ENGROSSED SUBSTITUTE HOUSE BILL 2406

State of Washington 65th Legislature 2018 Regular Session

By House State Government, Elections & Information Technology (originally sponsored by Representatives Hudgins, Stanford, and Ormsby)

READ FIRST TIME 01/25/18.

- AN ACT Relating to ensuring the integrity of elections through 1 2 security practices around auditing strengthening election 3 amending RCW 29A.60.185, 29A.60.170, equipment; 29A.40.100, 29A.60.125, and 4 29A.12.005, 29A.60.235; adding 5 sections to chapter 29A.12 RCW; and creating a new section.
- 6 BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON:
- 7 <u>NEW SECTION.</u> **Sec. 1.** It is the intent of the legislature to
- 8 ensure our elections have the utmost confidence of the citizens of
- 9 the state. In order to ensure the integrity of the elections in
- 10 Washington, the legislature wants to maximize the security benefits
- 11 of having locally run, decentralized counting systems in our state,
- 12 based in thirty-nine different counties. The legislature wants to
- 13 maximize this locally run benefit by adding options to the auditing
- 14 process for local elections administrators. Multiple jurisdictions,
- 15 with multiple options for ensuring election outcomes will increase
- 16 the transparency, integrity, and trust of our elections process.
- 17 **Sec. 2.** RCW 29A.60.185 and 2005 c 242 s 5 are each amended to 18 read as follows:
- 19 $\underline{(1)}$ Prior to certification of the election as required by RCW
- 20 29A.60.190, the county auditor shall conduct <u>a random check of the</u>

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- ballot counting equipment in accordance with RCW 29A.60.170, and an audit of duplicated ballots. The audit of duplicated ballots must involve a comparison of ballots duplicated under RCW 29A.60.125 to the original ballot. The county canvassing board must establish procedures for the auditing of duplicated ballots.
- 6 (2) In addition to the random check performed in subsection (1)
 7 of this section, the county auditor may conduct an audit using one of
 8 the following methods:

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- (a) An audit of results of votes cast on the direct recording electronic voting devices, or other in-person ballot marking systems, used in the county if there are races or issues with more than ten votes cast on all direct recording electronic voting devices or other in-person ballot marking systems in the county. This audit must be conducted by randomly selecting by lot up to four percent of the direct recording electronic voting devices or other in-person ballot marking systems, or one direct recording electronic voting device or other in-person ballot marking system, whichever is greater, and, for each device or system, comparing the results recorded electronically with the results recorded on paper. For purposes of this audit, the results recorded on paper must be tabulated as follows: On one-fourth of the devices or systems selected for audit, the paper records must be tabulated manually; on the remaining devices or systems, the paper records may be tabulated by a mechanical device determined by the secretary of state to be capable of accurately reading the votes cast and printed thereon and qualified for use in the state under applicable state and federal laws. Three races or issues, randomly selected by lot, must be audited on each device or system. This audit procedure must be subject to observation by political representatives if representatives have been appointed and are present at the time of the audit. As used in this subsection, "inperson ballot marking system" or "system" means an in-person ballot marking system that retains or produces a voting record of each vote cast using the system;
- (b) A risk-limiting audit. A "risk-limiting audit" means an audit protocol that makes use of statistical principles and methods and is designed to limit the risk of certifying an incorrect election outcome. The secretary of state shall:
- (i) Set the risk limit. A "risk limit" means the largest statistical probability that an incorrect reported tabulation outcome is not detected in a risk-limiting audit;

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- (ii) Randomly select for audit at least one statewide contest, and for each county at least one ballot contest other than the selected statewide contest. The county auditor shall randomly select a ballot contest for audit if in any particular election there is no statewide contest; and
- (iii) Establish procedures for implementation of risk-limiting audits, including random selection of the audit sample, determination of audit size, and procedures for a comparison risk-limiting audit and ballot polling risk-limiting audit as defined in (b)(iii)(A) and (B) of this subsection.
- 11 (A) In a comparison risk-limiting audit, the county auditor
 12 compares the voter markings on randomly selected ballots to the
 13 ballot-level cast vote record produced by the ballot counting
 14 equipment.
 - (B) In a ballot polling risk-limiting audit, the county auditor of a county using ballot counting equipment that does not produce ballot-level cast vote records reports the voter markings on randomly selected ballots until the prespecified risk limit is met; or
 - (c) An independent electronic audit of the original ballot counting equipment used in the county. The county auditor may either conduct an audit of all ballots cast, or limit the audit to three precincts or six batches pursuant to procedures adopted under RCW 29A.60.170(3). This audit must be conducted using an independent electronic audit system that is, at minimum:
 - (i) Approved by the secretary of state;

- (ii) Completely independent from all voting systems, including
 ballot counting equipment, that is used in the county;
- 28 <u>(iii) Distributed or manufactured by a vendor different from the</u> 29 <u>vendor that distributed or manufactured the original ballot counting</u> 30 equipment; and
- 31 <u>(iv) Capable of demonstrating that it can verify and confirm the</u>
 32 <u>accuracy of the original ballot counting equipment's reported</u>
 33 results.
 - (3) For each audit method, the secretary of state must adopt procedures for expanding the audit to include additional ballots when an audit results in a discrepancy. The procedure must specify under what circumstances a discrepancy will lead to an audit of additional ballots, and the method to determine how many additional ballots will be selected. The secretary of state shall adopt procedures to

40 investigate the cause of any discrepancy found during an audit.

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- 1 (4) The secretary of state must establish rules by January 1,
 2 2019, to implement and administer the auditing methods in this
 3 section, including facilitating public observation and reporting
 4 requirements.
 - (5) The county auditor must develop methods to regularly audit electronic ballot return systems to ensure accuracy when one hundred or more ballots in any election have been returned electronically by voters who are not overseas voters or service voters.

- **Sec. 3.** RCW 29A.60.170 and 2011 c 10 s 55 are each amended to 10 read as follows:
 - (1) At least twenty-eight days prior to any special election, general election, or primary, the county auditor shall request from the chair of the county central committee of each major political party a list of individuals who are willing to serve as observers. The county auditor has discretion to also request observers from any campaign or organization. The county auditor may delete from the lists names of those persons who indicate to the county auditor that they cannot or do not wish to serve as observers, and names of those persons who, in the judgment of the county auditor, lack the ability to properly serve as observers after training has been made available to them by the auditor.
 - (2) The counting center is under the direction of the county auditor and must be open to observation by one representative from each major political party consistent with RCW 29A.40.100, if representatives have been appointed by the respective major political parties and these representatives are present while the counting center is operating. The proceedings must be open to the public, but no persons except those employed and authorized by the county auditor may touch any ballot or ballot container or operate a vote tallying system.
- (3) A random check of the ballot counting equipment ((may)) must be conducted ((upon mutual agreement of the political party observers or at the discretion of the county auditor)) at least once per day that incoming ballots are processed until the results are certified. The first random check for each day must occur when the first set of ballots are processed through the ballot counting equipment. The random check procedures must be adopted by the county canvassing board, and consistent with rules adopted under RCW 29A.60.185(4), prior to the processing of ballots. The random check process shall

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1 involve a comparison of a manual count or electronic count if an audit under RCW 29A.60.185(2)(c) is conducted to the machine count 2 from the original ballot counting equipment and may involve, for each 3 machine, up to either three precincts or six batches depending on the 4 ballot counting procedures in place in the county, but not less than 5 6 one hundred ballots per random check. If there is not at least one 7 hundred ballots to randomly check for any given day, then a random check must be conducted for all ballots processed for that day. The 8 random check will be limited to one office or issue on the ballots in 9 the precincts or batches that are selected for the check. The 10 11 selection of the precincts or batches to be checked must be selected 12 according to procedures established by the county canvassing board ((and the check must be completed no later than forty-eight hours 13 after election day)). The random check procedures must include a 14 process, consistent with RCW 29A.60.185(3) and rules adopted under 15 RCW 29A.60.185(4), for expanding the audit to include additional 16 17 ballots when a random check conducted under this section results in a discrepancy. The procedure must specify under what circumstances a 18 discrepancy will lead to an audit of additional ballots and the 19 method to determine how many additional ballots will be selected. 20 21 Procedures adopted under RCW 29A.60.185 pertaining to investigations 22 of any discrepancy found during an audit must be followed.

23 **Sec. 4.** RCW 29A.60.110 and 2013 c 11 s 61 are each amended to 24 read as follows:

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38 39 (1) Immediately after their tabulation, all ballots counted at a ballot counting center must be sealed in containers that identify the primary or election and be retained for at least sixty days or according to federal law, whichever is longer.

(2) In the presence of major party observers who are available, ballots may be removed from the sealed containers at the elections department and consolidated into one sealed container for storage purposes. The containers may only be opened by the canvassing board as part of the canvass, to conduct recounts, to conduct a random check under RCW 29A.60.170, to conduct an audit under RCW 29A.60.185, or by order of the superior court in a contest or election dispute. If the canvassing board opens a ballot container, it shall make a full record of the additional tabulation or examination made of the ballots. This record must be added to any other record of the

canvassing process in that county.

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- 1 **Sec. 5.** RCW 29A.12.005 and 2013 c 11 s 21 are each amended to 2 read as follows:
- 3 As used in this chapter, "voting system" means:
- 4 (1) The total combination of mechanical, electromechanical, or 5 electronic equipment including, but not limited to, the software, 6 firmware, and documentation required to program, control, and support 7 the equipment, that is used:
 - (a) To define ballots;

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- (b) To cast and count votes;
- 10 (c) To report or display election results from the voting system;
 11 ((and))
- 12 (d) To maintain and produce any audit trail information; and
- (e) To perform an audit under RCW 29A.60.185; and
- 14 (2) The practices and associated documentation used:
- 15 (a) To identify system components and versions of such 16 components;
 - (b) To test the system during its development and maintenance;
 - (c) To maintain records of system errors and defects;
- 19 (d) To determine specific system changes to be made to a system 20 after the initial qualification of the system; and
- 21 (e) To make available any materials to the voter such as notices, 22 instructions, forms, or paper ballots.
- NEW SECTION. Sec. 6. A new section is added to chapter 29A.12 24 RCW to read as follows:
- 25 (1) A manufacturer or distributor of a voting system or component 26 of a voting system that is certified by the secretary of state under 27 RCW 29A.12.020 shall disclose to the secretary of state and attorney 28 general any breach of the security of its system immediately 29 following discovery of the breach if:
- 30 (a) The breach has, or is reasonably likely to have, compromised 31 the security, confidentiality, or integrity of an election in any 32 state; or
- 33 (b) Personal information of residents in any state was, or is 34 reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person 35 as a result of the breach and the personal information was not 36 secured. For purposes of this subsection, "personal information" has 37 the meaning given in RCW 19.255.010.

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- 1 (2) Notification under subsection (1) of this section must be 2 made in the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable 3 delay.
- 4 <u>NEW SECTION.</u> **Sec. 7.** A new section is added to chapter 29A.12 5 RCW to read as follows:
- (1) The secretary of state may decertify a voting system or any component of a voting system and withdraw authority for its future use or sale in the state if, at any time after certification, the secretary of state determines that:
- 10 (a) The system or component fails to meet the standards set forth 11 in applicable federal guidelines;
- 12 (b) The system or component was materially misrepresented in the certification application;
- 14 (c) The applicant has installed unauthorized modifications to the certified software or hardware; or
- 16 (d) Any other reason authorized by rule adopted by the secretary 17 of state.
- 18 (2) The secretary of state may decertify a voting system or any 19 component of a voting system and withdraw authority for its future 20 use or sale in the state if the manufacturer or distributor of the 21 voting system or component thereof fails to comply with the 22 notification requirements of section 6 of this act.
- 23 **Sec. 8.** RCW 29A.40.100 and 2011 c 10 s 40 are each amended to 24 read as follows:

25 County auditors must request that observers be appointed by the 26 major political parties to be present during the processing of 27 ballots at the counting center and other locations where incoming ballots are handled or processed by election officials. County 28 29 auditors have discretion to also request that observers be appointed 30 by any campaigns or organizations. Appointed observers must be allowed access to view each stage of processing of incoming ballots 31 including, but not limited to: Postelection audits conducted under 32 RCW 29A.60.185 and 29A.60.170, removal of ballots from drop boxes, 33 opening and sorting of ballots, signature verification, envelope 34 review, ballot review, scanning, tabulation, and adjudication 35 including duplication of ballots pursuant to RCW 29A.60.125. The 36 37 absence of the observers will not prevent the processing of ballots

if the county auditor has requested their presence.

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1 **Sec. 9.** RCW 29A.60.125 and 2005 c 243 s 10 are each amended to 2 read as follows:

If inspection of the ballot reveals a physically damaged ballot 3 or ballot that may be otherwise unreadable or uncountable by the 4 tabulating system, the county auditor may refer the ballot to the 5 б county canvassing board or duplicate the ballot if so authorized by the county canvassing board. The voter's original ballot may not be 7 altered. A ballot may be duplicated only if the intent of the voter's 8 marks on the ballot is clear and the electronic voting equipment 9 might not otherwise properly tally the ballot to reflect the intent 10 11 of the voter. Ballots must be duplicated by teams of two or more people working together. When duplicating ballots, the county auditor 12 13 shall take the following steps to create and maintain an audit trail 14 of the action taken:

- 15 (1) Each original ballot and duplicate ballot must be assigned 16 the same unique control number, with the number being marked upon the 17 face of each ballot, to ensure that each duplicate ballot may be tied 18 back to the original ballot;
- 19 (2) A log must be kept of the ballots duplicated, which must at 20 least include:
- 21 (a) The control number of each original ballot and the 22 corresponding duplicate ballot;
- 23 (b) The initials of at least two people who participated in the 24 duplication of each ballot; and
- 25 (c) The total number of ballots duplicated.
- Original and duplicate ballots must be sealed in secure storage at all times, except during duplication, inspection by the canvassing board, ((ex)) tabulation, or to conduct an audit under RCW 29 29A.60.185.
- 30 **Sec. 10.** RCW 29A.60.235 and 2017 c 300 s 1 are each amended to 31 read as follows:
- 32 (1) The county auditor shall prepare at the time of certification 33 an election reconciliation report that discloses the following 34 information:
- 35 (a) The number of registered voters;
 - (b) The number of ballots issued;
- 37 (c) The number of ballots received;
- 38 (d) The number of ballots counted;

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39 (e) The number of ballots rejected;

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- 1 (f) The number of provisional ballots issued;
- 2 (g) The number of provisional ballots received;
- 3 (h) The number of provisional ballots counted;
- 4 (i) The number of provisional ballots rejected;
- 5 (j) The number of federal write-in ballots received;
- 6 (k) The number of federal write-in ballots counted;
- 7 (1) The number of federal write-in ballots rejected;
- 8 (m) The number of overseas and service ballots issued by mail, 9 email, web site link, or facsimile;
- 10 (n) The number of overseas and service ballots received by mail, 11 email, or facsimile;
- 12 (o) The number of overseas and service ballots counted by mail, 13 email, or facsimile;
- 14 (p) The number of overseas and service ballots rejected by mail, 15 email, or facsimile;
- 16 (q) The number of nonoverseas and nonservice ballots sent by 17 email, web site link, or facsimile;
- 18 (r) The number of nonoverseas and nonservice ballots received by email or facsimile;
- 20 (s) The number of nonoverseas and nonservice ballots that were 21 rejected for:
- 22 (i) Failing to send an original or hard copy of the ballot by the 23 certification deadline; or
 - (ii) Any other reason, including the reason for rejection;
 - (t) The number of voters credited with voting; ((and))
 - (u) The number of replacement ballots requested;
- 27 (v) The number of replacement ballots issued;

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- 28 <u>(w) The number of replacement ballots received;</u>
- 29 (x) The number of replacement ballots counted;
- 30 (y) The number of replacement ballots rejected; and
- 31 <u>(z)</u> Any other information the auditor or secretary of state deems 32 necessary to reconcile the number of ballots counted with the number 33 of voters credited with voting, and to maintain an audit trail.
 - (2) The county auditor must make the report available to the public at the auditor's office and must publish the report on the auditor's web site at the time of certification. The county auditor must submit the report to the secretary of state at the time of certification in any form determined by the secretary of state.
- 39 (3)(a) The secretary of state must collect the reconciliation 40 reports from each county auditor and prepare a statewide

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reconciliation report for each state primary and general election.
The report may be produced in a form determined by the secretary that includes the information as described in this subsection (3). The

4 report must be prepared and published on the secretary of state's web 5 site within two months after the last county's election results have

6 been certified.

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- (b) The state report must include a comparison among counties on rates of votes received, counted, and rejected, including provisional, write-in, overseas ballots, and ballots transmitted electronically. The comparison information may be in the form of rankings, percentages, or other relevant quantifiable data that can be used to measure performance and trends.
- 13 (c) The state report must also include an analysis of the data 14 that can be used to develop a better understanding of election 15 administration and policy. The analysis must combine data, as 16 available, over multiple years to provide broader comparisons and 17 trends regarding voter registration and turnout and ballot counting. 18 The analysis must incorporate national election statistics to the

extent such information is available.

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