H-0449.1  _______________________________________________

                          HOUSE BILL 2028

          _______________________________________________

State of Washington      56th Legislature     1999 Regular Session

By Representatives Bush, O'Brien, Ballasiotes, Kastama, DeBolt, Sullivan, Lambert, Keiser, Benson, Miloscia, McDonald, Boldt, Quall, Talcott, Mulliken, Clements, Scott, Barlean, Koster, Dunn, Ruderman, Stensen, Delvin, Mielke, Esser, Pennington, Carrell, Cox, Schindler, Lovick, Schoesler, Schual‑Berke, Sump, D. Sommers, Fortunato, Buck, McMorris, Kessler, Anderson, Rockefeller, D. Schmidt, Mitchell, Kagi, Conway and Campbell

Read first time 02/15/1999.  Referred to Committee on Judiciary.

Prohibiting the use of intoxication as a defense.

    AN ACT Relating to prohibiting the use of voluntary intoxication as a defense against a criminal charge; and amending RCW 9A.16.090 and 9A.08.010.

BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON:

    Sec. 1.  RCW 9A.16.090 and 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.16.090 are each amended to read as follows:

(1) No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication shall be deemed less criminal by reason of ((his)) the person's condition((, but whenever the actual existence of any particular mental state is a necessary element to constitute a particular species or degree of crime, the fact of his intoxication may be taken into consideration in determining such mental state)).  Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to any criminal charge, nor may the fact of voluntary intoxication be used by a defendant to demonstrate the lack of any particular mental state that is an element of a crime charged.  Nothing in this section prohibits the prosecution from introducing evidence of a defendant's intoxication.

(2) This section applies to voluntary intoxication produced by any agent, including but not limited to alcohol or any drug.

    Sec. 2.  RCW 9A.08.010 and 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.08.010 are each amended to read as follows:

    (1) Kinds of Culpability Defined.

    (a) INTENT.  A person acts with intent or intentionally when ((he)):

(i) The person acts with the objective or purpose to accomplish a result which constitutes a crime; or

(ii) The person is voluntarily intoxicated and acts in a manner that would be considered intentional if the person were not intoxicated.

    (b) KNOWLEDGE.  A person knows or acts knowingly or with knowledge when:

    (i) ((he)) The person is aware of a fact, facts, or circumstances or result described by a statute defining an offense; or

    (ii) ((he)) The person is voluntarily intoxicated and acts in a manner that would be considered knowing if the person were not intoxicated.

If a person has information which would lead a reasonable ((man)) person in the same situation to believe that facts exist which facts are described by a statute defining an offense, the fact-finder may, but need not, infer that the person acted knowingly.

    (c) RECKLESSNESS.  A person is reckless or acts recklessly when ((he)):

(i) The person knows of and disregards a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and ((his)) the disregard of such substantial risk is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable ((man)) person would exercise in the same situation; or

(ii) The person is voluntarily intoxicated and acts in a manner that would be considered reckless if the person were not intoxicated.

    (d) CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE.  A person is criminally negligent or acts with criminal negligence when ((he)) the person fails to be aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and ((his)) the failure to be aware of such substantial risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable ((man)) person would exercise in the same situation.

    (2) Substitutes for Criminal Negligence, Recklessness, and Knowledge.  When a statute provides that criminal negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, such element also is established if a person acts intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.  When recklessness suffices to establish an element, such element also is established if a person acts intentionally or knowingly.  When acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, such element also is established if a person acts intentionally.

    (3) Culpability as Determinant of Grade of Offense.  When the grade or degree of an offense depends on whether the offense is committed intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence, its grade or degree shall be the lowest for which the determinative kind of culpability is established with respect to any material element of the offense.

    (4) Requirement of Wilfulness Satisfied by Acting Knowingly.  A requirement that an offense be committed wilfully is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements plainly appears.

                            --- END ---