HOUSE BILL REPORT
SHB 1322
This analysis was prepared by non-partisan legislative staff for the use of legislative members in
their deliberations. This analysis is not a part of the legislation nor does it constitute a
statement of legislative intent.
As Passed House:
March 9, 2007
Title: An act relating to the definition of disability in the Washington law against discrimination.
Brief Description: Defining disability in the Washington law against discrimination.
Sponsors: By House Committee on Judiciary (originally sponsored by Representatives McCoy, Grant, Sells, Cody, Conway, Schual-Berke, Roberts, Pettigrew, Lantz, Kagi, Moeller, Chase, Green, Kenney, Simpson, Darneille, Dickerson, Hankins, Santos, Ormsby and Flannigan).
Brief History:
Judiciary: 2/6/07, 2/13/07 [DPS].
Floor Activity:
Passed House: 3/9/07, 64-33.
Brief Summary of Substitute Bill |
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
Majority Report: The substitute bill be substituted therefor and the substitute bill do pass. Signed by 7 members: Representatives Lantz, Chair; Goodman, Vice Chair; Flannigan, Kirby, Moeller, Pedersen and Williams.
Minority Report: Do not pass. Signed by 4 members: Representatives Rodne, Ranking Minority Member; Warnick, Assistant Ranking Minority Member; Ahern and Ross.
Staff: Bill Perry (786-7123).
Background:
The state Law Against Discrimination provides that a person has the right to be free from
discrimination based on a number of factors. One of these factors is the presence of any
"sensory, mental, or physical disability."
The right to be free from discrimination based on such a disability applies to employment,
public accommodations, real estate transactions, insurance, and commerce.
In addition, the Law Against Discrimination defines certain practices to be unfair. For
example, it is an unfair practice to refuse to hire or fire a person, or to discriminate in a
person's compensation, based on the presence of any sensory or physical disability. Under
case law, employers are required to make "reasonable accommodations" for an employee
with a disability. There are also other specific unfair practices defined in the Law Against
Discrimination with respect to public accommodations, real estate transactions, insurance,
financial institutions, credit transactions, and labor union practices.
The Washington State Human Rights Commission (WSHRC) has responsibility for taking
complaints of violations of the Law Against Discrimination and for seeking resolution of
complaints and enforcement of the law.
There is no definition of "sensory, mental, or physical disability" in the Law Against
Discrimination itself. There is, however, a definition in the administrative rules of the
WSHRC. For purposes of those rules, the phrase means a condition that:
For purposes of employment discrimination under the WSHRC rules, a condition is a
"sensory, mental, or physical disability" if it "is an abnormality and is a reason why" the
person was discriminated against. This definition has been criticized by courts and
commentators as circular because it appears to say a condition is a disability if it is a reason
for discrimination.
In Pulcino v. Federal Express Corp., 141 Wn.2d 629 (2000), the state Supreme Court noted
the difficulties with the WSHRC rule and announced the test for disability in employment
discrimination cases to be whether or not a claimant's condition:
The Federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) has yet another definition of "disability." The state Supreme Court recently rejected both the WSHRC rule and its own earlier Pulcino test. The court adopted the ADA definition of "disability" in an employment discrimination case, McClarty v. Totem Electric, 157 Wn.2d 214 (2006). The test for a "disability" announced by the court is whether or not a person:
Summary of Substitute Bill:
A statutory definition is provided for the term "disability" within the state's Law Against
Discrimination.
A disability is a sensory, mental, or physical impairment that:
A disability exists whether or not an impairment:
An impairment includes any physiological disorder, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical
loss affecting enumerated body systems, as well as mental, developmental, traumatic, or
psychological disorders.
However, for purposes of the requirement for reasonable accommodation in employment, an
impairment must either:
These changes apply retroactively to all cases pending or not time barred on the effective date of the act.
Appropriation: None.
Fiscal Note: Available.
Effective Date: The bill takes effect 90 days after adjournment of session in which bill is passed.
Staff Summary of Public Testimony:
(In support) The McClarty decision will have disastrous consequences for persons in the
disabled community. What courts allow in the way of amelioration under the ADA standard
will deprive many people of services and accommodations they should have and are now
receiving.
The substitute bill is a carefully worked out compromise with the business community. The
substitute responds to the business community's concerns by reestablishing the "substantially
limiting" standard in reasonable accommodation cases.
It would be false economy not to pass this bill. Without the bill, fewer people will be able to
find employment and to contribute to the costs of their own needs. It would also be
dangerous not to pass the bill since many people who have disabilities disclosed them under
the pre-McClarty rules when they were protected. Without this bill, these same people may
now turn out to have effectively exposed themselves to discrimination.
The ADA standards that now apply have been so narrowly construed by the courts that even
disabilities like breast cancer, diabetes, multiple sclerosis, and asthma may not be protected
from discrimination. Many other states also have state laws that are broader than the ADA.
(Neutral) There was no problem applying the Law Against Discrimination before McClarty.
Now the HRC is having to turn down many complaints it previously could have taken. For
30 years people in this state have been protected by the state's law.
(Concerns) The inclusion of "cosmetic disfigurement" in the definition is unnecessary given
the breadth of the rest of the definition. The requirement to make reasonable accommodation
if there is a reasonable likelihood that an impairment will become substantially limiting is too
broad. Whether or not employment may aggravate an impairment to the point of it becoming
substantially limiting should be tied to whether or not it is medically necessary to
accommodate the impairment.
(Opposed) No one wants to discriminate, but the bill is just too broad and vague. Small
businesses do not have lawyers to help them figure out what they could do under a standard
like that. Small business interests were not included in the discussions that produced the
proposed substitute bill.
Persons Testifying: (In support) Jeffrey Needle, Washington Employment Lawyers
Association; David Lord, Washington Protection and Advocacy System; Paul Miller,
University of Washington School of Law; Jim Baker, Robert Blumenfeld, and Jeanette
Murphy, Association of Centers for Independent Living-Washington; Marie Jubie, North
Sound Mental Health Advisory Board; Kris Tefft, Association of Washington Business;
Kevin Bernadt, King County Developmental Disabilities; Joelle Brouner, Washington State
Rehabilitation Services; and Laurel Carter.
(Neutral) Marc Brenman, Washington State Human Rights Commission; and Toby Olson,
Governor's Committee on Disability Issues and Employment.
(Concerns) Lisa Sutton, Attorney General's Office.
(Opposed) Gary Smith, Independent Business Association.