Passed by the Senate April 14, 2005 YEAS 46   ________________________________________ President of the Senate Passed by the House April 12, 2005 YEAS 96   ________________________________________ Speaker of the House of Representatives | I, Thomas Hoemann, Secretary of the Senate of the State of Washington, do hereby certify that the attached is SENATE BILL 5477 as passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives on the dates hereon set forth. ________________________________________ Secretary | |
Approved ________________________________________ Governor of the State of Washington | Secretary of State State of Washington |
State of Washington | 59th Legislature | 2005 Regular Session |
Read first time 01/26/2005. Referred to Committee on Judiciary.
AN ACT Relating to sentencing outside the standard sentence range; amending RCW 9.94A.530 and 9.94A.535; adding a new section to chapter 9.94A RCW; creating new sections; and declaring an emergency.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON:
NEW SECTION. Sec. 1 The legislature intends to conform the
sentencing reform act, chapter 9.94A RCW, to comply with the ruling in
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ... (2004). In that case, the United
States supreme court held that a criminal defendant has a Sixth
Amendment right to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt any
aggravating fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction, that is
used to impose greater punishment than the standard range or standard
conditions. The legislature intends that aggravating facts, other than
the fact of a prior conviction, will be placed before the jury. The
legislature intends that the sentencing court will then decide whether
or not the aggravating fact is a substantial and compelling reason to
impose greater punishment. The legislature intends to create a new
criminal procedure for imposing greater punishment than the standard
range or conditions and to codify existing common law aggravating
factors, without expanding or restricting existing statutory or common
law aggravating circumstances. The legislature does not intend the
codification of common law aggravating factors to expand or restrict
currently available statutory or common law aggravating circumstances.
The legislature does not intend to alter how mitigating facts are to be
determined under the sentencing reform act, and thus intends that
mitigating facts will be found by the sentencing court by a
preponderance of the evidence.
While the legislature intends to bring the sentencing reform act
into compliance as previously indicated, the legislature recognizes the
need to restore the judicial discretion that has been limited as a
result of the Blakely decision.
Sec. 2 RCW 9.94A.530 and 2002 c 290 s 18 are each amended to read
as follows:
(1) The intersection of the column defined by the offender score
and the row defined by the offense seriousness score determines the
standard sentence range (see RCW 9.94A.510, (Table 1) and RCW
9.94A.517, (Table 3)). The additional time for deadly weapon findings
or for ((those offenses enumerated)) other adjustments as specified in
RCW 9.94A.533(((4) that were committed in a state correctional facility
or county jail)) shall be added to the entire standard sentence range.
The court may impose any sentence within the range that it deems
appropriate. All standard sentence ranges are expressed in terms of
total confinement.
(2) In determining any sentence other than a sentence above the
standard range, the trial court may rely on no more information than is
admitted by the plea agreement, or admitted, acknowledged, or proved in
a trial or at the time of sentencing, or proven pursuant to section 4
of this act. Acknowledgement includes not objecting to information
stated in the presentence reports. Where the defendant disputes
material facts, the court must either not consider the fact or grant an
evidentiary hearing on the point. The facts shall be deemed proved at
the hearing by a preponderance of the evidence, except as otherwise
specified in section 4 of this act.
(3) In determining any sentence above the standard sentence range,
the court shall follow the procedures set forth in section 4 of this
act. Facts that establish the elements of a more serious crime or
additional crimes may not be used to go outside the standard sentence
range except upon stipulation or when specifically provided for in RCW
9.94A.535(2) (d), (e), (g), and (h).
Sec. 3 RCW 9.94A.535 and 2003 c 267 s 4 are each amended to read
as follows:
The court may impose a sentence outside the standard sentence range
for an offense if it finds, considering the purpose of this chapter,
that there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an
exceptional sentence. Facts supporting aggravated sentences, other
than the fact of a prior conviction, shall be determined pursuant to
the provisions of section 4 of this act.
Whenever a sentence outside the standard sentence range is imposed,
the court shall set forth the reasons for its decision in written
findings of fact and conclusions of law. A sentence outside the
standard sentence range shall be a determinate sentence ((unless it is
imposed on an offender sentenced under RCW 9.94A.712. An exceptional
sentence imposed on an offender sentenced under RCW 9.94A.712 shall be
to a minimum term set by the court and a maximum term equal to the
statutory maximum sentence for the offense of conviction under chapter
9A.20 RCW)).
If the sentencing court finds that an exceptional sentence outside
the standard sentence range should be imposed, the sentence is subject
to review only as provided for in RCW 9.94A.585(4).
A departure from the standards in RCW 9.94A.589 (1) and (2)
governing whether sentences are to be served consecutively or
concurrently is an exceptional sentence subject to the limitations in
this section, and may be appealed by the offender or the state as set
forth in RCW 9.94A.585 (2) through (6).
((The following are illustrative factors which the court may
consider in the exercise of its discretion to impose an exceptional
sentence. The following are illustrative only and are not intended to
be exclusive reasons for exceptional sentences.))
(1) Mitigating Circumstances - Court to Consider
The court may impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range
if it finds that mitigating circumstances are established by a
preponderance of the evidence. The following are illustrative only and
are not intended to be exclusive reasons for exceptional sentences.
(a) To a significant degree, the victim was an initiator, willing
participant, aggressor, or provoker of the incident.
(b) Before detection, the defendant compensated, or made a good
faith effort to compensate, the victim of the criminal conduct for any
damage or injury sustained.
(c) The defendant committed the crime under duress, coercion,
threat, or compulsion insufficient to constitute a complete defense but
which significantly affected his or her conduct.
(d) The defendant, with no apparent predisposition to do so, was
induced by others to participate in the crime.
(e) The defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
or her conduct, or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of
the law, was significantly impaired. Voluntary use of drugs or alcohol
is excluded.
(f) The offense was principally accomplished by another person and
the defendant manifested extreme caution or sincere concern for the
safety or well-being of the victim.
(g) The operation of the multiple offense policy of RCW 9.94A.589
results in a presumptive sentence that is clearly excessive in light of
the purpose of this chapter, as expressed in RCW 9.94A.010.
(h) The defendant or the defendant's children suffered a continuing
pattern of physical or sexual abuse by the victim of the offense and
the offense is a response to that abuse.
(2) Aggravating Circumstances - Considered and Imposed by the Court
The trial court may impose an aggravated exceptional sentence
without a finding of fact by a jury under the following circumstances:
(a) The defendant and the state both stipulate that justice is best
served by the imposition of an exceptional sentence outside the
standard range, and the court finds the exceptional sentence to be
consistent with and in furtherance of the interests of justice and the
purposes of the sentencing reform act.
(b) The defendant's prior unscored misdemeanor or prior unscored
foreign criminal history results in a presumptive sentence that is
clearly too lenient in light of the purpose of this chapter, as
expressed in RCW 9.94A.010.
(c) The defendant has committed multiple current offenses and the
defendant's high offender score results in some of the current offenses
going unpunished.
(d) The failure to consider the defendant's prior criminal history
which was omitted from the offender score calculation pursuant to RCW
9.94A.525 results in a presumptive sentence that is clearly too
lenient.
(3) Aggravating Circumstances - Considered By A Jury - Imposed by
the Court
Except for circumstances listed in subsection (2) of this section,
the following circumstances are an exclusive list of factors that can
support a sentence above the standard range. Such facts should be
determined by procedures specified in section 4 of this act.
(a) The defendant's conduct during the commission of the current
offense manifested deliberate cruelty to the victim.
(b) The defendant knew or should have known that the victim of the
current offense was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance
((due to extreme youth, advanced age, disability, or ill health)).
(c) The current offense was a violent offense, and the defendant
knew that the victim of the current offense was pregnant.
(d) The current offense was a major economic offense or series of
offenses, so identified by a consideration of any of the following
factors:
(i) The current offense involved multiple victims or multiple
incidents per victim;
(ii) The current offense involved attempted or actual monetary loss
substantially greater than typical for the offense;
(iii) The current offense involved a high degree of sophistication
or planning or occurred over a lengthy period of time; or
(iv) The defendant used his or her position of trust, confidence,
or fiduciary responsibility to facilitate the commission of the current
offense.
(e) The current offense was a major violation of the Uniform
Controlled Substances Act, chapter 69.50 RCW (VUCSA), related to
trafficking in controlled substances, which was more onerous than the
typical offense of its statutory definition: The presence of ANY of
the following may identify a current offense as a major VUCSA:
(i) The current offense involved at least three separate
transactions in which controlled substances were sold, transferred, or
possessed with intent to do so;
(ii) The current offense involved an attempted or actual sale or
transfer of controlled substances in quantities substantially larger
than for personal use;
(iii) The current offense involved the manufacture of controlled
substances for use by other parties;
(iv) The circumstances of the current offense reveal the offender
to have occupied a high position in the drug distribution hierarchy;
(v) The current offense involved a high degree of sophistication or
planning, occurred over a lengthy period of time, or involved a broad
geographic area of disbursement; or
(vi) The offender used his or her position or status to facilitate
the commission of the current offense, including positions of trust,
confidence or fiduciary responsibility (e.g., pharmacist, physician, or
other medical professional).
(f) The current offense included a finding of sexual motivation
pursuant to RCW 9.94A.835.
(g) The offense was part of an ongoing pattern of sexual abuse of
the same victim under the age of eighteen years manifested by multiple
incidents over a prolonged period of time.
(h) The current offense involved domestic violence, as defined in
RCW 10.99.020, and one or more of the following was present:
(i) The offense was part of an ongoing pattern of psychological,
physical, or sexual abuse of the victim manifested by multiple
incidents over a prolonged period of time;
(ii) The offense occurred within sight or sound of the victim's or
the offender's minor children under the age of eighteen years; or
(iii) The offender's conduct during the commission of the current
offense manifested deliberate cruelty or intimidation of the victim.
(i) ((The operation of the multiple offense policy of RCW 9.94A.589
results in a presumptive sentence that is clearly too lenient in light
of the purpose of this chapter, as expressed in RCW 9.94A.010.)) The offense resulted in the pregnancy of a child victim of
rape.
(j) The defendant's prior unscored misdemeanor or prior unscored
foreign criminal history results in a presumptive sentence that is
clearly too lenient in light of the purpose of this chapter, as
expressed in RCW 9.94A.010.
(k)
(((l))) (j) The defendant knew that the victim of the current
offense was a youth who was not residing with a legal custodian and the
defendant established or promoted the relationship for the primary
purpose of victimization.
(((m))) (k) The offense was committed with the intent to obstruct
or impair human or animal health care or agricultural or forestry
research or commercial production.
(((n))) (l) The current offense is trafficking in the first degree
or trafficking in the second degree and any victim was a minor at the
time of the offense.
(m) The offense involved a high degree of sophistication or
planning.
(n) The defendant used his or her position of trust, confidence, or
fiduciary responsibility to facilitate the commission of the current
offense.
(o) The defendant committed a current sex offense, has a history of
sex offenses, and is not amenable to treatment.
(p) The offense involved an invasion of the victim's privacy.
(q) The defendant demonstrated or displayed an egregious lack of
remorse.
(r) The offense involved a destructive and foreseeable impact on
persons other than the victim.
(s) The defendant committed the offense to obtain or maintain his
or her membership or to advance his or her position in the hierarchy of
an organization, association, or identifiable group.
(t) The defendant committed the current offense shortly after being
released from incarceration.
(u) The current offense is a burglary and the victim of the
burglary was present in the building or residence when the crime was
committed.
(v) The offense was committed against a law enforcement officer who
was performing his or her official duties at the time of the offense,
the offender knew that the victim was a law enforcement officer, and
the victim's status as a law enforcement officer is not an element of
the offense.
(w) The defendant committed the offense against a victim who was
acting as a good samaritan.
(x) The defendant committed the offense against a public official
or officer of the court in retaliation of the public official's
performance of his or her duty to the criminal justice system.
(y) The victim's injuries substantially exceed the level of bodily
harm necessary to satisfy the elements of the offense. This aggravator
is not an exception to RCW 9.94A.530(2).
NEW SECTION. Sec. 4 A new section is added to chapter 9.94A RCW
to read as follows:
(1) At any time prior to trial or entry of the guilty plea if
substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced, the state may
give notice that it is seeking a sentence above the standard sentencing
range. The notice shall state aggravating circumstances upon which the
requested sentence will be based.
(2) The facts supporting aggravating circumstances shall be proved
to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury's verdict on the
aggravating factor must be unanimous, and by special interrogatory. If
a jury is waived, proof shall be to the court beyond a reasonable
doubt, unless the defendant stipulates to the aggravating facts.
(3) Evidence regarding any facts supporting aggravating
circumstances under RCW 9.94A.535(3) (a) through (y), shall be
presented to the jury during the trial of the alleged crime, unless the
state alleges the aggravating circumstances listed in RCW 9.94A.535(3)
(e)(iv), (h)(i), (o), or (t). If one of these aggravating
circumstances is alleged, the trial court may conduct a separate
proceeding if the evidence supporting the aggravating fact is not part
of the res geste of the charged crime, if the evidence is not otherwise
admissible in trial of the charged crime, and if the court finds that
the probative value of the evidence to the aggravated fact is
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect on the jury's
ability to determine guilt or innocence for the underlying crime.
(4) If the court conducts a separate proceeding to determine the
existence of aggravating circumstances, the proceeding shall
immediately follow the trial on the underlying conviction, if possible.
If any person who served on the jury is unable to continue, the court
shall substitute an alternate juror.
(5) If the jury finds, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt,
one or more of the facts alleged by the state in support of an
aggravated sentence, the court may sentence the offender pursuant to
RCW 9.94A.535 to a term of confinement up to the maximum allowed under
RCW 9A.20.021 for the underlying conviction if it finds, considering
the purposes of this chapter, that the facts found are substantial and
compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.
NEW SECTION. Sec. 5 (1) The sentencing guidelines commission
shall review the sentencing reform act as it relates to the sentencing
grid, all provisions providing for exceptional sentences both above and
below the standard sentencing ranges, and judicial discretion in
sentencing. As part of its review, the commission shall:
(a) Study the relevant provisions of the sentencing reform act,
including the provisions in this act;
(b) Consider how to restore the judicial discretion which has been
limited as a result of the Blakely decision;
(c) Consider the use of advisory sentencing guidelines for all or
any group of crimes;
(d) Draft proposed legislation that seeks to address the
limitations placed on judicial discretion in sentencing as a result of
the Blakely decision; and
(e) Determine the fiscal impact of any proposed legislation.
(2) The commission shall submit its findings and proposed
legislation to the legislature no later than December 1, 2005.
NEW SECTION. Sec. 6 If any provision of this act or its
application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the
remainder of the act or the application of the provision to other
persons or circumstances is not affected.
NEW SECTION. Sec. 7 This act is necessary for the immediate
preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, or support of the
state government and its existing public institutions, and takes effect
immediately.