BILL REQ. #: H-1278.2
State of Washington | 61st Legislature | 2009 Regular Session |
Read first time 02/02/09. Referred to Committee on Judiciary.
AN ACT Relating to reducing criminal justice expenses by eliminating the death penalty in favor of life incarceration; amending RCW 10.95.030; creating new sections; repealing RCW 10.95.040, 10.95.050, 10.95.060, 10.95.070, 10.95.080, 10.95.090, 10.95.100, 10.95.110, 10.95.120, 10.95.130, 10.95.140, 10.95.150, 10.95.160, 10.95.170, 10.95.180, 10.95.185, 10.95.190, 10.95.200, and 10.95.900; and declaring an emergency.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON:
NEW SECTION. Sec. 1 (1) The legislature recognizes that
questions about the administration of the death penalty in Washington
have existed since a 2003 plea bargain for Gary Leon Ridgway, the
acknowledged murderer of forty-eight women. In a March 30, 2006,
decision, the Washington supreme court was divided five to four over
whether Washington's capital punishment system is applied fairly. The
five justice majority concluded that the fact that Ridgway "will live
out his life in prison instead of facing the death penalty has caused
many in our community to seriously question whether the death penalty
can, in fairness, be proportional when applied to any other defendant
. . . it is a question best left to the people and to their elected
representatives in the Legislature." The four justice dissent
reasoned, after review of Washington's death penalty statute over the
twenty-five years of its existence, that "the death penalty is like
lightning, randomly striking some defendants and not others," and
concluded that "no rational explanation exists to explain why some
individuals escape the penalty of death and others do not."
(2) The legislature finds that historically most death sentences
imposed in Washington have been reversed and the death sentence has
been rarely imposed. In light of the very substantial pressures that
exist upon the criminal justice system, the legislature further finds
that the continued allocation of substantial public resources to
capital trials and appeals can no longer be sustained. The legislature
finds that these resources would be better directed toward maintaining
the state's criminal justice system, and concludes that the aims of
justice will be served by forever confining to our state's correctional
system those whose heinous crimes may formerly have qualified them for
the death penalty.
Sec. 2 RCW 10.95.030 and 1993 c 479 s 1 are each amended to read
as follows:
(((1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section,)) Any
person convicted of the crime of aggravated first degree murder shall
be sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of release or
parole. A person sentenced to life imprisonment under this section
shall not have that sentence suspended, deferred, or commuted by any
judicial officer and the indeterminate sentence review board or its
successor may not parole such prisoner nor reduce the period of
confinement in any manner whatsoever including but not limited to any
sort of good-time calculation. The department of social and health
services or its successor or any executive official may not permit such
prisoner to participate in any sort of release or furlough program.
(((2) If, pursuant to a special sentencing proceeding held under
RCW 10.95.050, the trier of fact finds that there are not sufficient
mitigating circumstances to merit leniency, the sentence shall be
death. In no case, however, shall a person be sentenced to death if
the person was mentally retarded at the time the crime was committed,
under the definition of mental retardation set forth in (a) of this
subsection. A diagnosis of mental retardation shall be documented by
a licensed psychiatrist or licensed psychologist designated by the
court, who is an expert in the diagnosis and evaluation of mental
retardation. The defense must establish mental retardation by a
preponderance of the evidence and the court must make a finding as to
the existence of mental retardation.))
(a) "Mentally retarded" means the individual has: (i)
Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning; (ii)
existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior; and (iii)
both significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning and
deficits in adaptive behavior were manifested during the developmental
period.
(b) "General intellectual functioning" means the results obtained
by assessment with one or more of the individually administered general
intelligence tests developed for the purpose of assessing intellectual
functioning.
(c) "Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning"
means intelligence quotient seventy or below.
(d) "Adaptive behavior" means the effectiveness or degree with
which individuals meet the standards of personal independence and
social responsibility expected for his or her age.
(e) "Developmental period" means the period of time between
conception and the eighteenth birthday.
NEW SECTION. Sec. 3 An inmate sentenced to death prior to the
effective date of this act, upon motion to the sentencing court, shall
be resentenced to a term of life imprisonment without possibility of
release or parole. If an inmate sentenced to death prior to the
effective date of this act fails to file a motion under this section
within sixty days of the effective date of this act, the department of
corrections shall file a motion with the sentencing court to resentence
the inmate to a term of life imprisonment without possibility of
release or parole.
NEW SECTION. Sec. 4 The following acts or parts of acts are each
repealed:
(1) RCW 10.95.040 (Special sentencing proceeding -- Notice -- Filing--Service) and 1981 c 138 s 4;
(2) RCW 10.95.050 (Special sentencing proceeding -- When held -- Jury
to decide matters presented -- Waiver -- Reconvening same jury -- Impanelling
new jury -- Peremptory challenges) and 1981 c 138 s 5;
(3) RCW 10.95.060 (Special sentencing proceeding -- Jury
instructions -- Opening statements -- Evidence -- Arguments -- Question for
jury) and 1981 c 138 s 6;
(4) RCW 10.95.070 (Special sentencing proceeding -- Factors which
jury may consider in deciding whether leniency merited) and 1993 c 479
s 2 & 1981 c 138 s 7;
(5) RCW 10.95.080 (When sentence to death or sentence to life
imprisonment shall be imposed) and 1981 c 138 s 8;
(6) RCW 10.95.090 (Sentence if death sentence commuted, held
invalid, or if death sentence established by chapter held invalid) and
1981 c 138 s 9;
(7) RCW 10.95.100 (Mandatory review of death sentence by supreme
court -- Notice -- Transmittal -- Contents of notice -- Jurisdiction) and 1981
c 138 s 10;
(8) RCW 10.95.110 (Verbatim report of trial proceedings--Preparation -- Transmittal to supreme court -- Clerk's papers -- Receipt) and
1981 c 138 s 11;
(9) RCW 10.95.120 (Information report -- Form -- Contents -- Submission
to supreme court, defendant, prosecuting attorney) and 1981 c 138 s 12;
(10) RCW 10.95.130 (Questions posed for determination by supreme
court in death sentence review -- Review in addition to appeal--Consolidation of review and appeal) and 1993 c 479 s 3 & 1981 c 138 s
13;
(11) RCW 10.95.140 (Invalidation of sentence, remand for
resentencing -- Affirmation of sentence, remand for execution) and 1993
c 479 s 4 & 1981 c 138 s 14;
(12) RCW 10.95.150 (Time limit for appellate review of death
sentence and filing opinion) and 1988 c 202 s 17 & 1981 c 138 s 15;
(13) RCW 10.95.160 (Death warrant -- Issuance -- Form -- Time for
execution of judgment and sentence) and 1990 c 263 s 1 & 1981 c 138 s
16;
(14) RCW 10.95.170 (Imprisonment of defendant) and 1983 c 255 s 1
& 1981 c 138 s 17;
(15) RCW 10.95.180 (Death penalty -- How executed) and 1996 c 251 s
1, 1986 c 194 s 1, & 1981 c 138 s 18;
(16) RCW 10.95.185 (Witnesses) and 1999 c 332 s 1 & 1993 c 463 s 2;
(17) RCW 10.95.190 (Death warrant -- Record -- Return to trial court)
and 1981 c 138 s 19;
(18) RCW 10.95.200 (Proceedings for failure to execute on day
named) and 1990 c 263 s 2, 1987 c 286 s 1, & 1981 c 138 s 20; and
(19) RCW 10.95.900 (Severability -- 1981 c 138) and 1981 c 138 s 22.
NEW SECTION. Sec. 5 This act is necessary for the immediate
preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, or support of the
state government and its existing public institutions, and takes effect
immediately.