Preproposal statement of inquiry was filed as WSR 05-14-166.
Title of Rule and Other Identifying Information: Voter verified paper audit trail -- Paper records for direct recording electronic devices.
Hearing Location(s): Conference Room, 520 Union Avenue S.E., Olympia, WA 98501, on October 26, 2005, at 9:00 a.m.
Date of Intended Adoption: November 15, 2005.
Submit Written Comments to: Paul Miller, P.O. Box 40232, Olympia, WA 98504-0232, e-mail firstname.lastname@example.org, fax (360) 664-6419 by October 25, 2005.
Assistance for Persons with Disabilities: Contact TTY (800) 422-8683.
Purpose of the Proposal and Its Anticipated Effects, Including Any Changes in Existing Rules: Direct recording electronic (DRE) devices must produce a paper record for each ballot prior to the casting of a ballot. The rules outline specific procedures for printing, maintaining, transferring, and auditing paper records. Additional rules are provided for recounts utilizing data from DREs and for a situation where a voter has left the direct recording electronic device without casting a ballot.
Reasons Supporting Proposal: Chapter 242, Laws of 2005 requires all DREs to produce paper records.
Statutory Authority for Adoption: RCW 29A.04.611.
Statute Being Implemented: Chapter 242, Laws of 2005.
Rule is not necessitated by federal law, federal or state court decision.
Name of Proponent: Office of Secretary of State, governmental.
Name of Agency Personnel Responsible for Drafting: Tami Neilson, Legislative Building, (360) 902-4182; Implementation and Enforcement: Paul Miller, 520 Union Avenue S.E., (360) 725-5783.
No small business economic impact statement has been prepared under chapter 19.85 RCW. Changes do not appear to have significant impact on small businesses.
A cost-benefit analysis is not required under RCW 34.05.328. Not applicable.
September 21, 2005
Secretary of State
WAC 434-253-023 Voter verified paper audit trail -- Duties prior to opening of the polls. If a direct recording electronic device is used at a poll site, before a device may be used by a voter, an inspector and at least one judge must verify:
(1) The paper printer is secured so that the paper record may not be removed from the device by anyone other than the election officer;
(2) Only a blank portion of the paper record is visible to the voter as he or she approaches the device; and
(3) The paper printer is sealed with a numbered seal to ensure the interior of the machine cannot be accessed.
[Statutory Authority: RCW 29.04.080, 29.04.210, 29.36.150 and 29.79.200. 97-21-045, recodified as § 434-253-080, filed 10/13/97, effective 11/13/97. Statutory Authority: 1990 c 59. 92-12-083, § 434-53-080, filed 6/2/92, effective 7/3/92.]
(1) If any seal or lock on a direct recording electronic device or paper printer has been broken or tampered with, it must be removed from service for the remainder of the election. A written report regarding the circumstances of the removal from service must be sent to the county canvassing board.
(2) Precinct election officers must replace any printed materials that were to remain in the poll booth if they have been defaced, removed, or destroyed.
(3) If a paper printer for a direct recording electronic device has malfunctioned or run out of paper, it must be handled pursuant to WAC 434-253-115.
[Statutory Authority: RCW 29.04.080, 29.04.210, 29.36.150 and 29.79.200. 98-03-033, § 434-253-110, filed 1/13/98, effective 2/13/98; 97-21-045, recodified as § 434-253-110, filed 10/13/97, effective 11/13/97. Statutory Authority: 1990 c 59. 92-12-083, § 434-53-110, filed 6/2/92, effective 7/3/92.]
(a) If the precinct election officer has confirmed that no ballots have been cast after the printer ran out of paper or malfunctioned, he or she must remove the direct recording electronic device from service, document the problem, and correct the problem. The device may be returned to service once the problem has been corrected.
(b) If the precinct election officer cannot confirm that no ballots were cast after the printer ran out of paper or malfunctioned, or if the problem cannot be corrected, the device must be removed from service for the remainder of the election. A written report regarding the circumstances of the removal from service must be sent to the county canvassing board.
(2) In any case where an electronic ballot has been cast without a corresponding paper record, the county may print the ballot image stored on the device for use as a paper record for that device.
(a) Placed in transfer containers; or
(b) Transferred in the paper printer if the paper printer is sealed so the paper record cannot be removed without breaking the seal.
(2) Paper records must be accompanied by a transmittal sheet which must include at a minimum:
(a) Name or other identifier of the polling place in which the digital recording electronic device was utilized;
(b) The seal number from the paper printer; and
(c) The serial number or other identifier of the digital recording electronic device if distinctly unique from the seal number on the paper record printer.
(3) The inspector and one judge from each political party must sign the transmittal sheet attesting to the number of paper record tapes included in the container and the seal number. If paper records are transferred in a container, the container must be locked. The seal must also be applied, if available.
WAC 434-262-105 Audit of results of votes cast on direct recording electronic device. (1) Whenever possible, audits required by RCW 29A.60.185 must use the same three races or issues, randomly selected by lot, for every direct recording electronic device subject to the audit. If there are not three countywide races or issues on the ballot, the county must select the maximum number of contests available but no more than three contests from each of the devices randomly selected for the audit.
(2) Written procedures to perform audits of direct recording electronic devices as outlined in RCW 29A.60.185 must be promulgated by the appropriate county auditor.
(a) The procedures must provide for a process of randomly selecting by lot the direct recording electronic devices that will be audited.
(b) The procedures for manually tabulating results must be conducted using a process that includes the following elements:
(i) A continuous paper record must be utilized in the audit; the paper record must not be cut into separate individual records; and
(ii) Paper records that indicate that a ballot has been canceled must be exempt from the audit;
(3) The county auditor must compare the paper records with the electronic records. The county auditor may take any necessary actions to investigate and resolve discrepancies.
(4) Prior to certification, and in time to resolve any discrepancies, the county auditor must alert the county canvassing board of discrepancies identified during the audit.
(a) A continuous paper record must be utilized in the audit; the paper record must not be cut into separate individual records; and
(b) Paper records that indicate that a ballot has been canceled must be exempt from the recount.
(2) The county auditor must compare the hand recount results with the original results. The county auditor may take any necessary actions to investigate and resolve discrepancies.