5339 AMH MAYC H2788.1
SB 5339 - H AMD 704
By Representative Maycumber
NOT CONSIDERED 12/23/2019
On page 1, line 11, after "in" strike all material through "of" and insert "subsections (2) and (3) of"
On page 2, line 3, after "(2)" strike all material through "(3)))" on line 33 and insert "If a person is convicted of the crime of aggravated first degree murder based on the aggravating circumstance under RCW 10.95.020(15), ((pursuant to)) a special sentencing proceeding is held under RCW 10.95.050, and the trier of fact finds that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency, the sentence shall be death. In no case, however, shall a person be sentenced to death if the person had an intellectual disability at the time the crime was committed, under the definition of intellectual disability set forth in (a) of this subsection. A diagnosis of intellectual disability shall be documented by a licensed psychiatrist or licensed psychologist designated by the court, who is an expert in the diagnosis and evaluation of intellectual disabilities. The defense must establish an intellectual disability by a preponderance of the evidence and the court must make a finding as to the existence of an intellectual disability.
(a) "Intellectual disability" means the individual has: (i) Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning; (ii) existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior; and (iii) both significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning and deficits in adaptive behavior were manifested during the developmental period.
(b) "General intellectual functioning" means the results obtained by assessment with one or more of the individually administered general intelligence tests developed for the purpose of assessing intellectual functioning.
(c) "Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning" means intelligence quotient seventy or below.
(d) "Adaptive behavior" means the effectiveness or degree with which individuals meet the standards of personal independence and social responsibility expected for his or her age.
(e) "Developmental period" means the period of time between conception and the eighteenth birthday.
(3)"
Beginning on page 4, line 38, strike all of section 2 and insert the following:
Sec. 2. "RCW 10.95.040 and 1981 c 138 s 4 are each amended to read as follows:
(1) If a person is charged with aggravated first degree murder ((as defined by))based on the aggravating circumstance under RCW 10.95.020(15), the prosecuting attorney shall file written notice of a special sentencing proceeding to determine whether or not the death penalty should be imposed when there is reason to believe that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency.
(2) The notice of special sentencing proceeding shall be filed and served on the defendant or the defendant's attorney within thirty days after the defendant's arraignment upon the charge of aggravated first degree murder unless the court, for good cause shown, extends or reopens the period for filing and service of the notice. Except with the consent of the prosecuting attorney, during the period in which the prosecuting attorney may file the notice of special sentencing proceeding, the defendant may not tender a plea of guilty to the charge of aggravated first degree murder nor may the court accept a plea of guilty to the charge of aggravated first degree murder or any lesser included offense.
(3) If a notice of special sentencing proceeding is not filed and served as provided in this section, the prosecuting attorney may not request the death penalty.
Sec. 3. RCW 10.95.050 and 1981 c 138 s 5 are each amended to read as follows:
(1) If a defendant is adjudicated guilty of aggravated first degree murder based on the aggravating circumstance under RCW 10.95.020(15), whether by acceptance of a plea of guilty, by verdict of a jury, or by decision of the trial court sitting without a jury, a special sentencing proceeding shall be held if a notice of special sentencing proceeding was filed and served as provided by RCW 10.95.040. No sort of plea, admission, or agreement may abrogate the requirement that a special sentencing proceeding be held.
(2) A jury shall decide the matters presented in the special sentencing proceeding unless a jury is waived in the discretion of the court and with the consent of the defendant and the prosecuting attorney.
(3) If the defendant's guilt was determined by a jury verdict, the trial court shall reconvene the same jury to hear the special sentencing proceeding. The proceeding shall commence as soon as practicable after completion of the trial at which the defendant's guilt was determined. If, however, unforeseen circumstances make it impracticable to reconvene the same jury to hear the special sentencing proceeding, the trial court may dismiss that jury and convene a jury pursuant to subsection (4) of this section.
(4) If the defendant's guilt was determined by plea of guilty or by decision of the trial court sitting without a jury, or if a retrial of the special sentencing proceeding is necessary for any reason including but not limited to a mistrial in a previous special sentencing proceeding or as a consequence of a remand from an appellate court, the trial court shall impanel a jury of twelve persons plus whatever alternate jurors the trial court deems necessary. The defense and prosecution shall each be allowed to peremptorily challenge twelve jurors. If there is more than one defendant, each defendant shall be allowed an additional peremptory challenge and the prosecution shall be allowed a like number of additional challenges. If alternate jurors are selected, the defense and prosecution shall each be allowed one peremptory challenge for each alternate juror to be selected and if there is more than one defendant each defendant shall be allowed an additional peremptory challenge for each alternate juror to be selected and the prosecution shall be allowed a like number of additional challenges.
Sec. 4. RCW 10.95.020 and 2003 c 53 s 96 are each amended to read as follows:
A person is guilty of aggravated first degree murder, a class A felony, if he or she commits first degree murder as defined by RCW 9A.32.030(1)(a), as now or hereafter amended, and one or more of the following aggravating circumstances exist:
(1) The victim was a law enforcement officer, corrections officer, or firefighter who was performing his or her official duties at the time of the act resulting in death and the victim was known or reasonably should have been known by the person to be such at the time of the killing;
(2) At the time of the act resulting in the death, the person was serving a term of imprisonment, had escaped, or was on authorized or unauthorized leave in or from a state facility or program for the incarceration or treatment of persons adjudicated guilty of crimes;
(3) At the time of the act resulting in death, the person was in custody in a county or county-city jail as a consequence of having been adjudicated guilty of a felony;
(4) The person committed the murder pursuant to an agreement that he or she would receive money or any other thing of value for committing the murder;
(5) The person solicited another person to commit the murder and had paid or had agreed to pay money or any other thing of value for committing the murder;
(6) The person committed the murder to obtain or maintain his or her membership or to advance his or her position in the hierarchy of an organization, association, or identifiable group;
(7) The murder was committed during the course of or as a result of a shooting where the discharge of the firearm, as defined in RCW 9.41.010, is either from a motor vehicle or from the immediate area of a motor vehicle that was used to transport the shooter or the firearm, or both, to the scene of the discharge;
(8) The victim was:
(a) A judge; juror or former juror; prospective, current, or former witness in an adjudicative proceeding; prosecuting attorney; deputy prosecuting attorney; defense attorney; a member of the indeterminate sentence review board; or a probation or parole officer; and
(b) The murder was related to the exercise of official duties performed or to be performed by the victim;
(9) The person committed the murder to conceal the commission of a crime or to protect or conceal the identity of any person committing a crime, including, but specifically not limited to, any attempt to avoid prosecution as a persistent offender as defined in RCW 9.94A.030;
(10) There was more than one victim and the murders were part of a common scheme or plan or the result of a single act of the person;
(11) The murder was committed in the course of, in furtherance of, or in immediate flight from one of the following crimes:
(a) Robbery in the first or second degree;
(b) Rape in the first or second degree;
(c) Burglary in the first or second degree or residential burglary;
(d) Kidnapping in the first degree; or
(e) Arson in the first degree;
(12) The victim was regularly employed or self-employed as a newsreporter and the murder was committed to obstruct or hinder the investigative, research, or reporting activities of the victim;
(13) At the time the person committed the murder, there existed a court order, issued in this or any other state, which prohibited the person from either contacting the victim, molesting the victim, or disturbing the peace of the victim, and the person had knowledge of the existence of that order;
(14) At the time the person committed the murder, the person and the victim were "family or household members" as that term is defined in RCW 10.99.020(((1)))(3), and the person had previously engaged in a pattern or practice of three or more of the following crimes committed upon the victim within a five-year period, regardless of whether a conviction resulted:
(a) Harassment as defined in RCW 9A.46.020; or
(b) Any criminal assault;
(15) The victim was pregnant."
Correct the title.
EFFECT: Expands the definition of aggravated first degree murder to include premeditated first degree murder committed against a pregnant victim.
Restores the statutory procedures for imposing the death penalty, but makes those procedures applicable only for sentencing a person convicted of aggravated first degree murder involving a pregnant victim.
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