SENATE BILL 6202

State of Washington 65th Legislature 2018 Regular Session

By Senators Liias, Miloscia, Hunt, and Keiser

Read first time 01/10/18. Referred to Committee on State Government, Tribal Relations & Elections.

- AN ACT Relating to ensuring the integrity of elections through strengthening election security practices around auditing and equipment; amending RCW 29A.60.185, 29A.60.170, 29A.60.110, and 29A.12.005; adding new sections to chapter 29A.12 RCW; and creating a new section.
- 6 BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON:
- 7 NEW SECTION. Sec. 1. It is the intent of the legislature to ensure our elections have the utmost confidence of the citizens of 8 the state. In order to ensure the integrity of the elections in 9 Washington, the legislature wants to maximize the security benefits 10 11 of having locally run, decentralized counting systems in our state, based in thirty-nine different counties. The legislature wants to 12 13 maximize this locally run benefit by adding options to the auditing 14 process for local elections administrators. Multiple jurisdictions, with multiple options for ensuring election outcomes will increase 15 16 the transparency, integrity, and trust of our elections process.
- 17 **Sec. 2.** RCW 29A.60.185 and 2005 c 242 s 5 are each amended to 18 read as follows:

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(1) Prior to certification of the election as required by RCW 29A.60.190, the county auditor shall conduct an audit using at minimum one of the following methods:

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- (a) An audit of results of votes cast on the direct recording 4 electronic voting devices, or other in-person ballot marking systems, 5 6 used in the county if there are races or issues with more than ten votes cast on all direct recording electronic voting devices or other 7 in-person ballot marking systems in the county, or the number of 8 votes cast on the devices or systems is statistically significant in 9 10 relation to the election result. This audit must be conducted by randomly selecting by lot up to four percent of the direct recording 11 electronic voting devices or other in-person ballot marking systems, 12 or one direct recording electronic voting device or other in-person 13 ballot marking system, whichever is greater, and, for each device or 14 system, comparing the results recorded electronically with the 15 16 results recorded on paper. For purposes of this audit, the results 17 recorded on paper must be tabulated as follows: On one-fourth of the devices or systems selected for audit, the paper records must be 18 19 tabulated manually; on the remaining devices or systems, the paper records may be tabulated by a mechanical device determined by the 20 21 secretary of state to be capable of accurately reading the votes cast 22 and printed thereon and qualified for use in the state under applicable state and federal laws. Three races or issues, randomly 23 selected by lot, must be audited on each device or system. This audit 24 25 procedure must be subject to observation by political party 26 representatives if representatives have been appointed and are present at the time of the audit: 27
- 28 <u>(b) A random check of the ballot counting equipment consistent</u>
 29 <u>with RCW 29A.60.170(3);</u>
- 30 (c) A risk-limiting audit. A "risk-limiting audit" means an audit
 31 protocol that makes use of statistical principles and methods and is
 32 designed to limit the risk of certifying an incorrect election
 33 outcome. The secretary of state shall:
- (i) Set the risk limit. A "risk limit" means the largest statistical probability that an incorrect reported tabulation outcome is not detected in a risk-limiting audit;
- (ii) Select for audit at least one statewide contest, and for
 each county at least one ballot contest other than the selected
 statewide contest. The secretary of state shall select other ballot

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1 <u>contests for audit if in any particular election there is no</u> 2 statewide contest; and

- (iii) Establish procedures for implementation of risk-limiting audits, including random selection of the audit sample, determination of audit size, and procedures for a comparison risk-limiting audit and ballot polling risk-limiting audit as defined in (c)(iii)(A) and (B) of this subsection.
- 8 (A) In a comparison risk-limiting audit, the county auditor
 9 compares the voter markings on randomly selected ballots to the
 10 ballot-level cast vote record produced by the ballot counting
 11 equipment.
 - (B) In a ballot polling risk-limiting audit, the county auditor of a county using ballot counting equipment that does not produce ballot-level cast vote records reports the voter markings on randomly selected ballots until the prespecified risk limit is met; or
 - (d) An independent electronic audit of the original ballot counting equipment used in the county. The county auditor may either conduct an audit of all ballots cast, or limit the audit to three precincts or six batches pursuant to procedures adopted under RCW 29A.60.170(3). This audit must be conducted using an independent electronic audit system that is, at minimum:
 - (i) Approved by the secretary of state;

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- 23 <u>(ii) Completely independent from all voting systems, including</u>
 24 ballot counting equipment, that is used in the county;
 - (iii) Distributed or manufactured by a vendor different from the vendor that distributed or manufactured the original ballot counting equipment; and
- (iv) Capable of demonstrating that it can verify and confirm the accuracy of the original ballot counting equipment's reported results.
 - (2) For each audit method, the secretary of state must adopt procedures for expanding the audit to include additional ballots when an audit results in a discrepancy. The procedure must specify under what circumstances a discrepancy will lead to an audit of additional ballots, and the method to determine how many additional ballots will be selected.
- 37 (3) At the discretion of the county auditor or upon a written 38 request of a candidate, an officer of a political party, or any group 39 of five or more registered voters, an additional number of ballots 40 may be audited to supplement the audits conducted under this section.

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- An application for a supplemental audit must be filed with the officer with whom filings are made for the jurisdiction. The person filing an application for a supplemental audit is subject to the same cost structure as for recounts under RCW 29A.64.030 and 29A.64.081.

 The secretary of state shall determine the initial number of additional ballots that may be audited. If a discrepancy is found
- 7 <u>after a supplemental audit is performed, procedures adopted under</u>
- 8 <u>subsection (2) of this section must be followed.</u>

- 9 (4) The secretary of state must establish rules by January 1,
 10 2019, to implement and administer the auditing methods in this
 11 section, including facilitating public observation and reporting
 12 requirements.
- **Sec. 3.** RCW 29A.60.170 and 2011 c 10 s 55 are each amended to 14 read as follows:
 - (1) At least twenty-eight days prior to any special election, general election, or primary, the county auditor shall request from the chair of the county central committee of each major political party a list of individuals who are willing to serve as observers. The county auditor has discretion to also request observers from any campaign or organization. The county auditor may delete from the lists names of those persons who indicate to the county auditor that they cannot or do not wish to serve as observers, and names of those persons who, in the judgment of the county auditor, lack the ability to properly serve as observers after training has been made available to them by the auditor.
 - (2) The counting center is under the direction of the county auditor and must be open to observation by one representative from each major political party, if representatives have been appointed by the respective major political parties and these representatives are present while the counting center is operating. The proceedings must be open to the public, but no persons except those employed and authorized by the county auditor may touch any ballot or ballot container or operate a vote tallying system.
 - (3) A random check of the ballot counting equipment may be conducted upon mutual agreement of the political party observers or at the discretion of the county auditor. The random check procedures must be adopted by the county canvassing board, and consistent with rules adopted under RCW 29A.60.185(4), prior to the processing of ballots. The random check process shall involve a comparison of a

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- manual count or electronic count if an audit under RCW 1 29A.60.185(1)(d) is conducted to the machine count from the original 2 3 ballot counting equipment and may involve up to either three precincts or six batches depending on the ballot counting procedures 4 in place in the county. The random check will be limited to one 5 6 office or issue on the ballots in the precincts or batches that are 7 selected for the check. The selection of the precincts or batches to be checked must be selected according to procedures established by 8 the county canvassing board ((and)). The random check procedures must 9 include a process, consistent with RCW 29A.60.185(2) and rules 10 adopted under RCW 29A.60.185(4), for expanding the audit to include 11 12 additional ballots when a random check conducted under this section results in a discrepancy. The procedure must specify under what 13 circumstances a discrepancy will lead to an audit of additional 14 ballots and the method to determine how many additional ballots will 15 16 be selected. The check must be completed no later than forty-eight 17 hours after election day.
- 18 **Sec. 4.** RCW 29A.60.110 and 2013 c 11 s 61 are each amended to 19 read as follows:

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- (1) Immediately after their tabulation, all ballots counted at a ballot counting center must be sealed in containers that identify the primary or election and be retained for at least sixty days or according to federal law, whichever is longer.
- (2) In the presence of major party observers who are available, ballots may be removed from the sealed containers at the elections department and consolidated into one sealed container for storage purposes. The containers may only be opened by the canvassing board as part of the canvass, to conduct recounts, to conduct a random check under RCW 29A.60.170, to conduct an audit under RCW 29A.60.185, or by order of the superior court in a contest or election dispute. If the canvassing board opens a ballot container, it shall make a full record of the additional tabulation or examination made of the ballots. This record must be added to any other record of the
- 35 **Sec. 5.** RCW 29A.12.005 and 2013 c 11 s 21 are each amended to 36 read as follows:
 - As used in this chapter, "voting system" means:

canvassing process in that county.

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- 1 (1) The total combination of mechanical, electromechanical, or 2 electronic equipment including, but not limited to, the software, 3 firmware, and documentation required to program, control, and support 4 the equipment, that is used:
 - (a) To define ballots;

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- (b) To cast and count votes;
- 7 (c) To report or display election results from the voting system; 8 ((and))
 - (d) To maintain and produce any audit trail information; and
 - (e) To perform an audit under RCW 29A.60.185; and
 - (2) The practices and associated documentation used:
- 12 (a) To identify system components and versions of such 13 components;
 - (b) To test the system during its development and maintenance;
- 15 (c) To maintain records of system errors and defects;
- 16 (d) To determine specific system changes to be made to a system 17 after the initial qualification of the system; and
- 18 (e) To make available any materials to the voter such as notices, 19 instructions, forms, or paper ballots.
- NEW SECTION. Sec. 6. A new section is added to chapter 29A.12 RCW to read as follows:
- 22 (1) A manufacturer or distributor of a voting system or component 23 of a voting system that is certified by the secretary of state under 24 RCW 29A.12.020 shall disclose to the secretary of state and attorney 25 general any breach of the security of its system immediately 26 following discovery of the breach if:
- 27 (a) The breach has, or is reasonably likely to have, compromised 28 the security, confidentiality, or integrity of an election in any 29 state; or
- 30 (b) Personal information of residents in any state was, or is 31 reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person 32 as a result of the breach and the personal information was not 33 secured. For purposes of this subsection, "personal information" has 34 the meaning given in RCW 19.255.010.
- 35 (2) Notification under subsection (1) of this section must be 36 made in the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable 37 delay.

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NEW SECTION. Sec. 7. A new section is added to chapter 29A.12 1 RCW to read as follows:

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- (1) The secretary of state may decertify a voting system or any component of a voting system and withdraw authority for its future use or sale in the state if, at any time after certification, the secretary of state determines it no longer conforms with the requirements of this title, applicable rules adopted in accordance with this title, or generally accepted safety requirements.
- (2) The secretary of state must decertify a voting system or any component of a voting system and withdraw authority for its future use or sale in the state if the manufacturer or distributor of the voting system or component thereof fails to comply with the notification requirements of section 6 of this act.

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