BILL REQ. #:  H-1278.2 



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HOUSE BILL 1909
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State of Washington61st Legislature2009 Regular Session

By Representatives Williams, Carlyle, Chase, Hunt, Hasegawa, Appleton, Darneille, Nelson, Cody, Moeller, Dickerson, Wood, Pedersen, Hudgins, Miloscia, Ormsby, White, Kagi, Santos, and Goodman

Read first time 02/02/09.   Referred to Committee on Judiciary.



     AN ACT Relating to reducing criminal justice expenses by eliminating the death penalty in favor of life incarceration; amending RCW 10.95.030; creating new sections; repealing RCW 10.95.040, 10.95.050, 10.95.060, 10.95.070, 10.95.080, 10.95.090, 10.95.100, 10.95.110, 10.95.120, 10.95.130, 10.95.140, 10.95.150, 10.95.160, 10.95.170, 10.95.180, 10.95.185, 10.95.190, 10.95.200, and 10.95.900; and declaring an emergency.

BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON:

NEW SECTION.  Sec. 1   (1) The legislature recognizes that questions about the administration of the death penalty in Washington have existed since a 2003 plea bargain for Gary Leon Ridgway, the acknowledged murderer of forty-eight women. In a March 30, 2006, decision, the Washington supreme court was divided five to four over whether Washington's capital punishment system is applied fairly. The five justice majority concluded that the fact that Ridgway "will live out his life in prison instead of facing the death penalty has caused many in our community to seriously question whether the death penalty can, in fairness, be proportional when applied to any other defendant . . . it is a question best left to the people and to their elected representatives in the Legislature." The four justice dissent reasoned, after review of Washington's death penalty statute over the twenty-five years of its existence, that "the death penalty is like lightning, randomly striking some defendants and not others," and concluded that "no rational explanation exists to explain why some individuals escape the penalty of death and others do not."
     (2) The legislature finds that historically most death sentences imposed in Washington have been reversed and the death sentence has been rarely imposed. In light of the very substantial pressures that exist upon the criminal justice system, the legislature further finds that the continued allocation of substantial public resources to capital trials and appeals can no longer be sustained. The legislature finds that these resources would be better directed toward maintaining the state's criminal justice system, and concludes that the aims of justice will be served by forever confining to our state's correctional system those whose heinous crimes may formerly have qualified them for the death penalty.

Sec. 2   RCW 10.95.030 and 1993 c 479 s 1 are each amended to read as follows:
     (((1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section,)) Any person convicted of the crime of aggravated first degree murder shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of release or parole. A person sentenced to life imprisonment under this section shall not have that sentence suspended, deferred, or commuted by any judicial officer and the indeterminate sentence review board or its successor may not parole such prisoner nor reduce the period of confinement in any manner whatsoever including but not limited to any sort of good-time calculation. The department of social and health services or its successor or any executive official may not permit such prisoner to participate in any sort of release or furlough program.
     (((2) If, pursuant to a special sentencing proceeding held under RCW 10.95.050, the trier of fact finds that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency, the sentence shall be death. In no case, however, shall a person be sentenced to death if the person was mentally retarded at the time the crime was committed, under the definition of mental retardation set forth in (a) of this subsection. A diagnosis of mental retardation shall be documented by a licensed psychiatrist or licensed psychologist designated by the court, who is an expert in the diagnosis and evaluation of mental retardation. The defense must establish mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence and the court must make a finding as to the existence of mental retardation.
     (a) "Mentally retarded" means the individual has: (i) Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning; (ii) existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior; and (iii) both significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning and deficits in adaptive behavior were manifested during the developmental period.
     (b) "General intellectual functioning" means the results obtained by assessment with one or more of the individually administered general intelligence tests developed for the purpose of assessing intellectual functioning.
     (c) "Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning" means intelligence quotient seventy or below.
     (d) "Adaptive behavior" means the effectiveness or degree with which individuals meet the standards of personal independence and social responsibility expected for his or her age.
     (e) "Developmental period" means the period of time between conception and the eighteenth birthday.
))

NEW SECTION.  Sec. 3   An inmate sentenced to death prior to the effective date of this act, upon motion to the sentencing court, shall be resentenced to a term of life imprisonment without possibility of release or parole. If an inmate sentenced to death prior to the effective date of this act fails to file a motion under this section within sixty days of the effective date of this act, the department of corrections shall file a motion with the sentencing court to resentence the inmate to a term of life imprisonment without possibility of release or parole.

NEW SECTION.  Sec. 4   The following acts or parts of acts are each repealed:
     (1) RCW 10.95.040 (Special sentencing proceeding -- Notice -- Filing--Service) and 1981 c 138 s 4;
     (2) RCW 10.95.050 (Special sentencing proceeding -- When held -- Jury to decide matters presented -- Waiver -- Reconvening same jury -- Impanelling new jury -- Peremptory challenges) and 1981 c 138 s 5;
     (3) RCW 10.95.060 (Special sentencing proceeding -- Jury instructions -- Opening statements -- Evidence -- Arguments -- Question for jury) and 1981 c 138 s 6;
     (4) RCW 10.95.070 (Special sentencing proceeding -- Factors which jury may consider in deciding whether leniency merited) and 1993 c 479 s 2 & 1981 c 138 s 7;
     (5) RCW 10.95.080 (When sentence to death or sentence to life imprisonment shall be imposed) and 1981 c 138 s 8;
     (6) RCW 10.95.090 (Sentence if death sentence commuted, held invalid, or if death sentence established by chapter held invalid) and 1981 c 138 s 9;
     (7) RCW 10.95.100 (Mandatory review of death sentence by supreme court -- Notice -- Transmittal -- Contents of notice -- Jurisdiction) and 1981 c 138 s 10;
     (8) RCW 10.95.110 (Verbatim report of trial proceedings--Preparation -- Transmittal to supreme court -- Clerk's papers -- Receipt) and 1981 c 138 s 11;
     (9) RCW 10.95.120 (Information report -- Form -- Contents -- Submission to supreme court, defendant, prosecuting attorney) and 1981 c 138 s 12;
     (10) RCW 10.95.130 (Questions posed for determination by supreme court in death sentence review -- Review in addition to appeal--Consolidation of review and appeal) and 1993 c 479 s 3 & 1981 c 138 s 13;
     (11) RCW 10.95.140 (Invalidation of sentence, remand for resentencing -- Affirmation of sentence, remand for execution) and 1993 c 479 s 4 & 1981 c 138 s 14;
     (12) RCW 10.95.150 (Time limit for appellate review of death sentence and filing opinion) and 1988 c 202 s 17 & 1981 c 138 s 15;
     (13) RCW 10.95.160 (Death warrant -- Issuance -- Form -- Time for execution of judgment and sentence) and 1990 c 263 s 1 & 1981 c 138 s 16;
     (14) RCW 10.95.170 (Imprisonment of defendant) and 1983 c 255 s 1 & 1981 c 138 s 17;
     (15) RCW 10.95.180 (Death penalty -- How executed) and 1996 c 251 s 1, 1986 c 194 s 1, & 1981 c 138 s 18;
     (16) RCW 10.95.185 (Witnesses) and 1999 c 332 s 1 & 1993 c 463 s 2;
     (17) RCW 10.95.190 (Death warrant -- Record -- Return to trial court) and 1981 c 138 s 19;
     (18) RCW 10.95.200 (Proceedings for failure to execute on day named) and 1990 c 263 s 2, 1987 c 286 s 1, & 1981 c 138 s 20; and
     (19) RCW 10.95.900 (Severability -- 1981 c 138) and 1981 c 138 s 22.

NEW SECTION.  Sec. 5   This act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, or support of the state government and its existing public institutions, and takes effect immediately.

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