Insurer A | Insurer B |
4% | | 4% or more |
10% | | 2% or more |
15% | | 1% or more; or |
(B) If the market is not highly concentrated and the involved insurers possess the following shares of the market:
Insurer A | Insurer B |
5% | | 5% or more |
10% | | 4% or more |
15% | | 3% or more |
19% | | 1% or more |
A highly concentrated market is one in which the share of the four largest insurers is seventy-five percent or more of the market. Percentages not shown in the tables are interpolated proportionately to the percentages that are shown. If more than two insurers are involved, exceeding the total of the two columns in the table is prima facie evidence of violation of the competitive standard in (a) of this subsection. For the purpose of this subsection (4)(b)(i), the insurer with the largest share of the market is Insurer A.
(ii) There is a significant trend toward increased concentration when the aggregate market share of a grouping of the largest insurers in the market, from the two largest to the eight largest, has increased by seven percent or more of the market over a period of time extending from a base year five to ten years before the acquisition up to the time of the acquisition. An acquisition or merger covered under subsection (2) of this section involving two or more insurers competing in the same market is prima facie evidence of violation of the competitive standard in (a) of this subsection if:
(A) There is a significant trend toward increased concentration in the market;
(B) One of the insurers involved is one of the insurers in a grouping of such large insurers showing the requisite increase in the market share; and
(C) Another involved insurer's market is two percent or more.
(iii) For the purposes of this subsection (4)(b):
(A) "Insurer" includes any company or group of companies under common management, ownership, or control;
(B) "Market" means the relevant product and geographical markets. In determining the relevant product and geographical markets, the commissioner shall give due consideration to, among other things, the definitions or guidelines, if any, adopted by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners and to information, if any, submitted by parties to the acquisition. In the absence of sufficient information to the contrary, the relevant product market is assumed to be the direct written insurance premium for a line of business, such line being that used in the annual statement required to be filed by insurers doing business in this state, and the relevant geographical market is assumed to be this state;
(C) The burden of showing prima facie evidence of violation of the competitive standard rests upon the commissioner.
(iv) Even though an acquisition is not prima facie violative of the competitive standard under (b)(i) and (ii) of this subsection, the commissioner may establish the requisite anticompetitive effect based upon other substantial evidence. Even though an acquisition is prima facie violative of the competitive standard under (b)(i) and (ii) of this subsection, a party may establish the absence of the requisite anticompetitive effect based upon other substantial evidence. Relevant factors in making a determination under this subsection include, but are not limited to, the following: Market shares, volatility of ranking of market leaders, number of competitors, concentration, trend of concentration in the industry, and ease of entry and exit into the market.
(c) An order may not be entered under subsection (5)(a) of this section if:
(i) The acquisition will yield substantial economies of scale or economies in resource use that cannot be feasibly achieved in any other way, and the public benefits that would arise from the economies exceed the public benefits that would arise from not lessening competition; or
(ii) The acquisition will substantially increase the availability of insurance, and the public benefits of the increase exceed the public benefits that would arise from not lessening competition.
(5)(a)(i) If an acquisition violates the standards of this section, the commissioner may enter an order:
(A) Requiring an involved insurer to cease and desist from doing business in this state with respect to the line or lines of insurance involved in the violation; or
(B) Denying the application of an acquired or acquiring insurer for a license to do business in this state.
(ii) Such an order may not be entered unless:
(A) There is a hearing;
(B) Notice of the hearing is issued prior to the end of the waiting period and not less than fifteen days prior to the hearing; and
(C) The hearing is concluded and the order is issued no later than sixty days after the filing of the preacquisition notification with the commissioner.
(iii) Every order must be accompanied by a written decision of the commissioner setting forth findings of fact and conclusions of law.
(iv) An order pursuant to this subsection (5)(a) does not apply if the acquisition is not consummated.
(b) Any person who violates a cease and desist order of the commissioner under (a) of this subsection and while the order is in effect, may, after notice and hearing and upon order of the commissioner, be subject at the discretion of the commissioner to one or more of the following:
(i) A monetary fine of not more than ten thousand dollars for every day of violation; or
(ii) Suspension or revocation of the person's license; or
(iii) Both (b)(i) and (ii) of this subsection.
(c) Any insurer or other person who fails to make a filing required by this section, and who also fails to demonstrate a good faith effort to comply with the filing requirement, is subject to a civil penalty of not more than fifty thousand dollars.
(6) RCW
48.31B.045 (2) and (3) and
48.31B.055 do not apply to acquisitions covered under subsection (2) of this section.
NOTES:
Effective dates—2015 c 122: See note following RCW
48.31B.005.