theoretical. Paragraph (a)(2) recognizes that where the testimony concerns the extent and value of legal services rendered in the action in which the testimony is offered, permitting the lawyers to testify avoids the need for a second trial with new counsel to resolve that issue. Moreover, in such a situation the judge has firsthand knowledge of the matter in issue; hence, there is less dependence on the adversary process to test the credibility of the testimony.

     [4] Apart from these two exceptions, paragraph (a)(3) recognizes that a balancing is required between the interests of the client and those of the tribunal and the opposing party. Whether the tribunal is likely to be misled or the opposing party is likely to suffer prejudice depends on the nature of the case, the importance and probable tenor of the lawyer's testimony, and the probability that the lawyer's testimony will conflict with that of other witnesses. Even if there is risk of such prejudice, in determining whether the lawyer should be disqualified, due regard must be given to the effect of disqualification on the lawyer's client. It is relevant that one or both parties could reasonably foresee that the lawyer would probably be a witness. The conflict of interest principles stated in Rules 1.7, 1.9 and 1.10 have no application to this aspect of the problem.

     [5] Because the tribunal is not likely to be misled when a lawyer acts as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm will testify as a necessary witness, paragraph (b) permits the lawyer to do so except in situations involving a conflict of interest.

Conflict of Interest

     [6] [Washington revision] In determining if it is permissible to act as advocate in a trial in which the lawyer will be a necessary witness, the lawyer must also consider that the dual role may give rise to a conflict of interest that will require compliance with Rules 1.7 or 1.9. For example, if there is likely to be substantial conflict between the testimony of the client and that of the lawyer, the representation involves a conflict of interest that requires compliance with Rule 1.7. This would be true even though the lawyer might not be prohibited by paragraph (a) from simultaneously serving as advocate and witness because the lawyer's disqualification would work a substantial hardship on the client. Similarly, a lawyer who might be permitted to simultaneously serve as an advocate and a witness by paragraph (a)(3) or (a)(4) might be precluded from doing so by Rule 1.9. The problem can arise whether the lawyer is called as a witness on behalf of the client or is called by the opposing party. Determining whether or not such a conflict exists is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer involved. If there is a conflict of interest, the lawyer must secure the client's informed consent, confirmed in writing. In some cases, the lawyer will be precluded from seeking the client's consent. See Rule 1.7. See Rule 1.0(b) for the definition of "confirmed in writing" and Rule 1.0(e) for the definition of "informed consent."

     [7] Paragraph (b) provides that a lawyer is not disqualified from serving as an advocate because a lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated in a firm is precluded from doing so by paragraph (a). If, however, the testifying lawyer would also be disqualified by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9 from representing the client in the matter, other lawyers in the firm will be precluded from representing the client by Rule 1.10 unless the client gives informed consent under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7.

Additional Washington Comment (8)

     [8] When a lawyer is called to testify as a witness by the adverse party, there is a risk that Rule 3.7 is being inappropriately used as a tactic to obtain disqualification of the lawyer. Paragraph (a)(4) is intended to confer discretion on the tribunal in determining whether disqualification is truly warranted in such circumstances. The provisions of paragraph (a)(4) were taken from former Washington RPC 3.7(c).

     (a) Rrefrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause;

     (b) Mmake reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel;

     (c) Nnot seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing;

     (d) Mmake timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal; and

     (e) not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding to present evidence about a past or present client unless the prosecutor reasonably believes:

     (1) the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable privilege;

     (2) the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing investigation or prosecution; and

     (3) there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information;

     (ef) except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused and Eexercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees or other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under Rule 3.6 or this Rule.

Comment

     [1] A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence. Precisely how far the prosecutor is required to go in this direction is a matter of debate and varies in different jurisdictions. Many jurisdictions have adopted the ABA Standards of Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecution Function, which in turn are the product of prolonged and careful deliberation by lawyers experienced in both criminal prosecution and defense. Applicable law may require other measures by the prosecutor and knowing disregard of those obligations or a systematic abuse of prosecutorial discretion could constitute a violation of Rule 8.4.

     [2] In some jurisdictions, a defendant may waive a preliminary hearing and thereby lose a valuable opportunity to challenge probable cause. Accordingly, prosecutors should not seek to obtain waivers of preliminary hearings or other important pretrial rights from unrepresented accused persons. Paragraph (c) does not apply, however, to an accused appearing pro se with the approval of the tribunal. Nor does it forbid the lawful questioning of an uncharged suspect who has knowingly waived the rights to counsel and silence.

     [3] The exception in paragraph (d) recognizes that a prosecutor may seek an appropriate protective order from the tribunal if disclosure of information to the defense could result in substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest.

     [4] Paragraph (e) is intended to limit the issuance of lawyer subpoenas in grand jury and other criminal proceedings to those situations in which there is a genuine need to intrude into the client-lawyer relationship.

     [5] Paragraph (f) supplements Rule 3.6, which prohibits extrajudicial statements that have a substantial likelihood of prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding. In the context of a criminal prosecution, a prosecutor's extrajudicial statement can create the additional problem of increasing public condemnation of the accused. Although the announcement of an indictment, for example, will necessarily have severe consequences for the accused, a prosecutor can, and should, avoid comments which have no legitimate law enforcement purpose and have a substantial likelihood of increasing public opprobrium of the accused. Nothing in this Comment is intended to restrict the statements which a prosecutor may make which comply with Rule 3.6(b) or 3.6(c).

     [6] Like other lawyers, prosecutors are subject to Rules 5.1 and 5.3, which relate to responsibilities regarding lawyers and nonlawyers who work for or are associated with the lawyer's office. Paragraph (f) reminds the prosecutor of the importance of these obligations in connection with the unique dangers of improper extrajudicial statements in a criminal case. In addition, paragraph (f) requires a prosecutor to exercise reasonable care to prevent persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor from making improper extrajudicial statements, even when such persons are not under the direct supervision of the prosecutor. Ordinarily, the reasonable care standard will be satisfied if the prosecutor issues the appropriate cautions to law-enforcement personnel and other relevant individuals.

Comment

     [1] In representation before bodies such as legislatures, municipal councils, and executive and administrative agencies acting in a rule-making or policy-making capacity, lawyers present facts, formulate issues and advance argument in the matters under consideration. The decision-making body, like a court, should be able to rely on the integrity of the submissions made to it. A lawyer appearing before such a body must deal with it honestly and in conformity with applicable rules of procedure. See Rules 3.3 (a) through (c), 3.4 (a) through (c), and 3.5.

     [2] Lawyers have no exclusive right to appear before nonadjudicative bodies, as they do before a court. The requirements of this Rule therefore may subject lawyers to regulations inapplicable to advocates who are not lawyers. However, legislatures and administrative agencies have a right to expect lawyers to deal with them as they deal with courts.

     [3] This Rule only applies when a lawyer represents a client in connection with an official hearing or meeting of a governmental agency or a legislative body to which the lawyer or the lawyer's client is presenting evidence or argument. It does not apply to representation of a client in a negotiation or other bilateral transaction with a governmental agency or in connection with an application for a license or other privilege or the client's compliance with generally applicable reporting requirements, such as the filing of income-tax returns. Nor does it apply to the representation of a client in connection with an investigation or examination of the client's affairs conducted by government investigators or examiners. Representation in such matters is governed by Rules 4.1 through 4.4.

     (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or

     (b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by rRule 1.6.

Comment

Misrepresentation

     [1] A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing with others on a client's behalf, but generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts. A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is false. Misrepresentations can also occur by partially true but misleading statements or omissions that are the equivalent of affirmative false statements. For dishonest conduct that does not amount to a false statement or for misrepresentations by a lawyer other than in the course of representing a client, see Rule 8.4.

Statements of Fact

     [2] This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement should be regarded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are ordinarily in this category, and so is the existence of an undisclosed principal except where nondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraud. Lawyers should be mindful of their obligations under applicable law to avoid criminal and tortious misrepresentation.

Crime or Fraud by Client

     [3] Under Rule 1.2(d), a lawyer is prohibited from counseling or assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. Paragraph (b) states a specific application of the principle set forth in Rule 1.2(d) and addresses the situation where a client's crime or fraud takes the form of a lie or misrepresentation. Ordinarily, a lawyer can avoid assisting a client's crime or fraud by withdrawing from the representation. Sometimes it may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm an opinion, document, affirmation or the like. In extreme cases, substantive law may require a lawyer to disclose information relating to the representation to avoid being deemed to have assisted the client's crime or fraud. If the lawyer can avoid assisting a client's crime or fraud only by disclosing this information, then under paragraph (b) the lawyer is required to do so, unless the disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.

     (b) An otherwise unrepresented person to whom limited representation is being provided or has been provided in accordance with rule 1.2 is considered to be unrepresented for purposes of this rule unless the opposing lawyer knows of, or has been provided with, a written notice of appearance under which, or a written notice of time period during which, he or she is to communicate only with the limited representation lawyer as to the subject matter within the limited scope of the representation.

Comment

     [1] This Rule contributes to the proper functioning of the legal system by protecting a person who has chosen to be represented by a lawyer in a matter against possible overreaching by other lawyers who are participating in the matter, interference by those lawyers with the client-lawyer relationship and the uncounselled disclosure of information relating to the representation.

     [2] This Rule applies to communications with any person who is represented by counsel concerning the matter to which the communication relates.

     [3] The Rule applies even though the represented person initiates or consents to the communication. A lawyer must immediately terminate communication with a person if, after commencing communication, the lawyer learns that the person is one with whom communication is not permitted by this Rule.

     [4] This Rule does not prohibit communication with a represented person, or an employee or agent of such a person, concerning matters outside the representation. For example, the existence of a controversy between a government agency and a private party, or between two organizations, does not prohibit a lawyer for either from communicating with nonlawyer representatives of the other regarding a separate matter. Nor does this Rule preclude communication with a represented person who is seeking advice from a lawyer who is not otherwise representing a client in the matter. A lawyer may not make a communication prohibited by this Rule through the acts of another. See Rule 8.4(a). Parties to a matter may communicate directly with each other, and a lawyer is not prohibited from advising a client concerning a communication that the client is legally entitled to make. Also, a lawyer having independent justification or legal authorization for communicating with a represented person is permitted to do so.

     [5] Communications authorized by law may include communications by a lawyer on behalf of a client who is exercising a constitutional or other legal right to communicate with the government. Communications authorized by law may also include investigative activities of lawyers representing governmental entities, directly or through investigative agents, prior to the commencement of criminal or civil enforcement proceedings. When communicating with the accused in a criminal matter, a government lawyer must comply with this Rule in addition to honoring the constitutional rights of the accused. The fact that a communication does not violate a state or federal constitutional right is insufficient to establish that the communication is permissible under this Rule.

     [6] A lawyer who is uncertain whether a communication with a represented person is permissible may seek a court order. A lawyer may also seek a court order in exceptional circumstances to authorize a communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this Rule, for example, where communication with a person represented by counsel is necessary to avoid reasonably certain injury.

     [7] [Washington revision] In the case of a represented organization, this Rule prohibits communications with a constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly consults with the organization's lawyer concerning the matter or has authority to obligate the organization with respect to the matter. Consent of the organization's lawyer is not required for communication with a former constituent. If a constituent of the organization is represented in the matter by his or her own counsel, the consent by that counsel to a communication will be sufficient for purposes of this Rule. In communicating with a current or former constituent of an organization, a lawyer must not use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of the organization. See Rule 4.4.

     [8] The prohibition on communication with a represented person only applies in circumstances where the lawyer knows that the person is in fact represented in the matter to be discussed. This means that the lawyer has actual knowledge of the fact of the representation; but such actual knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances. See Rule 1.0(f). Thus, the lawyer cannot evade the requirement of obtaining the consent of counsel by closing eyes to the obvious.

     [9] In the event the person with whom the lawyer communicates is not known to be represented by counsel in the matter, the lawyer's communications are subject to Rule 4.3.

Additional Washington Comments (10 – 11)

     [10] Comment [7] to Model Rule 4.2 was revised to conform to Washington law. The phrase "or whose act or omission in connection with the matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability" and the reference to Model Rule 3.4(f) was deleted. Whether and how lawyers may communicate with employees of an adverse party is governed by Wright v. Group Health Hospital, 103 Wn.2d 192, 691 P.2d 564 (1984). See also Washington Comment [5] to Rule 3.4.

     [11] An otherwise unrepresented person to whom limited representation is being provided or has been provided in accordance with Rule 1.2(c) is considered to be unrepresented for purposes of this Rule unless the opposing lawyer knows of, or has been provided with, a written notice of appearance under which, or a written notice of time period during which, he or she is to communicate only with the limited representation lawyer as to the subject matter within the limited scope of the representation. (The provisions of this Comment were taken from former Washington RPC 4.2(b)).

     (b) An otherwise unrepresented person to whom limited representation is being provided or has been provided in accordance with rule 1.2 is considered to be unrepresented for purposes of this rule unless the opposing lawyer knows of, or has been provided with, a written notice of appearance under which, or a written notice of time period during which, he or she is to communicate only with the limited representation lawyer as to the subject matter within the limited scope of the representation.

Comment

     [1] An unrepresented person, particularly one not experienced in dealing with legal matters, might assume that a lawyer is disinterested in loyalties or is a disinterested authority on the law even when the lawyer represents a client. In order to avoid a misunderstanding, a lawyer will typically need to identify the lawyer's client and, where necessary, explain that the client has interests opposed to those of the unrepresented person. For misunderstandings that sometimes arise when a lawyer for an organization deals with an unrepresented constituent, see Rule 1.13(d).

     [2] The Rule distinguishes between situations involving unrepresented persons whose interests may be adverse to those of the lawyer's client and those in which the person's interests are not in conflict with the client's. In the former situation, the possibility that the lawyer will compromise the unrepresented person's interests is so great that the Rule prohibits the giving of any advice, apart from the advice to obtain counsel. Whether a lawyer is giving impermissible advice may depend on the experience and sophistication of the unrepresented person, as well as the setting in which the behavior and comments occur. This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from negotiating the terms of a transaction or settling a dispute with an unrepresented person. So long as the lawyer has explained that the lawyer represents an adverse party and is not representing the person, the lawyer may inform the person of the terms on which the lawyer's client will enter into an agreement or settle a matter, prepare documents that require the person's signature and explain the lawyer's own view of the meaning of the document or the lawyer's view of the underlying legal obligations.

Additional Washington Comments (3 - 4)

     [3] An otherwise unrepresented person to whom limited representation is being provided or has been provided in accordance with Rule 1.2(c) is considered to be unrepresented for purposes of this Rule unless the opposing lawyer knows of, or has been provided with, a written notice of appearance under which, or a written notice of time period during which, he or she is to communicate only with the limited representation lawyer as to the subject matter within the limited scope of the representation. (The provisions of this Comment were taken from former Washington RPC 4.3(b)).

     [4] Government lawyers are frequently called upon by unrepresented persons, and in some instances by the courts, to provide general information on laws and procedures relating to claims against the government. The provision of such general information by government lawyers is not a violation of this Rule.

     (b) A lawyer who receives a document relating to the representation of the lawyer's client and knows or reasonably should know that the document was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.

Comment

     [1] Responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of third persons. It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence from third persons and unwarranted intrusions into privileged relationships, such as the client-lawyer relationship.

     [2] Paragraph (b) recognizes that lawyers sometimes receive documents that were mistakenly sent or produced by opposing parties or their lawyers. If a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that such a document was sent inadvertently, then this Rule requires the lawyer to promptly notify the sender in order to permit that person to take protective measures. Whether the lawyer is required to take additional steps, such as returning the original document, is a matter of law beyond the scope of these Rules, as is the question of whether the privileged status of a document has been waived. Similarly, this Rule does not address the legal duties of a lawyer who receives a document that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know may have been wrongfully obtained by the sending person. For purposes of this Rule, "document" includes e-mail or other electronic modes of transmission subject to being read or put into readable form.

     [3] Some lawyers may choose to return a document unread, for example, when the lawyer learns before receiving the document that it was inadvertently sent to the wrong address. Where a lawyer is not required by applicable law to do so, the decision to voluntarily return such a document is a matter of professional judgment ordinarily reserved to the lawyer. See Rules 1.2 and 1.4.

     (b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct.

     (c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if:

     (1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or

     (2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in which the other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.

Comment

     [1] Paragraph (a) applies to lawyers who have managerial authority over the professional work of a firm. See Rule 1.0(c). This includes members of a partnership, the shareholders in a law firm organized as a professional corporation, and members of other associations authorized to practice law; lawyers having comparable managerial authority in a legal services organization or a law department of an enterprise or government agency; and lawyers who have intermediate managerial responsibilities in a firm. Paragraph (b) applies to lawyers who have supervisory authority over the work of other lawyers in a firm.

     [2] Paragraph (a) requires lawyers with managerial authority within a firm to make reasonable efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm will conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct. Such policies and procedures include those designed to detect and resolve conflicts of interest, identify dates by which actions must be taken in pending matters, account for client funds and property and ensure that inexperienced lawyers are properly supervised.

     [3] Other measures that may be required to fulfill the responsibility prescribed in paragraph (a) can depend on the firm's structure and the nature of its practice. In a small firm of experienced lawyers, informal supervision and periodic review of compliance with the required systems ordinarily will suffice. In a large firm, or in practice situations in which difficult ethical problems frequently arise, more elaborate measures may be necessary. Some firms, for example, have a procedure whereby junior lawyers can make confidential referral of ethical problems directly to a designated senior partner or special committee. See Rule 5.2. Firms, whether large or small, may also rely on continuing legal education in professional ethics. In any event, the ethical atmosphere of a firm can influence the conduct of all its members and the partners may not assume that all lawyers associated with the firm will inevitably conform to the Rules.

     [4] Paragraph (c) expresses a general principle of personal responsibility for acts of another. See also Rule 8.4(a).

     [5] Paragraph (c)(2) defines the duty of a partner or other lawyer having comparable managerial authority in a law firm, as well as a lawyer who has direct supervisory authority over performance of specific legal work by another lawyer. Whether a lawyer has supervisory authority in particular circumstances is a question of fact. Partners and lawyers with comparable authority have at least indirect responsibility for all work being done by the firm, while a partner or manager in charge of a particular matter ordinarily also has supervisory responsibility for the work of other firm lawyers engaged in the matter. Appropriate remedial action by a partner or managing lawyer would depend on the immediacy of that lawyer's involvement and the seriousness of the misconduct. A supervisor is required to intervene to prevent avoidable consequences of misconduct if the supervisor knows that the misconduct occurred. Thus, if a supervising lawyer knows that a subordinate misrepresented a matter to an opposing party in negotiation, the supervisor as well as the subordinate has a duty to correct the resulting misapprehension.

     [6] Professional misconduct by a lawyer under supervision could reveal a violation of paragraph (b) on the part of the supervisory lawyer even though it does not entail a violation of paragraph (c) because there was no direction, ratification or knowledge of the violation.

     [7] [Washington revision] Apart from this Rule and Rule 8.4(a), a lawyer does not have disciplinary liability for the conduct of a partner, associate or subordinate lawyer. Whether a lawyer may be liable civilly or criminally for another lawyer's conduct is a question of law beyond the scope of these Rules.

     [8] The duties imposed by this Rule on managing and supervising lawyers do not alter the personal duty of each lawyer in a firm to abide by the Rules of Professional Conduct. See Rule 5.2(a).

     (b) A subordinate lawyer does not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.

Comment

     [1] Although a lawyer is not relieved of responsibility for a violation by the fact that the lawyer acted at the direction of a supervisor, that fact may be relevant in determining whether a lawyer had the knowledge required to render conduct a violation of the Rules. For example, if a subordinate filed a frivolous pleading at the direction of a supervisor, the subordinate would not be guilty of a professional violation unless the subordinate knew of the document's frivolous character.

     [2] When lawyers in a supervisor-subordinate relationship encounter a matter involving professional judgment as to ethical duty, the supervisor may assume responsibility for making the judgment. Otherwise a consistent course of action or position could not be taken. If the question can reasonably be answered only one way, the duty of both lawyers is clear and they are equally responsible for fulfilling it. However, if the question is reasonably arguable, someone has to decide upon the course of action. That authority ordinarily reposes in the supervisor, and a subordinate may be guided accordingly. For example, if a question arises whether the interests of two clients conflict under Rule 1.7, the supervisor's reasonable resolution of the question should protect the subordinate professionally if the resolution is subsequently challenged.

     (a) a partner, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;

     (b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; and

     (c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:

     (1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or

     (2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in which the person is employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the person, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.

Comment

     [1] Lawyers generally employ assistants in their practice, including secretaries, investigators, law student interns, and paraprofessionals. Such assistants, whether employees or independent contractors, act for the lawyer in rendition of the lawyer's professional services. A lawyer must give such assistants appropriate instruction and supervision concerning the ethical aspects of their employment, particularly regarding the obligation not to disclose information relating to representation of the client, and should be responsible for their work product. The measures employed in supervising nonlawyers should take account of the fact that they do not have legal training and are not subject to professional discipline.

     [2] Paragraph (a) requires lawyers with managerial authority within a law firm to make reasonable efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that nonlawyers in the firm will act in a way compatible with the Rules of Professional Conduct. See Comment [1] to Rule 5.1. Paragraph (b) applies to lawyers who have supervisory authority over the work of a nonlawyer. Paragraph (c) specifies the circumstances in which a lawyer is responsible for conduct of a nonlawyer that would be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer.

     (1) Aan agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to one or more specified persons;

     (2) A lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that proportion of the total compensation which fairly represents the services rendered by the deceased lawyer; and a lawyer who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or disappeared lawyer may, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay to the estate or other representative of that lawyer the agreed-upon purchase price;

     (3) Aa lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement; and

     (4) [Reserved.]

     (5) a lawyer authorized to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer may pay to the estate or other representative of the deceased lawyer that proportion of the total compensation that fairly represents the services rendered by the deceased lawyer.

     (b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.

     (c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal services.

     (d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if:

     (1) Aa nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time during administration;

     (2) Aa nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer (other than as secretary or treasurer) thereof or occupies the position of similar responsibility in any form of association other than a corporation; or

     (3) Aa nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer.

Comment

     [1] The provisions of this Rule express traditional limitations on sharing fees. These limitations are to protect the lawyer's professional independence of judgment. Where someone other than the client pays the lawyer's fee or salary, or recommends employment of the lawyer, that arrangement does not modify the lawyer's obligation to the client. As stated in paragraph (c), such arrangements should not interfere with the lawyer's professional judgment.

     [2] This Rule also expresses traditional limitations on permitting a third party to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering legal services to another. See also Rule 1.8(f) (lawyer may accept compensation from a third party as long as there is no interference with the lawyer's independent professional judgment and the client gives informed consent).

Additional Washington Comment (3)

     [3] Paragraph (a)(5) was taken from former Washington RPC 5.4 (a)(2).

     (a) Practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction;

     (b) Assist a person who is not a member of the Bar in the performance of activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice of law;

     (c) permit his or her name to be used as a lawyer by another person who is not a lawyer authorized to practice law in the state of Washington;

     (b) A lawyer who is not admitted to practice in this jurisdiction shall not:

     (1) except as authorized by these Rules or other law, establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law; or

     (2) hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the lawyer is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction.

     (c) A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that:

     (1) are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in this jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter;

     (2) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding before a tribunal in this or another jurisdiction, if the lawyer, or a person the lawyer is assisting, is authorized by law or order to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to be so authorized;

     (3) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; or

     (4) are not within paragraphs (c)(2) or (c)(3) and arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice.

     (d) engage in any of the following with an individual who is a disbarred or suspended lawyer or who has resigned in lieu of disbarment:

     (1) practice law with or in cooperation with such an individual;

     (2) maintain an office for the practice of law in a room or office occupied or used in whole or in part by such an individual;

     (3) permit such an individual to use the lawyer's name for the practice of law;

     (4) practice law for or on behalf of such an individual;

     (5) practice law under any arrangement or understanding for division of fees or compensation of any kind with such an individual; or

     (e) engage in the practice of law while on inactive status, or while suspended from the practice of law for any cause.

     (d) A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services in this jurisdiction that:

     (1) are provided to the lawyer's employer or its organizational affiliates and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; or

     (2) are services that the lawyer is authorized to provide by federal law or other law of this jurisdiction.

Comment

     [1] A lawyer may practice law only in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is authorized to practice. A lawyer may be admitted to practice law in a jurisdiction on a regular basis or may be authorized by court rule or order or by law to practice for a limited purpose or on a restricted basis. Paragraph (a) applies to unauthorized practice of law by a lawyer, whether through the lawyer's direct action or by the lawyer assisting another person.

     [2] The definition of the practice of law is established by law and varies from one jurisdiction to another. Whatever the definition, limiting the practice of law to members of the bar protects the public against rendition of legal services by unqualified persons. This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from employing the services of paraprofessionals and delegating functions to them, so long as the lawyer supervises the delegated work and retains responsibility for their work. See Rule 5.3.

     [3] A lawyer may provide professional advice and instruction to nonlawyers whose employment requires knowledge of the law; for example, claims adjusters, employees of financial or commercial institutions, social workers, accountants and persons employed in government agencies. Lawyers also may assist independent nonlawyers, such as paraprofessionals, who are authorized by the law of a jurisdiction to provide particular law-related services. In addition, a lawyer may counsel nonlawyers who wish to proceed pro se.

     [4] Other than as authorized by law or this Rule, a lawyer who is not admitted to practice generally in this jurisdiction violates paragraph (b) if the lawyer establishes an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law. Presence may be systematic and continuous even if the lawyer is not physically present here. Such a lawyer must not hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the lawyer is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction. See also Rules 7.1 and 7.5(b).

     [5] There are occasions in which a lawyer admitted to practice in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction under circumstances that do not create an unreasonable risk to the interests of their clients, the public or the courts. Paragraph (c) identifies four such circumstances. The fact that conduct is not so identified does not imply that the conduct is or is not authorized. With the exception of paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2), this Rule does not authorize a lawyer to establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction without being admitted to practice generally here.

     [6] There is no single test to determine whether a lawyer's services are provided on a "temporary basis" in this jurisdiction, and may therefore be permissible under paragraph (c). Services may be "temporary" even though the lawyer provides services in this jurisdiction on a recurring basis, or for an extended period of time, as when the lawyer is representing a client in a single lengthy negotiation or litigation.

     [7] Paragraphs (c) and (d) apply to lawyers who are admitted to practice law in any United States jurisdiction, which includes the District of Columbia and any state, territory or commonwealth of the United States. The word "admitted" in paragraph (c) contemplates that the lawyer is authorized to practice in the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted and excludes a lawyer who while technically admitted is not authorized to practice, because, for example, the lawyer is on inactive status.

     [8] Paragraph (c)(1) recognizes that the interests of clients and the public are protected if a lawyer admitted only in another jurisdiction associates with a lawyer licensed to practice in this jurisdiction. For this paragraph to apply, however, the lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction must actively participate in and share responsibility for the representation of the client.

     [9] Lawyers not admitted to practice generally in a jurisdiction may be authorized by law or order of a tribunal or an administrative agency to appear before the tribunal or agency. This authority may be granted pursuant to formal rules governing admission pro hac vice or pursuant to informal practice of the tribunal or agency. Under paragraph (c)(2), a lawyer does not violate this Rule when the lawyer appears before a tribunal or agency pursuant to such authority. To the extent that a court rule or other law of this jurisdiction requires a lawyer who is not admitted to practice in this jurisdiction to obtain admission pro hac vice before appearing before a tribunal or administrative agency, this Rule requires the lawyer to obtain that authority.

     [10] Paragraph (c)(2) also provides that a lawyer rendering services in this jurisdiction on a temporary basis does not violate this Rule when the lawyer engages in conduct in anticipation of a proceeding or hearing in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is authorized to practice law or in which the lawyer reasonably expects to be admitted pro hac vice. Examples of such conduct include meetings with the client, interviews of potential witnesses, and the review of documents. Similarly, a lawyer admitted only in another jurisdiction may engage in conduct temporarily in this jurisdiction in connection with pending litigation in another jurisdiction in which the lawyer is or reasonably expects to be authorized to appear, including taking depositions in this jurisdiction.

     [11] When a lawyer has been or reasonably expects to be admitted to appear before a court or administrative agency, paragraph (c)(2) also permits conduct by lawyers who are associated with that lawyer in the matter, but who do not expect to appear before the court or administrative agency. For example, subordinate lawyers may conduct research, review documents, and attend meetings with witnesses in support of the lawyer responsible for the litigation.

     [12] Paragraph (c)(3) permits a lawyer admitted to practice law in another jurisdiction to perform services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction if those services are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice. The lawyer, however, must obtain admission pro hac vice in the case of a court-annexed arbitration or mediation or otherwise if court rules or law so require.

     [13] Paragraph (c)(4) permits a lawyer admitted in another jurisdiction to provide certain legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted but are not within paragraphs (c)(2) or (c)(3). These services include both legal services and services that nonlawyers may perform but that are considered the practice of law when performed by lawyers.

     [14] Paragraphs (c)(3) and (c)(4) require that the services arise out of or be reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted. A variety of factors evidence such a relationship. The lawyer's client may have been previously represented by the lawyer, or may be resident in or have substantial contacts with the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted. The matter, although involving other jurisdictions, may have a significant connection with that jurisdiction. In other cases, significant aspects of the lawyer's work might be conducted in that jurisdiction or a significant aspect of the matter may involve the law of that jurisdiction. The necessary relationship might arise when the client's activities or the legal issues involve multiple jurisdictions, such as when the officers of a multinational corporation survey potential business sites and seek the services of their lawyer in assessing the relative merits of each. In addition, the services may draw on the lawyer's recognized expertise developed through the regular practice of law on behalf of clients in matters involving a particular body of federal, nationally-uniform, foreign, or international law.

     [15] Paragraph (d) identifies two circumstances in which a lawyer who is admitted to practice in another United States jurisdiction, and is not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law as well as provide legal services on a temporary basis. Except as provided in paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2), a lawyer who is admitted to practice law in another jurisdiction and who establishes an office or other systematic or continuous presence in this jurisdiction must become admitted to practice law generally in this jurisdiction.

     [16] Paragraph (d)(1) applies to a lawyer who is employed by a client to provide legal services to the client or its organizational affiliates, i.e., entities that control, are controlled by, or are under common control with the employer. This paragraph does not authorize the provision of personal legal services to the employer's officers or employees. The paragraph applies to in-house corporate lawyers, government lawyers and others who are employed to render legal services to the employer. The lawyer's ability to represent the employer outside the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is licensed generally serves the interests of the employer and does not create an unreasonable risk to the client and others because the employer is well situated to assess the lawyer's qualifications and the quality of the lawyer's work.

     [17] If an employed lawyer establishes an office or other systematic presence in this jurisdiction for the purpose of rendering legal services to the employer, the lawyer may be subject to registration or other requirements, including assessments for client protection funds and mandatory continuing legal education.

     [18] Paragraph (d)(2) recognizes that a lawyer may provide legal services in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is not licensed when authorized to do so by federal or other law, which includes statute, court rule, executive regulation or judicial precedent.

     [19] A lawyer who practices law in this jurisdiction pursuant to paragraphs (c) or (d) or otherwise is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction. See Rule 8.5(a).

     [20] In some circumstances, a lawyer who practices law in this jurisdiction pursuant to paragraphs (c) or (d) may have to inform the client that the lawyer is not licensed to practice law in this jurisdiction. For example, that may be required when the representation occurs primarily in this jurisdiction and requires knowledge of the law of this jurisdiction. See Rule 1.4(b).

     [21] Paragraphs (c) and (d) do not authorize communications advertising legal services to prospective clients in this jurisdiction by lawyers who are admitted to practice in other jurisdictions. Whether and how lawyers may communicate the availability of their services to prospective clients in this jurisdiction is governed by Rules 7.1 to 7.5.

     (a) a partnership or, shareholders, operating, employment, or other similar type of agreement that restricts the rights of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement; or

     (b) an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is part of the settlement of a client controversy between private parties.

Comment

     [1] An agreement restricting the right of lawyers to practice after leaving a firm not only limits their professional autonomy but also limits the freedom of clients to choose a lawyer. Paragraph (a) prohibits such agreements except for restrictions incident to provisions concerning retirement benefits for service with the firm.

     [2] Paragraph (b) prohibits a lawyer from agreeing not to represent other persons in connection with settling a claim on behalf of a client.

     [3] [Washington revision] This Rule does not prohibit restrictions that may be included in the terms of the sale of a law practice pursuant to Rule 1.17, a lawyer's plea agreement in a criminal matter, or a stipulation under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct.

     [11] When the full protections of all of the Rules of Professional Conduct do not apply to the provision of law-related services, principles of law external to the Rules, for example, the law of principal and agent, govern the legal duties owed to those receiving the services. Those other legal principles may establish a different degree of protection for the recipient with respect to confidentiality of information, conflicts of interest and permissible business relationships with clients. See also Rule 8.4 (Misconduct).

     [1] The provisions of this Rule were taken from former Washington RPC 5.5 (d) and (e) (as amended in 2002).

     (a) provide legal services without fee or expectation of fee to:

     (1) persons of limited means or

     (2) charitable, religious, civil, community, governmental and educational organizations in matters which are designed primarily to address the needs of persons of limited means; and

     (b) provide pro bono publico service through:

     (1) delivery of legal services at no fee or substantially reduced fee to individuals, groups or organizations seeking to secure or protect civil rights, or charitable, religious, civil, community, governmental and educational organizations in matters in furtherance of their organizational purposes, where the payment of standard legal fees would significantly deplete the organization's economic resources or would be otherwise inappropriate;

     (2) delivery of legal services at a substantially reduced fee to persons of limited means; or

     (3) participation in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the legal profession.

     Pro bono publico service may be reported on the annual fee statement furnished to the WSBA. Lawyers rendering a minimum of fifty (50) hours of pro bono publico service shall receive a recognition award for such service from the WSBA.

Comment

     [1] [Washington revision] Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional work load, has a responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay, and personal involvement in the problems of the disadvantaged can be one of the most rewarding experiences in the life of a lawyer. It is recognized that in some years a lawyer may render greater or fewer hours than the annual standard specified, but during the course of his or her legal career, each lawyer should render on average per year, at a minimum, the number of hours set forth in this Rule. Services can be performed in civil matters or in criminal or quasi-criminal matters for which there is no government obligation to provide funds for legal representation, such as post-conviction death penalty appeal cases.

     [2] [Washington revision] Paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) recognize the critical need for legal services that exists among persons of limited means. Legal services under these paragraphs consist of a full range of activities, including individual and class representation, the provision of legal advice, legislative lobbying, administrative rule making and the provision of free training or mentoring to those who represent persons of limited means or organizations primarily representing such persons. The variety of these activities should facilitate participation by government lawyers, even when restrictions may exist on their engaging in the outside practice of law.

     [3] [Washington revision] Persons eligible for legal services under paragraphs (a)(1) are those who qualify for services provided by a qualified legal services provider (see Washington Comment [14]) and those whose incomes and financial resources are slightly above the guidelines utilized by such programs but nevertheless, cannot afford counsel. Legal services under paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) include those rendered to individuals or to organizations such as homeless shelters, battered women's centers and food pantries that serve those of limited means. The term "governmental organizations" includes, but is not limited to, public protection programs and sections of governmental or public sector agencies.

     [4] Because service must be provided without fee or expectation of fee, the intent of the lawyer to render free legal services is essential for the work performed to fall within the meaning of paragraphs (a)(1) and (2). Accordingly, services rendered cannot be considered pro bono if an anticipated fee is uncollected, but the award of statutory attorneys' fees in a case originally accepted as pro bono would not disqualify such services from inclusion under this section. Lawyers who do receive fees in such cases are encouraged to contribute an appropriate portion of such fees to organizations or projects that benefit persons of limited means.

     [5] [Washington revision] A lawyer's responsibility under this Rule can be fulfilled either through the activities described in paragraph (a)(1) and (2) or in a variety of ways as set forth in paragraph (b).

     [6] Paragraph (b)(1) includes the provision of certain types of legal services to those whose incomes and financial resources place them above limited means. It also permits the pro bono lawyer to accept a substantially reduced fee for services. Examples of the types of issues that may be addressed under this paragraph include First Amendment claims, Title VII claims and environmental protection claims. Additionally, a wide range of organizations may be represented, including social service, medical research, cultural and religious groups.

     [7] Paragraph (b)(2) covers instances in which lawyers agree to and receive a modest fee for furnishing legal services to persons of limited means. Participation in judicare programs and acceptance of court appointments in which the fee is substantially below a lawyer's usual rate are encouraged under this section.

     [8] [Washington revision] Paragraph (b)(3) recognizes the value of lawyers engaging in activities that improve the law, the legal system or the legal profession. Serving in a volunteer capacity on bar association committees or on boards of pro bono or legal services programs, taking part in Law Week activities, acting as an uncompensated continuing legal education instructor, an uncompensated mediator or arbitrator and engaging in uncompensated legislative lobbying to improve the law, the legal system or the profession are a few examples of the many activities that fall within this paragraph.

     [9] Because the provision of pro bono services is a professional responsibility, it is the individual ethical commitment of each lawyer. Nevertheless, there may be times when it is not feasible for a lawyer to engage in pro bono services. At such times a lawyer may discharge the pro bono responsibility by providing financial support to organizations providing free legal services to persons of limited means. Such financial support should be reasonably equivalent to the value of the hours of service that would have otherwise been provided. In addition, at times it may be more feasible to satisfy the pro bono responsibility collectively, as by a firm's aggregate pro bono activities.

     [10] Because the efforts of individual lawyers are not enough to meet the need for free legal services that exists among persons of limited means, the government and the profession have instituted additional programs to provide those services. Every lawyer should financially support such programs, in addition to either providing direct pro bono services or making financial contributions when pro bono service is not feasible.

     [11] Law firms should act reasonably to enable and encourage all lawyers in the firm to provide the pro bono legal services called for by this Rule.

     [12] The responsibility set forth in this Rule is not intended to be enforced through disciplinary process.

Additional Washington Comment (13 - 16)

     [13] Washington's version of this Rule differs from the Model Rule. Washington's Rule 6.1 specifies an aspirational minimum of thirty hours of pro bono publico legal services per year rather than fifty, but provides for presentation of a service recognition award to those lawyers reporting to the WSBA a minimum of fifty hours. Unlike the Model Rule, paragraph (a) of Washington's Rule does not specify that the majority of the pro bono publico legal service hours should be provided without fee or expectation of fee. And Washington's Rule does not include the final paragraph of the Model Rule relating to voluntary contributions of financial support to legal services organizations. The provisions of Rule 6.1 were taken from former Washington RPC 6.1 (as amended in 2003).

     [14] For purposes of this Rule, a "qualified legal services provider" is a not-for-profit legal services organization whose primary purpose is to provide legal services to low-income clients.

     [15] Pro bono publico service does not include services rendered for wages or other compensation by lawyers employed by qualified legal services providers (as that term is defined in Washington Comment [14]), government agencies, or other organizations as part of their employment.

     [16] The amount of time spent rendering pro bono publico services should be calculated on the same basis that lawyers calculate their time on billable matters. For example, if time spent traveling to a client meeting or to a court hearing is considered to be part of the time for which a paying client would be billed, it is appropriate to include such time in calculating the number of pro bono publico service hours rendered under this Rule.

     (a) Rrepresenting the client is likely to result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;

     (b) Rrepresenting the client is likely to result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer; or

     (c) Tthe client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent the client.

Comment

     [1] [Washington revision] A lawyer ordinarily is not obliged to accept a client whose character or cause the lawyer regards as repugnant. The lawyer's freedom to select clients is, however, qualified. A lawyer may be subject to appointment by a court to serve unpopular clients or persons unable to afford legal services.

Appointed Counsel

     [2] For good cause a lawyer may seek to decline an appointment to represent a person who cannot afford to retain counsel or whose cause is unpopular. Good cause exists if the lawyer could not handle the matter competently, see Rule 1.1, or if undertaking the representation would result in an improper conflict of interest, for example, when the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent the client. A lawyer may also seek to decline an appointment if acceptance would be unreasonably burdensome, for example, when it would impose a financial sacrifice so great as to be unjust.

     [3] An appointed lawyer has the same obligations to the client as retained counsel, including the obligations of loyalty and confidentiality, and is subject to the same limitations on the client-lawyer relationship, such as the obligation to refrain from assisting the client in violation of the Rules.

     (a) Iif participating in the decision or action would be incompatible with the lawyer's obligations to a client under rRule 1.7; or

     (b) Wwhere the decision or action could have a material adverse effect on the representation of a client of the organization whose interests are adverse to a client of the lawyer.

Comment

     [1] Lawyers should be encouraged to support and participate in legal service organizations. A lawyer who is an officer or a member of such an organization does not thereby have a client-lawyer relationship with persons served by the organization. However, there is potential conflict between the interests of such persons and the interests of the lawyer's clients. If the possibility of such conflict disqualified a lawyer from serving on the board of a legal services organization, the profession's involvement in such organizations would be severely curtailed.

     [2] It may be necessary in appropriate cases to reassure a client of the organization that the representation will not be affected by conflicting loyalties of a member of the board. Established, written policies in this respect can enhance the credibility of such assurances.

Comment

     [1] Lawyers involved in organizations seeking law reform generally do not have a client-lawyer relationship with the organization. Otherwise, it might follow that a lawyer could not be involved in a bar association law reform program that might indirectly affect a client. See also Rule 1.2(b). For example, a lawyer specializing in antitrust litigation might be regarded as disqualified from participating in drafting revisions of rules governing that subject. In determining the nature and scope of participation in such activities, a lawyer should be mindful of obligations to clients under other Rules, particularly Rule 1.7. A lawyer is professionally obligated to protect the integrity of the program by making an appropriate disclosure within the organization when the lawyer knows a private client might be materially benefitted.

     (1) is subject to Rules 1.7 and, 1.9(a), and 1.18(c) only if the lawyer knows that the representation of the client involves a conflict of interest, except that those rRules shall not prohibit a lawyer from providing limited legal services sufficient only to determine eligibility of the client for assistance by the program and to make an appropriate referral of the client to another program; and

     (2) is subject to Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer associated with the lawyer in a law firm is disqualified by Rule 1.7 or 1.9(a) with respect to the matter; and,

     (3) notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), is not subject to Rules 1.7, 1.9(a), or 1.10, or 1.18(c) in providing limited legal services to a client if:

     (ai) the program lawyers representing the opposing clients are screened by effective means from information as relating to the representation of the opposing client's confidences, secrets, trial strategy and work product as to the matter at issue,;

     (bii) each client is notified of the conflict and the screening mechanism used to prohibit dissemination of confidential or secret information relating to the representation; and

     (ciii) the program is able to demonstrate by convincing evidence that no confidences or secrets that are material were information relating to the representation of the opposing client was transmitted by the personally disqualified lawyers to the lawyer representing the conflicting client before implementation of the screening mechanism and notice to the opposing client.

     (b) Except as provided in paragraph (a)(2), Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule.

Comment

     [1] [Washington revision] Legal services organizations, courts and various nonprofit organizations have established programs through which lawyers provide short-term limited legal services — such as advice or the completion of legal forms — that will assist persons to address their legal problems without further representation by a lawyer. In these programs, such as legal-advice hotlines, advice-only clinics or pro se counseling programs, a client-lawyer relationship is established, but there is no expectation that the lawyer's representation of the client will continue beyond the limited consultation. Such programs are normally operated under circumstances in which it is not feasible for a lawyer to systematically screen for conflicts of interest as is generally required before undertaking a representation. See, e.g., Rules 1.7, 1.9, 1.10, and 1.18.

     [2] A lawyer who provides short-term limited legal services pursuant to this Rule must secure the client's informed consent to the limited scope of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c). If a short-term limited representation would not be reasonable under the circumstances, the lawyer may offer advice to the client but must also advise the client of the need for further assistance of counsel. Except as provided in this Rule, the Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c), are applicable to the limited representation.

     [3] [Washington revision] Because a lawyer who is representing a client in the circumstances addressed by this Rule ordinarily is not able to check systematically for conflicts of interest, paragraph (a) requires compliance with Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a), or 1.18(c) only if the lawyer knows that the representation presents a conflict of interest for the lawyer, and with Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is disqualified by Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a) in the matter.

     [4] Because the limited nature of the services significantly reduces the risk of conflicts of interest with other matters being handled by the lawyer's firm, paragraph (b) provides that Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule except as provided by paragraph (a)(2). Paragraph (a)(2) requires the participating lawyer to comply with Rule 1.10 when the lawyer knows that the lawyer's firm is disqualified by Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a). By virtue of paragraph (b), however, a lawyer's participation in a short-term limited legal services program will not preclude the lawyer's firm from undertaking or continuing the representation of a client with interests adverse to a client being represented under the program's auspices. Nor will the personal disqualification of a lawyer participating in the program be imputed to other lawyers participating in the program.

     [5] If, after commencing a short-term limited representation in accordance with this Rule, a lawyer undertakes to represent the client in the matter on an ongoing basis, Rules 1.7, 1.9(a) and 1.10 become applicable.

Additional Washington Comments (6 - 7)

     [6] Washington's version of this Rule differs from the Model Rule. The differences accommodate the unique civil legal services delivery system, which uses a statewide centralized telephone intake and referral system for low-income persons to access free civil legal services. The Rule recognizes that lawyers who provide intake and referral services such as these will necessarily at times receive confidential information from adverse parties. The risk that such information will be used against the material interests of either party is relatively low in comparison to the need for services, and when such a risk exists, protections of lawyer screening and notice to the client are required by the Rule.

     [7] Paragraph (a)(3) was taken from former Washington RPC 6.5 (a)(3) as enacted in 2002. The replacement of "confidences and secrets" in paragraph (a)(3) with "information relating to the representation" was necessary to conform the language of the Rule to a terminology change in Rule 1.6. No substantive change is intended. See Comment [19] to Rule 1.6.

     (b) Is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the rules of professional conduct or other law; or

     (c) Compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers' services, unless the comparison can be factually substantiated.

Comment

     [1] This Rule governs all communications about a lawyer's services, including advertising permitted by Rule 7.2. Whatever means are used to make known a lawyer's services, statements about them must be truthful.

     [2] Truthful statements that are misleading are also prohibited by this Rule. A truthful statement is misleading if it omits a fact necessary to make the lawyer's communication considered as a whole not materially misleading. A truthful statement is also misleading if there is a substantial likelihood that it will lead a reasonable person to formulate a specific conclusion about the lawyer or the lawyer's services for which there is no reasonable factual foundation.

     [3] An advertisement that truthfully reports a lawyer's achievements on behalf of clients or former clients may be misleading if presented so as to lead a reasonable person to form an unjustified expectation that the same results could be obtained for other clients in similar matters without reference to the specific factual and legal circumstances of each client's case. Similarly, an unsubstantiated comparison of the lawyer's services or fees with the services or fees of other lawyers may be misleading if presented with such specificity as would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the comparison can be substantiated. The inclusion of an appropriate disclaimer or qualifying language may preclude a finding that a statement is likely to create unjustified expectations or otherwise mislead a prospective client.

     [4] See also Rule 8.4(e) for the prohibition against stating or implying an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.

     (b) A copy or recording of an advertisement or written communication shall be kept by the lawyer for 2 years after its last dissemination along with a record of when and where it was used. Upon written request by the State Bar, either instigated by the State Bar or as the result of any inquiry from the public, the lawyer shall make any such copy or recording available to the State Bar, and shall provide to the State Bar evidence of any relevant professional qualifications and of the facts upon which any factual or objective claims contained in the advertisement or communication are based. The State Bar Association may provide the lawyer's response to any person making inquiry.

     (cb) A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer's services, except that a lawyer may

     (1) pay the reasonable costs of advertising advertisements or written communications permitted by this rRule and may;

     (2) pay the usual charges of a legal service plan or a not-for-profit lawyer referral service or other legal service organization;

     (3) pay for a law practice in accordance with Rule 1.17; and

     (4) refer clients to another lawyer pursuant to an agreement not otherwise prohibited under these Rules that provides for the other person to refer clients or customers to the lawyer, if

     (i) the reciprocal referral agreement is not exclusive, and

     (ii) the client is informed of the existence and nature of the agreement.

     (dc) Any communication made pursuant to this rRule shall include the name and office address of at least one lawyer or law firm responsible for its content.

Comment

     [1] To assist the public in obtaining legal services, lawyers should be allowed to make known their services not only through reputation but also through organized information campaigns in the form of advertising. Advertising involves an active quest for clients, contrary to the tradition that a lawyer should not seek clientele. However, the public's need to know about legal services can be fulfilled in part through advertising. This need is particularly acute in the case of persons of moderate means who have not made extensive use of legal services. The interest in expanding public information about legal services ought to prevail over considerations of tradition. Nevertheless, advertising by lawyers entails the risk of practices that are misleading or overreaching.

     [2] This Rule permits public dissemination of information concerning a lawyer's name or firm name, address and telephone number; the kinds of services the lawyer will undertake; the basis on which the lawyer's fees are determined, including prices for specific services and payment and credit arrangements; a lawyer's foreign language ability; names of references and, with their consent, names of clients regularly represented; and other information that might invite the attention of those seeking legal assistance.

     [3] Questions of effectiveness and taste in advertising are matters of speculation and subjective judgment. Some jurisdictions have had extensive prohibitions against television advertising, against advertising going beyond specified facts about a lawyer, or against "undignified" advertising. Television is now one of the most powerful media for getting information to the public, particularly persons of low and moderate income; prohibiting television advertising, therefore, would impede the flow of information about legal services to many sectors of the public. Limiting the information that may be advertised has a similar effect and assumes that the bar can accurately forecast the kind of information that the public would regard as relevant. Similarly, electronic media, such as the Internet, can be an important source of information about legal services, and lawful communication by electronic mail is permitted by this Rule. But see Rule 7.3(a) for the prohibition against the solicitation of a prospective client through a real-time electronic exchange that is not initiated by the prospective client.

     [4] Neither this Rule nor Rule 7.3 prohibits communications authorized by law, such as notice to members of a class in class action litigation.

Paying Others to Recommend a Lawyer

     [5] Lawyers are not permitted to pay others for channeling professional work. Paragraph (b)(1), however, allows a lawyer to pay for advertising and communications permitted by this Rule, including the costs of print directory listings, on-line directory listings, newspaper ads, television and radio airtime, domain-name registrations, sponsorship fees, banner ads, and group advertising. A lawyer may compensate employees, agents and vendors who are engaged to provide marketing or client-development services, such as publicists, public-relations personnel, business-development staff and website designers. See Rule 5.3 for the duties of lawyers and law firms with respect to the conduct of nonlawyers who prepare marketing materials for them.

     [6] [Washington revision] A lawyer may pay the usual charges of a legal service plan or a not-for-profit lawyer referral service. A legal service plan is a prepaid or group legal service plan or a similar delivery system that assists prospective clients to secure legal representation. A lawyer referral service, on the other hand, is any organization that holds itself out to the public as a lawyer referral service. Such referral services are understood by laypersons to be consumer-oriented organizations that provide unbiased referrals to lawyers with appropriate experience in the subject matter of the representation and afford other client protections, such as complaint procedures or malpractice insurance requirements. Consequently, this Rule only permits a lawyer to pay the usual charges of a not-for-profit lawyer referral service.

     [7] A lawyer who accepts assignments or referrals from a legal service plan or referrals from a lawyer referral service must act reasonably to assure that the activities of the plan or service are compatible with the lawyer's professional obligations. See Rule 5.3. Legal service plans and lawyer referral services may communicate with prospective clients, but such communication must be in conformity with these Rules. Thus, advertising must not be false or misleading, as would be the case if the communications of a group advertising program or a group legal services plan would mislead prospective clients to think that it was a lawyer referral service sponsored by a state agency or bar association. Nor could the lawyer allow in-person, telephonic, or real-time contacts that would violate Rule 7.3.

     [8] [Washington revision] A lawyer also may agree to refer clients to another lawyer in return for the undertaking of that person to refer clients or customers to the lawyer. Such reciprocal referral arrangements must not interfere with the lawyer's professional judgment as to making referrals or as to providing substantive legal services. See Rules 2.1 and 5.4(c). Except as provided in Rule 1.5(e), a lawyer who receives referrals from a lawyer must not pay anything solely for the referral, but the lawyer does not violate paragraph (b) of this Rule by agreeing to refer clients to the other lawyer, so long as the reciprocal referral agreement is not exclusive and the client is informed of the referral agreement. Conflicts of interest created by such arrangements are governed by Rule 1.7. Reciprocal referral agreements should not be of indefinite duration and should be reviewed periodically to determine whether they comply with these Rules. This Rule does not restrict referrals or divisions of revenues or net income among lawyers within firms comprised of multiple entities.

Additional Washington Comment (9)

     [9] That portion of Model Rule 7.2 (b)(4) that allows lawyers to enter into reciprocal referral agreements with nonlawyer professionals was not adopted.

     (3) has consented to the contact by requesting a referral from a not-for-profit lawyer referral service.

     (b) A lawyer shall not send a written communication to a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining solicit professional employment from a prospective client by written, recorded or electronic communication or by in-person, telephone or real-time electronic contact even when not otherwise prohibited by paragraph (a), if:

     (1) the person prospective client has made known to the lawyer a desire not to receive communications from be solicited by the lawyer; or

     (2) the solicitation involves coercion, duress or harassment.

     (c) [Reserved.]

     (d) Notwithstanding the prohibitions in paragraph (a), a lawyer may participate with a prepaid or group legal service plan operated by an organization not owned or directed by the lawyer that uses in-person or telephone contact to solicit memberships or subscriptions for the plan from persons who are not known to need legal services in a particular matter covered by the plan.

Comment

     [1] There is a potential for abuse inherent in direct in-person, live telephone or real-time electronic contact by a lawyer with a prospective client known to need legal services. These forms of contact between a lawyer and a prospective client subject the layperson to the private importuning of the trained advocate in a direct interpersonal encounter. The prospective client, who may already feel overwhelmed by the circumstances giving rise to the need for legal services, may find it difficult fully to evaluate all available alternatives with reasoned judgment and appropriate self-interest in the face of the lawyer's presence and insistence upon being retained immediately. The situation is fraught with the possibility of undue influence, intimidation, and over-reaching.

     [2] This potential for abuse inherent in direct in-person, live telephone or real-time electronic solicitation of prospective clients justifies its prohibition, particularly since lawyer advertising and written and recorded communication permitted under Rule 7.2 offer alternative means of conveying necessary information to those who may be in need of legal services. Advertising and written and recorded communications which may be mailed or autodialed make it possible for a prospective client to be informed about the need for legal services, and about the qualifications of available lawyers and law firms, without subjecting the prospective client to direct in-person, telephone or real-time electronic persuasion that may overwhelm the client's judgment.

     [3] The use of general advertising and written, recorded or electronic communications to transmit information from lawyer to prospective client, rather than direct in-person, live telephone or real-time electronic contact, will help to assure that the information flows cleanly as well as freely. The contents of advertisements and communications permitted under Rule 7.2 can be permanently recorded so that they cannot be disputed and may be shared with others who know the lawyer. This potential for informal review is itself likely to help guard against statements and claims that might constitute false and misleading communications, in violation of Rule 7.1. The contents of direct in-person, live telephone or real-time electronic conversations between a lawyer and a prospective client can be disputed and may not be subject to third-party scrutiny. Consequently, they are much more likely to approach (and occasionally cross) the dividing line between accurate representations and those that are false and misleading.

     [4] [Washington revision] There is far less likelihood that a lawyer would engage in abusive practices against an individual who is a former client, or with whom the lawyer has close personal or family relationship, or in situations in which the lawyer is motivated by considerations other than the lawyer's pecuniary gain. Nor is there a serious potential for abuse when the person contacted is a lawyer. Consequently, the general prohibition in Rule 7.3(a) is not applicable in those situations. Also, paragraph (a) is not intended to prohibit a lawyer from participating in constitutionally protected activities of public or charitable legal-service organizations or bona fide political, social, civic, fraternal, employee or trade organizations whose purposes include providing or recommending legal services to its members or beneficiaries.

     [5] But even permitted forms of solicitation can be abused. Thus, any solicitation which contains information which is false or misleading within the meaning of Rule 7.1, which involves coercion, duress or harassment within the meaning of Rule 7.3 (b)(2), or which involves contact with a prospective client who has made known to the lawyer a desire not to be solicited by the lawyer within the meaning of Rule 7.3 (b)(1) is prohibited. Moreover, if after sending a letter or other communication to a client as permitted by Rule 7.2 the lawyer receives no response, any further effort to communicate with the prospective client may violate the provisions of Rule 7.3(b).

     [6] This Rule is not intended to prohibit a lawyer from contacting representatives of organizations or groups that may be interested in establishing a group or prepaid legal plan for their members, insureds, beneficiaries or other third parties for the purpose of informing such entities of the availability of and details concerning the plan or arrangement which the lawyer or lawyer's firm is willing to offer. This form of communication is not directed to a prospective client. Rather, it is usually addressed to an individual acting in a fiduciary capacity seeking a supplier of legal services for others who may, if they choose, become prospective clients of the lawyer. Under these circumstances, the activity which the lawyer undertakes in communicating with such representatives and the type of information transmitted to the individual are functionally similar to and serve the same purpose as advertising permitted under Rule 7.2.

     [7] [Reserved.]

     [8] Paragraph (d) of this Rule permits a lawyer to participate with an organization which uses personal contact to solicit members for its group or prepaid legal service plan, provided that the personal contact is not undertaken by any lawyer who would be a provider of legal services through the plan. The organization must not be owned by or directed (whether as manager or otherwise) by any lawyer or law firm that participates in the plan. For example, paragraph (d) would not permit a lawyer to create an organization controlled directly or indirectly by the lawyer and use the organization for the in-person or telephone solicitation of legal employment of the lawyer through memberships in the plan or otherwise. The communication permitted by these organizations also must not be directed to a person known to need legal services in a particular matter, but is to be designed to inform potential plan members generally of another means of affordable legal services. Lawyers who participate in a legal service plan must reasonably assure that the plan sponsors are in compliance with Rules 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3(b). See 8.4(a).

Additional Washington Comments (9 - 12)

     [9] A lawyer who receives a referral from a third party should exercise caution in contacting the prospective client directly by in-person, live telephone, or real-time electronic contact. Such contact is generally prohibited by this Rule unless the prospective client has asked to be contacted by the lawyer. A prospective client may request such contact through a third party. Prior to initiating contact with the prospective client, however, the lawyer should confirm with the source of the referral that the prospective client has indeed made such a request. Similarly, when making referrals to other lawyers, the referring lawyer should discuss with the prospective client whether he or she wishes to be contacted directly.

     [10] Those in need of legal representation often seek assistance in finding a lawyer through a lawyer referral service. Washington adopted paragraph (a)(3) in order to facilitate communication between lawyers and potential clients who have specifically requested a referral from a not-for-profit lawyer referral service. Under this paragraph, a lawyer receiving such a referral may contact the potential client directly by in-person, live telephone, or real-time electronic contact to discuss possible representation.

     [11] Washington did not adopt paragraph (c) of the Model Rule relating to labeling of communications with prospective clients. A specific labeling requirement is unnecessary in light of the prohibition in Rule 7.1 against false or misleading communications.

     [12] The phrase "directly or through a third person" in paragraph (a) was retained from former Washington RPC 7.3(a).

     (ab) A lawyer admitted to engage in patent practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office may use the designation "pPatent aAttorney" or a substantially similar designation.

     (c) A lawyer engaged in Admiralty practice may use the designation "Admiralty," "Proctor in Admiralty" or a substantially similar designation.

     (bd) Upon A lawyer shall not state or imply that a lawyer is a specialist in a particular field of law, except upon issuance of an identifying certificate, award, or recognition by a group, organization, or association, a lawyer may use the terms "certified", "specialist", "expert", or any other similar term to describe his or her qualifications as a lawyer or his or her qualifications in any subspecialty of the law. If the terms are used to identify any certificate, award, or recognition by any group, organization, or association, the reference must meet the following requirements:

     (1) the reference must be truthful and verifiable and may not be misleading in violation of otherwise comply with Rrule 7.1;

     (2) the reference must identify the certifying group, organization, or association; and

     (3) the reference must state that the Supreme Court of Washington does not recognize the certification of specialties in the practice of law and that the certificate, award, or recognition is not a requirement to practice law in the state of Washington.

Comment

     [1] [Washington revision] Paragraph (a) of this Rule permits a lawyer to indicate areas of practice in communications about the lawyer's services. If a lawyer practices only in certain fields, or will not accept matters except in a specified field or fields, the lawyer is permitted to so indicate.

     [2] Paragraph (b) recognizes the long-established policy of the Patent and Trademark Office for the designation of lawyers practicing before the Office. Paragraph (c) recognizes that designation of Admiralty practice has a long historical tradition associated with maritime commerce and the federal courts.

     [3] [Reserved.]

Additional Washington Comment (4)

     [4] Statements indicating that the lawyer is a "specialist," practices a "specialty," "specializes in" particular fields, and the like, are subject to the limitations set forth in paragraph (d). The provisions of paragraph (d) were taken from former Washington RPC 7.4(b).

     (b) A law firm with offices in more than one jurisdiction may use the same name or other professional designation in each jurisdiction, but identification of the lawyers in an office of the firm shall indicate the jurisdictional limitations on those not licensed to practice in the jurisdiction where the office is located.

     (c) The name of a lawyer holding a public office shall not be used in the name of a law firm, or in communications on its behalf, during any substantial period in which the lawyer is not actively and regularly practicing with the firm.

     (d) Lawyers may state or imply that they practice in a partnership or other organization only when that is the fact. Lawyers practicing out of the same office who are not partners, shareholders of a professional corporation, or members of a professional limited liability company or partnership may not join their names together. Lawyers who are not (1) partners, shareholders of a professional corporation, or members of a professional limited liability company or partnership, or (2) employees of a sole proprietorship, partnership, professional corporation, or members of a professional limited liability company or partnership or other organization, or (3) in the relationship of being "Of Counsel" to a sole proprietorship, partnership, professional corporation, or members of a professional limited liability company or partnership or other organization, shall have separate letterheads, cards and pleading paper, and shall sign their names individually at the end of all pleadings and correspondence and not in conjunction with the names of other lawyers.

Comment

     [1] A firm may be designated by the names of all or some of its members, by the names of deceased members where there has been a continuing succession in the firm's identity or by a trade name such as the "ABC Legal Clinic." A lawyer or law firm may also be designated by a distinctive website address or comparable professional designation. Although the United States Supreme Court has held that legislation may prohibit the use of trade names in professional practice, use of such names in law practice is acceptable so long as it is not misleading. If a private firm uses a trade name that includes a geographical name such as "Springfield Legal Clinic," an express disclaimer that it is a public legal aid agency may be required to avoid a misleading implication. It may be observed that any firm name including the name of a deceased partner is, strictly speaking, a trade name. The use of such names to designate law firms has proven a useful means of identification. However, it is misleading to use the name of a lawyer not associated with the firm or a predecessor of the firm, or the name of a nonlawyer.

     [2] With regard to paragraph (d), lawyers sharing office facilities, but who are not in fact associated with each other in a law firm, may not denominate themselves as, for example, "Smith and Jones," for that title suggests that they are practicing law together in a firm.

Additional Washington Comment (3)

     [3] Lawyers practicing out of the same office who are not partners, shareholders of a professional corporation, or members of a professional limited liability company or partnership may not join their names together. Lawyers who are not 1) partners, shareholders of a professional corporation, or members of a professional limited liability company or partnership, or 2) employees of a sole proprietorship, partnership, professional corporation, or members of a professional limited liability company or partnership or other organization, or 3) in the relationship of being "Of Counsel" to a sole proprietorship, partnership, professional corporation, or members of a professional limited liability company or partnership or other organization, must have separate letterheads, cards and pleading paper, and must sign their names individually at the end of all pleadings and correspondence and not in conjunction with the names of other lawyers. (The provisions of this Comment were taken from former Washington RPC 7.5(d).)

     [6] If a lawyer makes or solicits a political contribution under circumstances that constitute bribery or another crime, Rule 8.4(b) is implicated.

     (a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or

     (b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this rRule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by rRule 1.6.

Comment

     [1] The duty imposed by this Rule extends to persons seeking admission to the bar as well as to lawyers. Hence, if a person makes a material false statement in connection with an application for admission, it may be the basis for subsequent disciplinary action if the person is admitted, and in any event may be relevant in a subsequent admission application. The duty imposed by this Rule applies to a lawyer's own admission or discipline as well as that of others. Thus, it is a separate professional offense for a lawyer to knowingly make a misrepresentation or omission in connection with a disciplinary investigation of the lawyer's own conduct. Paragraph (b) of this Rule also requires correction of any prior misstatement in the matter that the applicant or lawyer may have made and affirmative clarification of any misunderstanding on the part of the admissions or disciplinary authority of which the person involved becomes aware.

     [2] This Rule is subject to the provisions of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution and corresponding provisions of state constitutions. A person relying on such a provision in response to a question, however, should do so openly and not use the right of nondisclosure as a justification for failure to comply with this Rule.

     [3] A lawyer representing an applicant for admission to the bar, or representing a lawyer who is the subject of a disciplinary inquiry or proceeding, is governed by the rules applicable to the client-lawyer relationship, including Rule 1.6 and, in some cases, Rule 3.3.

Additional Washington Comment (4)

     [4] A lawyer's obligations under this Rule are in addition to the lawyer's obligations under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct.

     (b) A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office shall comply with the applicable provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

     (c) A lawyer, in order to assist in maintaining the fair and independent administration of justice, should support and continue traditional efforts to defend judges and courts from unjust criticism.

Comment

     [1] Assessments by lawyers are relied on in evaluating the professional or personal fitness of persons being considered for election or appointment to judicial office and to public legal offices, such as attorney general, prosecuting attorney and public defender. Expressing honest and candid opinions on such matters contributes to improving the administration of justice. Conversely, false statements by a lawyer can unfairly undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

     [2] When a lawyer seeks judicial office, the lawyer should be bound by applicable limitations on political activity.

     [3] To maintain the fair and independent administration of justice, lawyers are encouraged to continue traditional efforts to defend judges and courts unjustly criticized.

     (b) A lawyer having knowledge who knows that a judge has committed a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct that raises a substantial question as to the judge's fitness for office should promptly shall inform the appropriate authority.

     (c) This rRule does not permit a lawyer to report the professional misconduct of another lawyer or a judge to the appropriate authority if doing so would require disclosure of the lawyer to disclose information otherwise protected by rRule 1.6.

Comment

     [1] [Washington revision] Self-regulation of the legal profession requires that members of the profession, when they know of a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, initiate disciplinary investigation by reporting lawyer misconduct to the appropriate disciplinary authority. Lawyers have a similar obligation with respect to judicial misconduct. An apparently isolated violation may indicate a pattern of misconduct that only a disciplinary investigation can uncover. Reporting a violation is especially important where the victim is unlikely to discover the offense.

     [2] [Washington revision] A report about misconduct is prohibited if it would involve violation of Rule 1.6. However, a lawyer should encourage a client to consent to disclosure where prosecution would not substantially prejudice the client's interests.

     [3] [Washington revision] This Rule does not oblige a lawyer to report every violation of the Rules, but instead limits the reporting obligation to those offenses that a self-regulating profession must vigorously endeavor to prevent. A measure of judgment is, therefore, required in complying with the provisions of this Rule. The term "substantial" refers to the seriousness of the possible offense and not the quantum of evidence of which the lawyer is aware. And reporting is required only when a lawyer knows about reportable misconduct. See Rule 1.0(f) for the definition of "knows"; see Rule 1.0(l) for the definition of "substantial." Similar considerations apply to the reporting of judicial misconduct.

     [4] The duty to report professional misconduct does not apply to a lawyer retained to represent a lawyer whose professional conduct is in question. Such a situation is governed by the Rules applicable to the client-lawyer relationship.

     [5] [Washington revision] Information about a lawyer's or judge's misconduct or fitness may be received by a lawyer in the course of that lawyer's participation in an approved lawyers or judges assistance program. In that circumstance, the reporting requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Rule do not apply. Lawyers and judges should not hesitate to seek assistance from these programs in order to prevent additional harm to their professional careers and additional injury to the welfare of clients and the public. Admission to Practice Rule 19(b) provides that confidential communications between lawyer-clients and staff or peer counselors of the Lawyers' Assistance Program (LAP) of the Washington State Bar Association are privileged. Likewise, Discipline Rule for Judges 14(e) provides that confidential communications between judges and peer counselors of the Judicial Assistance Committees of the various judges associations or the LAP are privileged.

     (a) Vviolate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;

     (b) Ccommit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;

     (c) Eengage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;

     (d) Eengage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;

     (e) Sstate or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;

     (f) Kknowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law;

     (g) Ccommit a discriminatory act prohibited by state law on the basis of sex, race, age, creed, religion, color, national origin, disability, sexual orientation, or marital status, where the act of discrimination is committed in connection with the lawyer's professional activities. In addition, it is professional misconduct to commit a discriminatory act on the basis of sexual orientation if such an act would violate this rRule when committed on the basis of sex, race, age, creed, religion, color, national origin, disability or marital status. This rRule shall not limit the ability of a lawyer to accept, decline, or withdraw from the representation of a client in accordance with RPC 1.15 Rule 1.16;

     (h) Iin representing a client, engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice toward judges, other parties and/or their counsel, witnesses and/or their counsel, jurors, or court personnel or officers, that a reasonable person would interpret as manifesting prejudice or bias on the basis of sex, race, age, creed, religion, color, national origin, disability, sexual orientation, or marital status, or socioeconomic status. This rRule does not restrict a lawyer from representing a client by advancing material factual or legal issues or arguments;

     (i) Ccommit any act involving moral turpitude, or corruption, or any unjustified act of assault or other act which reflects disregard for the rule of law, whether the same be committed in the course of his or her conduct as a lawyer, or otherwise, and whether the same constitutes a felony or misdemeanor or not; and if the act constitutes a felony or misdemeanor, conviction thereof in a criminal proceeding shall not be a condition precedent to disciplinary action, nor shall acquittal or dismissal thereof preclude the commencement of a disciplinary proceeding;

     (j) Wwillfully disobey or violate a court order directing him or her to do or cease doing an act which he or she ought in good faith to do or forbear;

     (k) Vviolate his or her oath as an attorney;

     (l) Vviolate a duty or sanction imposed by or under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct in connection with a disciplinary matter; including, but not limited to, the duties catalogued at ELC 1.5;

     (m) Vviolate the Code of Judicial Conduct; or

     (n) Eengage in conduct demonstrating unfitness to practice law.

Comment

     [1] Lawyers are subject to discipline when they violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so through the acts of another, as when they request or instruct an agent to do so on the lawyer's behalf. Paragraph (a), however, does not prohibit a lawyer from advising a client concerning action the client is legally entitled to take.

     [2] [Reserved.]

     [3] [Washington revision] Legitimate advocacy respecting the factors set forth in paragraph (h) does not violate paragraphs (d) or (h). A trial judge's finding that peremptory challenges were exercised on a discriminatory basis does not alone establish a violation of this Rule.

     [4] A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law upon a good faith belief that no valid obligation exists. The provisions of Rule 1.2(d) concerning a good faith challenge to the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law apply to challenges of legal regulation of the practice of law.

     [5] Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer's abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of lawyers. The same is true of abuse of positions of private trust such as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, agent and officer, director or manager of a corporation or other organization.

Additional Washington Comment (6)

     [6] Paragraphs (g) – (n) were taken from former Washington RPC 8.4 (as amended in 2002).

     (b) A lawyer may be subjected to disciplinary sanctions or actions in this jurisdiction on the basis of suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary sanction by competent authority in any other state, federal or foreign jurisdiction.

     (a) Disciplinary Authority. A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer's conduct occurs. A lawyer not admitted in this jurisdiction is also subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction if the lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal services in this jurisdiction. A lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both this jurisdiction and another jurisdiction for the same conduct.

     (b) Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows:

     (1) for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise; and

     (2) for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer's conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. A lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer's conduct will occur.

Comment

Disciplinary Authority

     [1] It is longstanding law that the conduct of a lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction. Extension of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction to other lawyers who provide or offer to provide legal services in this jurisdiction is for the protection of the citizens of this jurisdiction. Reciprocal enforcement of a jurisdiction's disciplinary findings and sanctions will further advance the purposes of this Rule. See, Rules 6 and 22, ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement. A lawyer who is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction under Rule 8.5(a) appoints an official to be designated by this Court to receive service of process in this jurisdiction. The fact that the lawyer is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction may be a factor in determining whether personal jurisdiction may be asserted over the lawyer for civil matters.

Choice of Law

     [2] A lawyer may be potentially subject to more than one set of rules of professional conduct which impose different obligations. The lawyer may be licensed to practice in more than one jurisdiction with differing rules, or may be admitted to practice before a particular court with rules that differ from those of the jurisdiction or jurisdictions in which the lawyer is licensed to practice. Additionally, the lawyer's conduct may involve significant contacts with more than one jurisdiction.

     [3] Paragraph (b) seeks to resolve such potential conflicts. Its premise is that minimizing conflicts between rules, as well as uncertainty about which rules are applicable, is in the best interest of both clients and the profession (as well as the bodies having authority to regulate the profession). Accordingly, it takes the approach of (i) providing that any particular conduct of a lawyer shall be subject to only one set of rules of professional conduct, (ii) making the determination of which set of rules applies to particular conduct as straightforward as possible, consistent with recognition of appropriate regulatory interests of relevant jurisdictions, and (iii) providing protection from discipline for lawyers who act reasonably in the face of uncertainty.

     [4] Paragraph (b)(1) provides that as to a lawyer's conduct relating to a proceeding pending before a tribunal, the lawyer shall be subject only to the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits unless the rules of the tribunal, including its choice of law rule, provide otherwise. As to all other conduct, including conduct in anticipation of a proceeding not yet pending before a tribunal, paragraph (b)(2) provides that a lawyer shall be subject to the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer's conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in another jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. In the case of conduct in anticipation of a proceeding that is likely to be before a tribunal, the predominant effect of such conduct could be where the conduct occurred, where the tribunal sits or in another jurisdiction.

     [5] When a lawyer's conduct involves significant contacts with more than one jurisdiction, it may not be clear whether the predominant effect of the lawyer's conduct will occur in a jurisdiction other than the one in which the conduct occurred. So long as the lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect will occur, the lawyer shall not be subject to discipline under this Rule.

     [6] If two admitting jurisdictions were to proceed against a lawyer for the same conduct, they should, applying this Rule, identify the same governing ethics rules. They should take all appropriate steps to see that they do apply the same rule to the same conduct, and in all events should avoid proceeding against a lawyer on the basis of two inconsistent rules.

     [7] The choice of law provision applies to lawyers engaged in transnational practice, unless international law, treaties or other agreements between competent regulatory authorities in the affected jurisdictions provide otherwise.

II. Civil

     The kind of statement referred to in Rule 3.6 which may potentially prejudice civil matters triable to a jury is a statement designed to influence the jury or to detract from the impartiality of the proceedings.

     Purpose: Current rule 8(f) (Special Admission for House Counsel) of the Admission to Practice Rules (APR) will be superseded if the suggested amendment to Rule 5.5 (d)(1) of the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC), which permits attorneys admitted in other states to practice law in-house in Washington, is adopted. This suggested amendment would retain APR 8(f) to apply solely to lawyers admitted in other countries to allow them to practice under a limited license as house counsel. See Alternative 1. If the suggested amendment to RPC 5.5 (d)(1) is not adopted, then current APR 8(f) would be retained, and this suggested amendment would become APR 8(h). See Alternative 2. Finally, if the suggested amendment to RPC 5.5 (d)(1) is adopted but this suggested amendment is not, then current APR 8(f) should be deleted and reserved. See Alternative 3.

     Persons admitted as house counsel under this suggested amendment would be required to meet the limited licensing criteria in the current 8(f), except that consistent with the proposed RPC 5.5, they would not be required to take the ethics portion of the bar examination. The amendment will also make a technical change to tie these house counsel application fees to the application fees for admission of foreign attorney applicants to the bar in Washington. These suggested amendments would not affect any other special admission rule in APR 8.

     The proponents of this amendment believe this change would be very beneficial. Washington is part of the global community, and our economy increasingly relies on that role. The ability of our businesses to operate effectively from Washington is important in fostering our economy. For example, the information technology and bio-technology industries are founded on intellectual property rights, and an effective in-house legal team is key to success. At some businesses, that team includes lawyers from many countries, working together in Washington. Denying Washington businesses the opportunity to bring in attorneys from other countries inhibits their ability to grow and conduct business here, forcing growth out of the state or out of the country.

     Although some states do not consider lawyers in-house to be practicing law and, thus, do not regulate them at all, that is not true in Washington. The suggested rule would require an application process, and the Washington Supreme Court and the Washington State Bar Association would maintain control over admission, regulation and the ability to discipline.

     (a) In General. Lawyers admitted to the practice of law in any state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia or a foreign country, who do not meet the requirements of rule 1(b), may engage in the practice of law in this state only as provided in this rule.

     (b) Exception for Particular Action or Proceeding. [No change.]

     (c) Exception for Indigent Representation. [No change.]

     (d) Exception for Educational Purposes. [No change.]

     (e) Exception for Emeritus Membership. [No change.]

     (f) Exception for Foreign House Counsel. A lawyer admitted to the practice of law in a jurisdiction other than a United States jurisdiction state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia may apply to the Board of Governors for a limited license to practice law as in-house counsel in this state when the lawyer is employed in Washington as a lawyer exclusively for a profit or not for profit corporation, including its subsidiaries and affiliates, association, or other business entity, that is not a government entity, and whose lawful business consists of activities other than the practice of law or the provision of legal services. The lawyer shall apply by (i) filing an application in the form and manner that may be prescribed by the Board of Governors, (ii) presenting satisfactory proof of (I) admission by examination to the practice of law and current good standing in a jurisdiction other than United States jurisdiction state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia and (II) good moral character, (iii) filing an affidavit from an officer, director, or general counsel of the applicant's employer in this state attesting to the fact the applicant is employed as a lawyer for the employer, including its subsidiaries and affiliates, and the nature of the employment conforms to the requirements of this rule, (iv) paying such fee as may be set by the Board of Governors with approval of the Supreme Court the application fees required of foreign lawyer applicants for admission under APR 3, and (v) furnishing whatever additional information or proof that may be required in the course of investigating the applicant. The lawyer must also pass the Professional Responsibility portion of the Washington bar examination.

     (1) Upon approval of the application by the Board of Governors, the lawyer shall take the Oath of Attorney, pay the current year's annual membership fee and the Board of Governors shall transmit its recommendation to the Supreme Court which may enter an order admitting the lawyer to the limited practice of law under this section.

     (2) Subject to the exceptions contained in the following sentence pertaining to pro bono client representation, the practice of a lawyer admitted under this section shall be limited to practice exclusively for the employer, including its subsidiaries and affiliates, furnishing the affidavit required by this rule and shall not include (i) appearing before a court or tribunal as a person admitted to practice law in this state, except in association with an active member of the Washington State Bar Association who shall be the lawyer of record therein, responsible for the conduct thereof and present at all proceedings, (ii) offering legal services or advice to the public or (iii) holding oneself out to be so engaged or authorized. Notwithstanding the above, the practice of a lawyer admitted under this section may include providing legal services for no fee through a qualified legal services provider, as that term is defined in part 8 (e)(2), including without limitation representation before a court or tribunal without associating with an active member of the Washington State Bar Association. The prohibition against compensation in the preceding sentence shall not prevent a qualified legal services provider from reimbursing an in-house counsel admitted under this section for actual expenses incurred while rendering legal services under this pro bono exception. In addition, a qualified legal services provider shall be entitled to receive all court awarded attorney's fees for pro bono representation rendered by the in-house counsel.

     (3) All business cards and employer letterhead used by a lawyer admitted under this section shall state clearly that the lawyer is admitted to practice in Washington as in-house counsel.

     (4) A lawyer admitted under this section shall pay to the Washington State Bar Association an annual license fee in the maximum amount required of active members.

     (5) The practice of a lawyer admitted under this section shall be subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct, the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct, and to all other laws and rules governing lawyers admitted to the active practice of law in this state. Jurisdiction shall continue whether or not the lawyer retains the limited license and irrespective of the residence of the lawyer.

     (6) The lawyer shall promptly report to the Washington State Bar Association a change in employment, a change in membership status in a state or territory of the United States or District of Columbia any jurisdiction where the applicant has been admitted to the practice of law or the commencement of any formal disciplinary proceeding in a state or territory of the United States or District of Columbia any jurisdiction where the applicant has been admitted to the practice of law.

     (7) The limited license granted under this section shall be automatically terminated when employment by the employer furnishing the affidavit required by this rule is terminated, the lawyer has been admitted to the practice of law pursuant to any other provision of the APR, the lawyer fails to comply with the terms of this rule, the lawyer fails to maintain current good standing in at least one state or territory of the United States or District of Columbia other jurisdiction where the lawyer has been admitted to the practice of law upon passing the bar exam, or on suspension or disbarment for discipline in a state or territory of the United States or District of Columbia any jurisdiction where the lawyer has been admitted to the practice of law. If a lawyer's employment is terminated but the lawyer, within three months from the last day of employment is employed by an employer filing the affidavit required by (iii), the license shall be reinstated.

     (g) Exception for Military Lawyers. [No change.]

     * It is suggested that Alternative 1 be adopted in the event the Court approves the Ethics 2003 suggested amendments to RPC 5.5 (d)(1), which suggested amendments have been simultaneously submitted for the Court's consideration. If the Court disapproves the suggested amendments to RPC 5.5 (d)(1), then it is suggested that current APR 8(f) be retained and that the Exception for Foreign House Counsel be adopted as APR 8(h). See Alternative 2, infra. If the Court elects to approve the Ethics 2003 suggested amendments to RPC 5.5 (d)(1) but to disapprove the suggested Exception for Foreign House Counsel, then current APR 8(f) should be deleted and reserved in accordance with the Ethics 2003 recommendation. See Alternative 3, infra.

     (a) In General. Lawyers admitted to the practice of law in any state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia or a foreign country, who do not meet the requirements of rule 1(b), may engage in the practice of law in this state only as provided in this rule.

     (b) Exception for Particular Action or Proceeding. [No change.]

     (c) Exception for Indigent Representation. [No change.]

     (d) Exception for Educational Purposes. [No change.]

     (e) Exception for Emeritus Membership. [No change.]

     (f) Exception for House Counsel. [No change.]

     (g) Exception for Military Lawyers. [No change.]

     (h) Exception for Foreign House Counsel. A lawyer admitted to the practice of law in a jurisdiction other than a United States jurisdiction may apply to the Board of Governors for a limited license to practice law as in-house counsel in this state when the lawyer is employed in Washington as a lawyer exclusively for a profit or not for profit corporation, including its subsidiaries and affiliates, association, or other business entity, that is not a government entity, and whose lawful business consists of activities other than the practice of law or the provision of legal services. The lawyer shall apply by (i) filing an application in the form and manner that may be prescribed by the Board of Governors, (ii) presenting satisfactory proof of (I) admission by examination to the practice of law and current good standing in a jurisdiction other than United States jurisdiction and (II) good moral character, (iii) filing an affidavit from an officer, director, or general counsel of the applicant's employer in this state attesting to the fact the applicant is employed as a lawyer for the employer, including its subsidiaries and affiliates, and the nature of the employment conforms to the requirements of this rule, (iv) paying the application fees required of foreign lawyer applicants for admission under APR 3, and (v) furnishing whatever additional information or proof that may be required in the course of investigating the applicant.

     (1) Upon approval of the application by the Board of Governors, the lawyer shall take the Oath of Attorney, pay the current year's annual membership fee and the Board of Governors shall transmit its recommendation to the Supreme Court which may enter an order admitting the lawyer to the limited practice of law under this section.

     (2) Subject to the exceptions contained in the following sentence pertaining to pro bono client representation, the practice of a lawyer admitted under this section shall be limited to practice exclusively for the employer, including its subsidiaries and affiliates, furnishing the affidavit required by this rule and shall not include (i) appearing before a court or tribunal as a person admitted to practice law in this state, (ii) offering legal services or advice to the public or (iii) holding oneself out to be so engaged or authorized.

     (3) All business cards and employer letterhead used by a lawyer admitted under this section shall state clearly that the lawyer is admitted to practice in Washington as in-house counsel.

     (4) A lawyer admitted under this section shall pay to the Washington State Bar Association an annual license fee in the maximum amount required of active members.

     (5) The practice of a lawyer admitted under this section shall be subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct, the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct, and to all other laws and rules governing lawyers admitted to the active practice of law in this state. Jurisdiction shall continue whether or not the lawyer retains the limited license and irrespective of the residence of the lawyer.

     (6) The lawyer shall promptly report to the Washington State Bar Association a change in employment, a change in membership status in any jurisdiction where the applicant has been admitted to the practice of law or the commencement of any formal disciplinary proceeding in any jurisdiction where the applicant has been admitted to the practice of law.

     (7) The limited license granted under this section shall be automatically terminated when employment by the employer furnishing the affidavit required by this rule is terminated, the lawyer has been admitted to the practice of law pursuant to any other provision of the APR, the lawyer fails to comply with the terms of this rule, the lawyer fails to maintain current good standing in at least one other jurisdiction where the lawyer has been admitted to the practice of law, or on suspension or disbarment for discipline in any jurisdiction where the lawyer has been admitted to the practice of law. If a lawyer's employment is terminated but the lawyer, within three months from the last day of employment is employed by an employer filing the affidavit required by (iii), the license shall be reinstated.

     * See footnote appended to Alternative 1, supra.

     (a) In General. [No change.]

     (b) Exception for Particular Action or Proceeding. [No change.]

     (c) Exception for Indigent Representation. [No change.]

     (d) Exception for Educational Purposes. [No change.

     (e) Exception for Emeritus Membership. [No change.]

     (f) Exception for House Counsel. [Reserved. See RPC 5.5 (d)(1).] A lawyer admitted to the practice of law in a state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia may apply to the Board of Governors for a limited license to practice law as in-house counsel in this state when the lawyer is employed in Washington as a lawyer exclusively for a profit or not for profit corporation, including its subsidiaries and affiliates, association, or other business entity, that is not a government entity, and whose lawful business consists of activities other than the practice of law or the provision of legal services. The lawyer shall apply by (I) filing an application in the form and manner that may be prescribed by the Board of Governors, (ii) presenting satisfactory proof of (I) admission by examination to the practice of law and current good standing in a state of territory of the United States or the District of Columbia and (II) good moral character, (iii) filing an affidavit from an officer, director, or general counsel of the applicant's employer in this state attesting to the fact the applicant is employed as a lawyer for the employer, including its subsidiaries and affiliates, and the nature of the employment conforms to the requirements of this rule, (iv) paying such fee as may be set by the Board of Governors with approval of the Supreme Court, and (v) furnishing whatever additional information or proof that may be required in the course of investigating the applicant. The lawyer must also pass the Professional Responsibility portion of the Washington bar examination.

     (1) Upon approval of the application by the Board of Governors, the lawyer shall take the Oath of Attorney, pay the current year's annual membership fee and the Board of Governors shall transmit its recommendation to the Supreme Court which may enter an order admitting the lawyer to the limited practice of law under this section.

     (2) Subject to the exceptions contained in the following sentence pertaining to pro bono client representation, the practice of a lawyer admitted under this section shall be limited to practice exclusively for the employer, including its subsidiaries and affiliates, furnishing the affidavit required by this rule and shall not include (I) appearing before a court or tribunal as a person admitted to practice law in this state, except in association with an active member of the Washington State Bar Association who shall be the lawyer of record therein, responsible for the conduct thereof and Present at all proceedings, (ii) offering legal services or advice to the public or (iii) holding oneself out to be so engaged or authorized. Notwithstanding the above, the Practice of a lawyer admitted under this section may include providing legal services for no fee through a qualified legal services provider, as that term is defined in part 8 (e)(2), including without limitation representation before a court or tribunal without associating with an active member of the Washington State Bar Association. The prohibition against compensation in the preceding sentence shall not prevent a qualified legal services provider from reimbursing an in-house counsel admitted under this section for actual expenses incurred while rendering legal services under this pro bono exception. In addition, a qualified legal services provider shall be entitled to receive all court awarded attorney's fees for pro bono representation rendered by the in-house counsel.

     (3) All business cards and employer letterhead used by a lawyer admitted under this section shall state clearly that the lawyer is admitted to practice in Washington as in-house counsel.

     (4) A lawyer admitted under this section shall pay to the Washington State Bar Association an annual license fee in the maximum amount required of active members.

     (5) The practice of a lawyer admitted under this section shall be subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct, the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct, and to all other laws and rules governing lawyers admitted to the active practice of law in this state. Jurisdiction shall continue whether or not the lawyer retains the limited license and irrespective of the residence of the lawyer.

     (6) The lawyer shall promptly report to the Washington State Bar Association a change in employment, a change in membership status in a state or territory of the United States or District of Columbia where the applicant has been admitted to the practice of law or the commencement of any formal disciplinary proceeding in a state or territory of the United States or District of Columbia where the applicant has been admitted to the practice of law.

     (7) The limited license granted under this section shall be automatically terminated when employment by the employer furnishing the affidavit required by this rule is terminated, the lawyer has been admitted to the practice of law pursuant to any other provision of the APR, the lawyer fails to comply with the terms of this rule, the lawyer fails to maintain current good standing in at least one state or territory of the United States or District of Columbia where the lawyer has been admitted to the practice of law upon passing the bar exam, or on suspension or disbarment for discipline in a state or territory of the United States or District of Columbia where the lawyer has been admitted to the practice of law. If a lawyer's employment is terminated but the lawyer, within three months from the last day of employment is employed by an employer filing the affidavit required by (iii), the license shall be reinstated.

     (g) Exception for Military Lawyers. [No change.]

     * See footnote appended to Alternative 1, supra.

     Purpose: This proposal is a substantial revision of Washington's Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC). Washington's current rules--based primarily on the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct--were adopted in 1985. The ABA significantly revised the Model Rules in 2002 and 2003 as a result of the work of the ABA's Ethics 2000 Commission, the ABA Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice, and the ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility. In 2003, the WSBA Board of Governors appointed a Special Committee for the Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (Ethics 2003 Committee), composed of knowledgeable lawyers with diverse experience in the practice of law, along with a nonlawyer member. The Board directed the Committee to undertake a comprehensive study and evaluation of the revised ABA Model Rules, to consider the suitability of adopting the ABA Ethics 2000 revisions, and to evaluate the desirability of other appropriate changes to Washington's RPC. The Ethics 2003 Committee issued a report with its recommendations in March 2004. A copy of the report of the Committee, with a detailed discussion of the various recommended changes, accompanies this submission and is available at the WSBA website (referenced below). The great majority of the Committee's recommendations were approved and adopted by the Board of Governors. Instances in which the Board revised the Committee's recommendation are noted in the Supplement to the Ethics 2003 Report, which also accompanies this submission and is available at the WSBA website (referenced below).

     Recognizing the importance of consistency and uniformity in rules regulating lawyer conduct, the Ethics 2003 Committee recommended adoption of the Model Rules, together with associated commentary, unless there was a compelling and articulable reason for deviation. And, in general, the content of this proposal substantially parallels the ABA Model Rules in form and substance. In some instances the Committee and the Board concluded that the Model Rules are silent on a subject that has traditionally and successfully been addressed in Washington, or that an existing Rule is clearly more suited to the regulation of Washington lawyers than its Model Rule counterpart. In such instances, it is suggested that existing RPC provisions be retained or that new Washington-specific provisions be adopted.

     Among the significant elements of the submission are the following:

•	Inclusion of official Comments throughout the RPC, based on the comments to the Model Rules, to provide guidance on the interpretation and application of the rules.
•	Substitution of the term "zealous" in the Model Rules Preamble with the phrase "conscientious and ardent."
•	Extension of the "reasonableness" requirement applicable to fees under RPC 1.5 to the amount of expenses charged to a client, along with inclusion of the Model Rule requirement that contingent fee agreements be set forth in a writing "signed by the client."
•	Inclusion of additional exceptions to the RPC 1.6 duty of confidentiality, including an exception that would permit disclosure "to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily injury" and an exception that would permit disclosure "to prevent the client from committing a fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services."
•	A substantial number of clarifications to the rules governing conflicts of interest (RPC 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.10).
•	Retention of RPC 1.8(e), requiring that a client remain ultimately liable for advanced court costs and litigation expenses, in lieu of the Model Rule approach that would permit advanced costs and expenses to be contingent on the outcome of litigation.
•	Retention and expansion of RPC 1.8(i) (a provision not retained in the revised Model Rules), which expressly addresses conflicts arising when lawyers are related as parent, child, sibling, spouse, or -- in the proposed version -- when the lawyers are in a "close familial or intimate relationship."
•	At the urging of ATJ/legal services representatives, a recommendation against adoption of that aspect of Model Rule 1.8(g) requiring that client consent to aggregate settlements be confirmed in a writing "signed by the client," the suggested rule instead requiring client consent that is "confirmed in writing" only.
•	Retention of RPC 1.8(k), prohibiting sex with clients, which, unlike the Model Rule, includes specific provision relating to sexual relations with a representative of an organizational client.
•	Retention of Washington's screening provisions in RPC 1.10, which may be used to avoid disqualification arising from a conflict of interest when a lawyer changes law firms.
•	Addition of new Rule 1.13 (Organization as Client) clarifying the lawyer's role when representing an organization and defining the lawyer's obligation upon learning that an officer, employee, or other constituent is violating or intends to violate the law.
•	Clarifications to the rule governing trust accounts and addition of a new rule governing trust account recordkeeping (Rules 1.15A & 1.15B).
•	Addition of new Rule 1.17 governing the sale of a law practice.
•	Addition of new Rule 1.18 governing a lawyer's duties to a prospective client.
•	Addition of new Rule 2.4 governing a lawyer's duties when serving as a third-party neutral.
•	A significant revision to Rule 3.3, which governs a lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal, requiring a lawyer who gains actual knowledge of an offer of false material evidence by a client to take remedial measures, up to and including disclosure to the tribunal.
•	Significant revisions to Rules 5.5 and 8.5 to address issues of the multijurisdictional practice of law, disciplinary jurisdiction, and choice of law.
•	Retention of Rule 6.1 (Voluntary Pro Bono Publico Service) as amended by the Court in 2003, with the addition of official comments designed, inter alia, to assist practitioners in tracking and voluntarily reporting pro bono service hours to the WSBA.
•	Adoption of Model Rule 8.3 (a) & (b), imposing a mandatory reporting requirement when a lawyer knows that another lawyer or a judge has committed serious professional or judicial misconduct.
•	Retention of Washington's existing RPC Preamble in a prefatory section captioned "Fundamental Principles of Professional Conduct."
•	Numerous other suggested changes, mostly conforming to the ABA Model Rules, discussed in detail in the report of the Ethics 2003 Committee.

     In addition to the substantive changes, the rules have been reorganized to correspond directly to the structure of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.

     (c) Powers of the Practice of Law Board.

     (1) Advisory Opinions. On request of any person, or in connection with the consideration of any complaint or any investigation made on its own initiative, the Board may render advisory opinions relating to the authority of non-lawyers to perform legal and law-related services and arrange for their publication. No opinion shall be rendered if, to the Board's knowledge, the subject matter either involves or might affect a case or controversy pending in any court. An advisory opinion shall be issued by the Board in writing and shall be transmitted to the person making the inquiry. At the direction of the Board, an opinion may be published in the Washington State Bar News. Published opinions shall not, insofar as practicable, identify the party or parties making an inquiry, or the complainant or respondent.

     (2) Complaints. The Board shall have jurisdiction over and shall inquire into and consider complaints alleging the unauthorized practice of law by any person or entity in accordance with the procedures outlined in this rule.

     (3) Investigation. The Board may, on its own initiative, and without any complaint being made to it, investigate any condition or situation of which it becomes aware that may involve the unauthorized practice of law.

     (4) Recommendations to the Supreme Court Regarding the Provision of Legal and Law-Related Services by Non-Lawyers. On request of the Supreme Court or any person or organization, or on its own initiative, the Board may recommend that non-lawyers be authorized to engage in certain defined activities that otherwise constitute the practice of law as defined in GR 24. In forwarding a recommendation that non-lawyers be authorized to engage in certain legal or law-related activities that constitute the practice of law as defined in GR 24, the Board shall determine whether regulation under authority of the Supreme Court (including the establishment of minimum and uniform standards of competency, conduct, and continuing education) is necessary to protect the public interest. Any recommendation that non-lawyers be authorized to engage in the limited provision of legal or law-related services shall be accompanied by a determination:

     (A) that access to affordable and reliable legal and law-related services consistent with protection of the public will be enhanced by permitting non-lawyers to engage in the defined activities set forth in the recommendation;

     (B) that the defined activities outlined in the recommendation can be reasonably and competently provided by skilled and trained non-lawyers;

     (C) if the public interest requires regulation under authority of the Supreme Court, such regulation is tailored to promote access to affordable legal and law-related services while ensuring that those whose important rights are at stake can reasonably rely on the quality, skill and ability of those non-lawyers who will provide such services;

     (D) that, to the extent that the activities authorized will involve the handling of client trust funds, provision has been made to ensure that such funds are handled in a manner consistent with RPC 1.14 1.15A and APR 12.1, including the requirement that such funds be placed in interest bearing accounts, with interest paid to the Legal Foundation of Washington; and

     (E) that the costs of regulation, if any, can be effectively underwritten within the context of the proposed regulatory regime.

     Recommendations to authorize non-lawyers to engage in the limited practice of law pursuant to this section shall be forwarded to the Washington State Board of Governors for consideration and comment before transmission to the Supreme Court. Upon approval of such recommendations by the Supreme Court pursuant to the procedures set out in GR 9, those who meet the requirements and comply with applicable regulatory and licensing provisions shall be deemed to be engaged in the authorized practice of law.

     (d) - (j) [Unchanged.]

     (f) Exception for House Counsel. [Reserved. See RPC 5.5 (d)(1).] A lawyer admitted to the practice of law in a state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia may apply to the Board of Governors for a limited license to practice law as in-house counsel in this state when the lawyer is employed in Washington as a lawyer exclusively for a profit or not for profit corporation, including its subsidiaries and affiliates, association, or other business entity, that is not a government entity, and whose lawful business consists of activities other than the practice of law or the provision of legal services. The lawyer shall apply by (I) filing an application in the form and manner that may be prescribed by the Board of Governors, (ii) presenting satisfactory proof of (I) admission by examination to the practice of law and current good standing in a state of territory of the United States or the District of Columbia and (II) good moral character, (iii) filing an affidavit from an officer, director, or general counsel of the applicant's employer in this state attesting to the fact the applicant is employed as a lawyer for the employer, including its subsidiaries and affiliates, and the nature of the employment conforms to the requirements of this rule, (iv) paying such fee as may be set by the Board of Governors with approval of the Supreme Court, and (v) furnishing whatever additional information or proof that may be required in the course of investigating the applicant. The lawyer must also pass the Professional Responsibility portion of the Washington bar examination.

     (1) Upon approval of the application by the Board of Governors, the lawyer shall take the Oath of Attorney, pay the current year's annual membership fee and the Board of Governors shall transmit its recommendation to the Supreme Court which may enter an order admitting the lawyer to the limited practice of law under this section.

     (2) Subject to the exceptions contained in the following sentence pertaining to pro bono client representation, the practice of a lawyer admitted under this section shall be limited to practice exclusively for the employer, including its subsidiaries and affiliates, furnishing the affidavit required by this rule and shall not include (I) appearing before a court or tribunal as a person admitted to practice law in this state, except in association with an active member of the Washington State Bar Association who shall be the lawyer of record therein, responsible for the conduct thereof and Present at all proceedings, (ii) offering legal services or advice to the public or (iii) holding oneself out to be so engaged or authorized. Notwithstanding the above, the Practice of a lawyer admitted under this section may include providing legal services for no fee through a qualified legal services provider, as that term is defined in part 8 (e)(2), including without limitation representation before a court or tribunal without associating with an active member of the Washington State Bar Association. The prohibition against compensation in the preceding sentence shall not prevent a qualified legal services provider from reimbursing an in-house counsel admitted under this section for actual expenses incurred while rendering legal services under this pro bono exception. In addition, a qualified legal services provider shall be entitled to receive all court awarded attorney's fees for pro bono representation rendered by the in-house counsel.

     (3) All business cards and employer letterhead used by a lawyer admitted under this section shall state clearly that the lawyer is admitted to practice in Washington as in-house counsel.

     (4) A lawyer admitted under this section shall pay to the Washington State Bar Association an annual license fee in the maximum amount required of active members.

     (5) The practice of a lawyer admitted under this section shall be subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct, the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct, and to all other laws and rules governing lawyers admitted to the active practice of law in this state. Jurisdiction shall continue whether or not the lawyer retains the limited license and irrespective of the residence of the lawyer.

     (6) The lawyer shall promptly report to the Washington State Bar Association a change in employment, a change in membership status in a state or territory of the United States or District of Columbia where the applicant has been admitted to the practice of law or the commencement of any formal disciplinary proceeding in a state or territory of the United States or District of Columbia where the applicant has been admitted to the practice of law.

     (7) The limited license granted under this section shall be automatically terminated when employment by the employer furnishing the affidavit required by this rule is terminated, the lawyer has been admitted to the practice of law pursuant to any other provision of the APR, the lawyer fails to comply with the terms of this rule, the lawyer fails to maintain current good standing in at least one state or territory of the United States or District of Columbia where the lawyer has been admitted to the practice of law upon passing the bar exam, or on suspension or disbarment for discipline in a state or territory of the United States or District of Columbia where the lawyer has been admitted to the practice of law. If a lawyer's employment is terminated but the lawyer, within three months from the last day of employment is employed by an employer filing the affidavit required by (iii), the license shall be reinstated.

     (g) [Unchanged.]

     C. Dishonest Conduct. As used in these rules, "dishonest conduct" or "dishonesty" means wrongful acts committed by a lawyer in the nature of theft or embezzlement of money or the wrongful taking or conversion of money, property or other thing of value, including but not limited to refusal to refund unearned fees or expenses as required by Rule 1.15 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

     D. - F. [Unchanged.]

     (a) Random Examination. [Unchanged.]

     (b) Particular Examination. Upon receipt of information that a particular lawyer or law firm may not be in compliance with RPC 1.14 1.15A, the Chair may authorize an examination limited to the lawyer or law firm's books and records. Information may be presented to the Chair without notice to the lawyer or law firm. Disclosure of this information is subject to rules 3.1 - 3.4.

     (c) Audit. [Unchanged.]

     (b) [Unchanged.]

     (c) Costs. Nothing in these rules precludes a financial institution from charging a particular lawyer or law firm for the reasonable cost of producing the reports and records required by this rule, but those charges may not be a transaction cost charged against funds payable to the Legal Foundation of Washington under RPC 1.14 (c)(1) 1.15A (i)(1).

     (d) [Unchanged.]

     (b) [Unchanged.]

     Reviser's note: The brackets and enclosed material in the text of the above section occurred in the copy filed by the agency and appear in the Register pursuant to the requirements of RCW 34.08.040.

     Reviser's note: The typographical errors in the above material occurred in the copy filed by the State Supreme Court and appear in the Register pursuant to the requirements of RCW 34.08.040.

     Reviser's note: The spelling errors in the above material occurred in the copy filed by the State Supreme Court and appear in the Register pursuant to the requirements of RCW 34.08.040.

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